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Why China Should Unsign the

International Covenant on Civil

and Political Rights
MargaretK. Lewis*
ABSTRACT

In March 2019, the United Nations Human Rights Council

finalized its periodic review of China's human rights recordjust
as human rights in China were under intensified attack. As
during prior reviews, China was criticized for its human rights
practices. And, once again, China was urged to ratify the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which China signed over twenty years ago. It is time to reevaluate
this approach.
This Article argues that the international community should
change tack and instead call on China to remove its signature
from this foundational human rights treaty. While this would be

a brash and unusual strategy, it is sound as a matter of both law
and politics. The anticipatedupsides of confronting China about
its failure to meet even the minimal obligations as a signatory

outweigh the possible downsides of scaling back from the goal of
universal participation.

This Article recognizes that China's signing of the ICCPR
has provided a justification for domestic actors to promote
human rights protective reforms. The strength of this argument

has, however, faded in recent years. A better path is to pursue a
forthright approach whereby

the international community

rebukes the Chinese leadership's retrograde motion on civil and
political rights while supporting those within China who have
looked to the ICCPR for inspiration.

* Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. This article has benefited
greatly from the comments of Ira Belkin, Yu-jie Chen, Donald Clarke, Jerome Cohen, Ji
li, Thomas Kellogg, Benjamin Liebman, Sida Liu, and other participants at the Columbia
Law Workshop in Chinese Law, as well as from comments from Margaret deGuzman,
Andrea Worden, and the faculties at Academia Sinica's Institutum Iurisprudentiae and
National Chiao Tung University School of Law. Thank you also to Bennett Williams and
Lauren Russo for their excellent research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2019, the United Nations Human Rights Council
finalized its periodic review of China's human rights record just as
human rights in China were under intensified attack.1 The review
coincided with the twentieth anniversary of the People's Republic of
China's (PRC or China) signing of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), a foundational treaty that sets forth a
range of protections such as freedom of speech, assembly, and religion.

China not only has failed to ratify the ICCPR but is instead
increasingly undermining the rights it protects. 2 This Article argues
that the international community should respond by calling on China
to remove its signature.

1.
See Human Rights Council, China, UPR Report Consideration- 38th Meeting,
40th Regular Session Human Rights Council, UNITED NATIONS WEB TV (Mar. 15, 2019),
http://bit.ly/2Isfsnc [https://perma.cc/6UZX-RMRZ] (archived Oct. 27, 2019) [hereinafter
HRC Live Meeting].
2.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, http://bit.ly/2GnkI8b (last
visited Oct. 27, 2019) [https://perma.cc/2WTL-V2CX] (archived Oct. 27, 2019) (notating
China's signing date of Oct. 5, 1998) [hereinafter ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page].
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This is not a recommendation that is made lightly, but it is one
3
whose time has come. Prior to its first review before the council in
2009, China reported that the "relevant departments are carrying out
necessary legislative, judiciary and administrative reforms to create
4
the conditions for the early ratification of ICCPR." Prior to its second
5
review in 2013, China again reported that the "relevant organs[ ] of
the National government are continuing steadily to pursue
administrative and legislative reforms in preparation for ratifying the
Convention." 6 Prior to its third review last fall, China once again
reported that the "relevant departments of the Government are
steadily continuing to advance administrative and judicial reforms in
7
preparation for [ICCPR] ratification."
These repeated claims do not fit reality. Since its 2009 review,
China-in this Article being used as shorthand for the governing partystate structure 8 -has tightened suppression of civil and political
rights. For example, China imprisoned until death a Nobel laureate for
his peaceful expression of political views and for years arbitrarily
deprived his wife of freedom of movement, without any basis even .in
convicted and/or extrajudicially
Chinese law. 9 It criminally

READS,
GOOD
Hugo,
Victor
by
Quote
Cf.
3.
https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/381646-nothing-is-more-powerful-than-an-ideawhose-time-has (last visited June 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/38Y2-V9KX] (archived
June 20, 2019) ("Nothing is more powerful than an idea whose time has come.").
Although this Article is being published in 2020, I first made this argument in an October
2018 Washington Post op-ed. This Article is an outgrowth of that op-ed: it draws on and
expands the arguments therein. Margaret K. Lewis, ChinaMust Stop Making a Mockery
Out of the Rights Treaties It Signs, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2018), https://wapo.st/2ETjKD3
[https://perma.cc/C2ZU-RA2E] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
Human Rights Council, National report submitted in accordance with
4.
paragraph 15(a) of the annex to Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1: China, ¶ 11, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/4/CHN/1 (Feb. 2, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 National Report].
The vague phrase "relevant organs" or "relevant authorities" (youguan bumen
5.
S1) is commonly used by the PRC government, spurring an unintentionally
humorous explanation by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a "relevant organ" is
2019),
CHINA DIGITAL TIMES (May 9,
that is "not irrelevant."
one
https://chinadigitaltimes.net/ [https://perma.cc/YEW8-6N2D] (archived June 11, 2019).
It has also spurred an intentionally humorous parody account. The Relevant Organs
2019),
10,
Nov.
visited
(last
TWITTER
(@relevantorgans),
https://twitter.com/relevantorgans [https://perma.cc/RY4A-H995] (archived Oct. 26,
2019).
Human Rights Council, National report submitted in accordance with
6.
paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: China, T 7, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/17/CHN/1 (Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 National Report].
Human Rights Council, National report submitted in accordance with
7.
paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21: China, 1 14, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/31/CHN/1 (Nov. 6, 2018) [hereinafter 2018 National Report].
See generally Margaret K. Lewis, Seeking Truthful Names: The External
8.
Implications of China's Internal Ideology on Governance, in LAW AND THE PARTY IN XI
(forthcoming
2020),
ORGANISATION
AND
CHINA:
IDEOLOGY
JINPING'S
6
https://ssrn.com/abstract=32384 4 [https://perma.cc/Y79H-NY4W] (archived Oct. 26,
2019) (exploring interrelated nature of Party and state).
See Chinese Experts Worried About Liu Xia's Health, U.N. OFFICE HIGH
9.
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disappeared hundreds of lawyers and other rights defenders.10 And it
expanded the ability of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP or Party)
to deprive people of liberty without judicial process." The worsening
climate for civil and political rights is seen most starkly in the at least
one million Uighurs and members of other Muslim minority groups
who have been held in so-called reeducation camps. 2
A country's failure to fulfill its human rights commitments is not
surprising. 13 And perfection is far from required; for instance,
numerous countries are struggling to implement the right "to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal

established by law."1 4
Nor is it unusual to have a period between signing a treaty and
becoming a full party: 15 the United States took nearly fifteen years to
ratify the ICCPR 1 6 and has yet to ratify the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, despite signing it in 1977.17

COMM'R HUM. RTS. (July 4, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23322&LangID=E
[https://perma.cc/9VVU-W7JQ]
(archived June 20, 2019); UN Declares Detention of Imprisoned Nobel Peace Prize
Laureate and Wife Illegal; Calls for Immediate Release, FREEDOM Now (Aug. 1, 2011),
http://www.freedom-now.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Press-Release-and-OpinionsLiu-Xiaobo-Liu-Xia-8-1-ll.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMW7-4EJT] (archived June 20, 2019).
10.
See China: On "709" Anniversary, Legal Crackdown Continues, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (July 7, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/china-709-anniversarylegal-crackdown-continues [https://perma.cc/JXT6-YERV] (archived June 20, 2019).
11.
See Lucy Hornby, China detention law to roll back legal protections for
suspects, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/147eclca-0a38-11e88eb7-42f857ea9f09 [https://perma.cc/G84X-JC5F] (archived Nov. 11, 2019).
12.
See, e.g., Adrian Zenz, 'Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart
attitude':China'spoliticalre-educationcampaignin Xinjiang, 38 CENT. ASIAN SURV. 102
(2019) (detailing arrival at number of approximately one million); Lucas Niewenhuis, 1.5
Million Muslims Are In China's Camps - Scholar, SUPCHINA (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://supchina.com/2019/03/13/1-5-million-muslims-are-in-chinas-camps-scholar/
[https://perma.cc/K748-HDHX] (archived Oct. 26, 2019) (Zenz presenting updated
estimate of 1.5 million); see also Jessica Batke, Where Did the One Million Figure for
Detentions in Xinjiang's Camps Come From?, CHINAFILE (Jan. 8, 2019),
http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/features/where-did-one-million-figuredetentions-xinjiangs-camps-come [https://perma.cc/6E35-A92W] (archived June 20,
2019); Stephanie Nebehay, 1.5 million Muslims could be detained in China's Xinjiang,
REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2019), https://reut.rs/2GuOwmf [https://perma.cc/5GQG-HW8M]
(archived Oct. 26, 2019).
13.
See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,
111 YALE L.J. 1935, 2020 (2002).
14.
See The Right to a Fair Trial, FAIR TRIALS, https://www.fairtrials.org/rightfair-trial (last visited Oct. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/XJV4-MFUE] (archived Oct. 26,
2019) ("Despite the importance of fair trials being recognised by the international
community, this basic human right is being abused day-in-day-out in countries across
the globe."); ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supra note 2, at art. 14.
15.
See Barbara Oomen, Between Signing and Ratifying: PreratificationPolitics,
the Disability Convention, and the Dutch, 40 HUM. RTs. Q. 420, 429 (2018) (calculating
that, "[fjor countries that end up ratifying a [U.N. human rights] treaty, this process
[between signing and ratification] takes three years and ten months on average").
16.
See ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supra note 2.
17.
See id.

20201

WHY CHINA SHOULD UNSIGNICCPR

135

There is debate as to a state's obligations during this interim period
but, 18 at a minimum, it must refrain from acts that would defeat the
20
9
object and purpose of the treaty.1 This fundamental "good faith"

obligation in international law preserves the sanctity of treaties and
requires that states refrain from opportunistic or bad faith behaviors.

China's intolerance for civil and political rights guts the core
protections in the ICCPR: the trend is retrogression and repression,
not progression and protection. Yet, during the 2018 review, members
of the Human Rights Council once again urged China to ratify the
ICCPR. 2 1 This semidecadal wash-rinse-repeat exercise has proved
futile.
Encouraging China to retract its signature to a major human
rights treaty may seem counterproductive to the goals of improving
conditions within China and of fortifying human rights norms on the
international level. Nor is there a mechanism for other countries
actually to remove China from the list of signatories. At best, countries.
could create a joint statement expressing this position, akin to the June

2019 letter by twenty-two countries to the United Nations (UN) High
Commissioner for Human Rights urging China to stop the mass
detentions in Xinjiang. 22
And state practice with respect to "unsigning" is exceptionally
24
that it did not intend
thin. 23 The United States' 2002 announcement
25
to join the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court
stands as a rare example of a state voluntarily declaring its intention

See, e.g., David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, The Object and Purpose of a
18.
Treaty: Three Interpretive Methods, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 565, 594 (2010).
19.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 10, 18, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331; What is the difference between signing, ratificationand accession of
http://ask.un.org/faq/14594
2018),
26,
(Apr.
U.N.
treaties?, ASK
UN
[https://perma.cc/9TTH-YXWH] (archived Oct. 26, 2019) (explaining signing "creates an
obligation to refrain, in good faith, from acts that would defeat the object and the purpose
of the treaty").
See Oliver Dorr, Article 18: Obligation Not to Defeat the Object and Purpose
20.
of a Treaty Priorto its Entry Into Force, in VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES

¶ 4 (Oliver D6rr et al. eds., 2012) (describing the interim obligation as "basically an
obligation of good faith").
See Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal
21.
Periodic Review: China, ¶ 28.4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/60 (Dec. 26, 2018) [hereinafter 2018
China UPR Report]; Lewis, supra note 3.
See Nick Cumming-Bruce, China Rebuked by 22 Nations Over Xinjiang
22.
Repression, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/world/asia/
china-xinjiang-rights.html [https://perma.cc/Z9W3-3JZ7] (archived Aug. 5, 2019).
23.
See infra Part III.
Letter from John R. Bolton, Sec'y. of State for Arms Control & Int'l Sec., U.S.
24.
Dep't of State, to Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y Gen. (May 6, 2002), https://20012009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/9968.htm [https://perma.cc/2RX5-K8EC] (archived June
20, 2019).
See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, n.12, opened for
25.
signatureJuly 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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not to become a party despite having signed a treaty. 26 But China's
status in the zone of mere signatory to the ICCPR makes possible a
strategy that is essentially off the table after ratification; ICCPR
ratification makes it exceedingly difficult, and perhaps even
impossible, for a state to withdraw.27 Seizing the interim period as an
opportunity to press China to admit its growing distance from the
ICCPR's norms would send pointed messages to the PRC Party-state,
pro-human rights audiences within China, and the international
community.
First, a call for unsigning would tell the Chinese leadership that
the international community condemns the worsening conditions for
civil and political rights and highlight that China's signature is
illusory; whatever intentions the leadership had over the first twenty
years after signing, China's signature on the ICCPR today does not
appear to express a true intention to be bound by the norms therein. 28
Second, though China's signing of the ICCPR initially provided a
justification for domestic actors to promote human rights protective
reforms, the hope that the Chinese leadership is listening has also
become illusory. 29 Advocating unsigning would emphasize that China
is not a monolithic entity. The international community should rebuke
the PRC leadership's retrograde motion on human rights while
supporting those within China who have looked to the ICCPR for
inspiration.
Third, rebutting China's "no one-size-fits-all" 30 view of human
rights would be a self-affirmation by the international community of
its commitment to universal values. International law scholars have
long emphasized the importance of an inclusive approach to
international human rights treaties. 3 1 The deterioration of civil and

political rights inside China combined with the PRC leadership's
efforts to dilute human rights norms outside its borders gives reason,

however, to rethink this position. The PRC leadership's current assault
on civil and political rights means that international conceptions of

26.
See generally Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REv. 2061 (2003).
27. See infra note 272.
28.
Cf. State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China,
Seeking Happiness for People: 70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China,
XINHUANET
(Sept.
22,
2019),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201909/22/c_138412720.htm [https://perma.cc/CFR5-TBW7] (archived Oct. 26, 2019)
(government white paper stating that "China abides by the provisions of [international
human rights instruments that it has signed]" but not mentioning the ICCPR once in
the forty-one page report) [hereinafter Seeking Happinessfor People].
29.
See id.
30.
See Letter from Chinese Mission, to the U.N. Office at Geneva (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfaeng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/t1538785.sh
tml [https://perma.cc/8FAV-MXDQ] (archived June 20, 2019).
31.
See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human
Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171, 182 (2003) ("[O]ur principal policy contention is
that broad ratification of human rights treaties plays an important role in the process of
building national human rights cultures (and a transnational human rights culture).").

2020]

WHY CHINA SHOULD UNSIGNICCPR

1 37

these rights would be better served by China remaining outside the
ICCPR rather than enfeebling them via engagement in the ICCPR's
interpretive and monitoring mechanisms. There is no bar to China
resigning (and ratifying) the ICCPR at a future date should
circumstances pivot in a rights-protecting direction.

Part II examines China's three cycles of review before the UN
Human Rights Council-2009, 2013, 2018-and how these reviews

coincided with periods of cautious hope, increasing uncertainty, and
alarm, respectively, regarding China's approach towards human
rights. The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process is, as the name
32
This
indicates, a sweeping look at a country's human rights record.
Article's focus is on China's approach to civil and political rights largely
because these rights are particularly under siege as the most
threatening to the Party's lock on power.33
Part III introduces scholarship on the requirement that states
refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty
in the period between signing and ratification. There is no consensus
as to what this so-called interim obligation entails in practice, and
34
there is a dearth of real-world examples that might provide a guide.
Nonetheless, there is a general understanding among international,
law scholars that the requirements of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties and customary law demand some level of good-faith..
36
performance. 35 It is an interim obligation, not an interim aspiration.

Part IV builds on the preceding two parts to argue that, as a
matter of both law and politics, the international community should,

See Human Rights Council, Basic facts about the UPR, U.N. OFFIcE HIGH
32.
COMM'R HUM. RTS., https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPRUPagesBasicFacts.aspx
(last visited June 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/2SWF-C9LF] (archived June 20, 2019).
33. A focus on civil and political rights is not meant to diminish the importance
of other rights. China itself prefers to emphasize economic rights-as covered by the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 95-19, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. China prioritized these
rights in its 2018 National Report. See 2018 National Report, supra note 7, J¶ 7, 23
("This [road of developing human rights with Chinese characteristics] is a road that
takes development as the priority. . . . The incidence of poverty dropped from 10.2 per
cent at the end of 2012 to 3.1 per cent at the end of 2017."). There is debate, however,
over both how robustly China is implementing these rights today and also how much
credit the government can take for a reduction in the poverty rate since the 1970s. See
Rob Schmitz, Who's Lifting Chinese People Out of Poverty?, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 17,
2017), https://n.pr/2GwGRO [https://perma.cc/88UP-CQXJ] (archived Oct. 26, 2019)
(addressing claims that "Chinese people lift[ed] themselves out of poverty once Mao and
his horrific political campaigns expired") (emphasis added). A focus on civil and political
rights is also necessary to keep this Article manageable in its scope.
See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, How to Defeat a Treaty's Object and Purpose Pending
34.
Entry into Force: Toward Manifest Intent, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 283, 283 (2001)
("While the interim obligation has been recognized in various international legal
systems, it remains unclear how to determine whether the interim obligation is being
violated.").
See infra notes 197-200.
35.
See id.
36.
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call on China to unsign the ICCPR. As a matter of law, China has failed
in good faith to meet its interim obligation using a variety of measures
(Part IV.A). As a matter of politics (Part IV.B), a jarring rebuke would
directly confront China's efforts to undermine international human
rights norms.
Undermining is distinct from redefining. There is debate in
government and academic circles as to whether China is a "revisionist
power," which denotes a plan to change the meaning of international
norms. 37 The extent to which China is trying to construct an

international consensus around its preferred, specific definition of
human rights is a point of increasing attention.3 8 The claim here is
that, in the context of civil and political rights, China's actions
demonstrate at least a desire to sap these rights of their normative
force. Put visually, it is as if the PRC leadership is trying to turn these
international norms into the ancient vessels (ding) that are beautiful
to view and have an imposing presence yet are empty shells. 39 Once
the content has been drained from human rights norms, what is left
are phrases like "freedom of speech" that are visually pleasing and
appear at first glance to be legally weighty but, upon closer inspection,

are essentially hollow. Individual states are then left with the option,
but not the obligation, to fill these vessels with whatever content they

37.
See, e.g., Andrew Nathan, China's Rise and InternationalRegimes: Does
China Seek to Overthrow Global Norms?, in CHINA IN THE ERA OF XI JINPING: DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES 165 (Robert S. Ross et al. eds., 2016); Steve Chan,
Weixing Hu & Kai He, Discerning States' Revisionist and Status-Quo Orientations:
Comparing China and the US, 25 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 613 (2018); Suisheng Zhao, A
Revisionist Stakeholder: China and the Post-World War II World Order, 27 J. CONTEMP.
CHINA 643, 644 (2018) ("China is a revisionist stakeholder, dissatisfied not with the
principles but its status in the hierarch of the order."); Jennifer Lind, Asia's Other
RevisionistPower: Why U.S. Grand Strategy Unnerves China, FOREIGN AFF. MAG., Mar.Apr. 2017, at 74.
38.
For example, "China proposes the view that 'The rights to subsistence and
development are the primary, basic human rights."' ST. COUNCIL INFO. OFF., PROGRESS
IN HUMAN RIGHTS OVER THE 40 YEARS OF REFORM AND OPENING UP IN CHINA 43 (Dec.

2018), http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white-paper/2018/12/13/content28147643173
7638.htm [https://perma.cc/3RK4-JKEM] (archived Aug. 6, 2019). A discussion regarding
the extent to which China is attempting to change norms and/or is being changed by
international norms is not new. See generally ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF COMPLIANCE (Bert B. Lockwood, Jr. ed., 1999)

(addressing compliance, socialization, and effectiveness in the context of China's
interactions with the UN human rights regime).
39.
For a visual example of such an artifact, see Da Ke Ding (food vessel),
SHANGHAI
MUSEUM,
http://bit.ly/2KJuvea
(last
visited
Oct.
25,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/CN54-RHLR] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).

2020]

139

WHYCHINA SHOULD UNSIGNICCPR

ascribe to the enumerated rights: a "criticism-free" approach to human
41
rights. 40 For China, the vessels stand nearly empty.
This is not to say that China is intent in tearing down all
international institutions. The Chinese leadership has openly stated
its goal of becoming a more active player abroad, both through
42
multilateral organizations and bilateral ties. It further has expressed
a general vision of its desired world order, with much attention being
paid to the implications of the aim to "build a new type of international
relationship featuring mutual respect, fairness, justice and win-win
43
cooperation, to build a community with a shared future for mankind."

China is thus better understood as disruptive rather than flat-out
44
The level
destructive of the international order.
45
disruption varies based on the international regime.

and type

of

See Andrea Worden, The Human Rights Council Advisory Committee: A New
40.
Tool in China's Anti-Human Rights Strategy, SINOPSIS (Aug. 6, 2019),
https://sinopsis.cz/en/worden-human-rights-council-advisory-committee/
[https://perma.cc/GW33-DLBU] (archived Aug. 6, 2019). For an empty-vessel metaphor
in another context, see Donald Clarke, Jiang Shigong on Xi Jinping and Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics: An Empty Vessel, CHINA COLLECTION (May 28, 2018),
https://thechinacollection.org/jiang-shigong-xi-jinping-socialism-chinese-characteristicsempty-vessel/ [https://perma.cc/8QV6-Y5NT] (archived Aug. 17, 2019) (commenting that,
to Professor Jiang, Marxist ideology and communist theory in China today "are just
meaningless strings of letters or characters; they are empty vessels, to be filled with
whatever content happens to be China's current governance structure.").
41.
See id.
See Ann Kent, China's Participation in International Organisations, in
42.
POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 132 (Yongjin Zhang et al. eds.,
2014) ("China's growing participation in international organisations provides a source
and mark of its expanding power, and a measure of its increased global commitments
and responsibilities.").
2018 National Report, supra note 7, ¶ 10.
43.
Cf. Jessica Chen Weiss, A World Safe for Autocracy? China's Rise and the
44.
Future of Global Politics, FOREIGN AFF. MAG., July-Aug. 2019, at 92, 94 ("Beijing's
behavior suggests that China is a disgruntled and increasingly ambitious stakeholder in
[the U.S.-led international order], not an implacable enemy of it."); Ronald T.P. Alcala,
Eugene Gregory & Shane R. Reeves, Chinese Fazhi and the International Order: How
Chinese Legal Rhetoric Undermines Rule of Law, HARV. INT'L REV. (Jan. 4, 2019),
https://hir.harvard.edu/chinese-fazhi-and-the-international-order-how-chinese-legalrhetoric-undermines-rule-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/WPT2-KQSE] (archived Oct. 25,
2019) ("China may comply with certain international norms that conflict with its
national interest, not out of a respect for the rule of law, but rather as part of a pragmatic
cost-benefit analysis.").
See, e.g., Managing Global Disorder:Prospects for U.S.-China Cooperation,
45.
https://on.cfr.org/2UgobHZ
2018),
18,
(Apr.
REL.
FOREIGN
ON
COUNCIL
[https://perma.cc/QVZ2-CQMK] (archived Oct. 25, 2019) ("While China supports the
existing trade regime and international institutions .. .it has certainly not championed
the free flow of capital and information, two tenets of globalization."). For an analysis of
how China acted internationally in the late twentieth century, see ALASTAIR LAIN
JOHNSTON, SOCIAL STATES: CHINA IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 1980-2000 xiv
(Princeton Univ. Press 2008) (concluding "that there is considerable, if subtle, evidence
of the socialization of Chinese diplomats, strategists, and analysts in certain counterrealpolitik norms and practices as a result of participation in [international security]
institutions.").
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The argument here is tailored to the international legal regime 4 6
with respect to human rights, with a focus on civil and political rights.

Specifically, flaccid standards for international human rights support
China's preferred vision. 47 By weakening the international conception
of rights, China strengthens its stance that it should not be judged
against what it sees as biased human rights standards. 48 An approach
that is rooted in a sovereigntist, relativist view turns universal norms
into fluid, eye-of-the-beholder concepts. 4 9
Part V pulls back from the immediate proposal to raise the longerterm question of what China's engagement with the international
human rights regime means for the vitality of fundamental norms.5 0
This inquiry is all the more salient because China's growing
prominence in international human rights institutions is occurring as
the scholarly community is questioning whether, as Samuel Moyn
asserted in 2018, "The human rights measurement controversy of the
past decade has reached its limits." 51 Moyn advocates a shift in focus
to the choice "either to give up the ideals for which the human rights

movement has stood ...
52

or to seek some other framework and strategy

to advance them."
This author, for one, is not giving up on those ideals. Calling on
China to erase its signature from the ICCPR is a brash maneuver, at
least in the generally courteous world of UN review processes. 53 And

46.
See Nathan, supra note 37 (defining "regimes" in part as "the formal and
informal norms and institutions that regulate interactions at the supranational level").
47.
Yu-Jie Chen, China's Challenge to the InternationalHuman Rights Regime,
51 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1179, 1204 ("China has sponsored or objected to various
resolutions, demonstrating its intention not only to lessen the intensity of international
scrutiny but also to promote its preferred norms.").
48.
See China rejects politically biased human rights standards, claims: FM,
GLOBAL TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1126358.shtml
[https://perma.cc/P64R-5S25] (archived Aug. 18, 2019); see also Anlei Zuo, China's
Approaches to the Western-dominated InternationalLaw: A HistoricalPerspectivefrom
the Opium War to the South China Sea Arbitration Case, 6 BALT. J. INT'L L. 21, 55 (2018)
("The rise of China could be an opportunity to rectify these structural biases and
systematic violence in the current Western-dominated international law with a more
democratic and balanced approach.").
49.
The question to what extent human rights are fully universal as compared
with subject to variation across states is, of course, not new. See, e.g., Jack Donnelly,
Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTs. Q. 400, 419 (1984)
(positing that "we can justifiably insist on some form of weak cultural relativism; that
is, on a fundamental universality of basic human rights, tempered by a recognition of
the possible need for limited cultural variations").
50.
This next step in a more sustained strategy requires a broader look into how
"the international legal regime [can] encourage states to respect human rights." RYAN
GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOcIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH

INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 2013). This issue is preliminarily addressed
in Part V.
51.
Samuel Moyn, Beyond the Human Rights Measurement Controversy, 81 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 121, 121 (2018).
52.
Id. at 137.
53.
Cf. Elvira Dominguez-Redondo, The Universal Periodic Review of the UN
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China would, in all likelihood, flatly reject the proposal. Moreover,
urging unsigning is not a silver bullet that can solve the combined
challenges of deteriorating civil and political rights within China and
China's striving for dilution of those norms internationally. But even
if symbolic and only one component in a much-needed larger strategy,
pressing China to exclude itself from the ICCPR would underscore that
the rights therein matter. It would further help prompt a rethinking of
how other states should grapple with China's efforts to weaken the
vitality of the international human rights regime. More generally, this
China-specific inquiry has implications for broader debates about
whether more stringent criteria should be set for engagement with
human rights treaties. 54
It is expected that China, like other states, wants to influence the
55
international regimes in which it takes part. The communities that
believe in the universality of human rights have not coalesced around
56
China's growing heft on the
a plan to address this influence.
international scene coupled with its efforts to hollow out norms

57
requires these communities to move from enervation to innervation.

A challenge for those who believe that there is an essential sinew to
human rights is not only how to preserve that core fiber in a defensive
58
manner but also how to fortify-to "innervate" -rights such that they
remain imbued with meaning.

II. CHINA'S UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEWS
In the four decades since Deng Xiaoping ushered in the policy of
"reform and opening," 59 China has gone from largely eschewing
international organizations to becoming a key player in multilateral'

fora. The PRC obtained the "China" seat in the United Nations in 1972,

Human Rights Council: An Assessment of the First Session, 7 CHINA J. INTL L. 593 (2008)
(noting the "co-operative, non-confrontational approach envisaged from the outset of the
creation of [the UPR].").
See infra notes 499-501.
54.
Matthew D. Stephen, States, Norms, and Power: Emerging Powers and Global
55.
Order, 42 MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 888, 890-92 (2014) (book review).
See id.
56.
57.

Enervate,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

DIcTIONARY,

https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/enervate (last visited Oct. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/KN328UGW] (archived Oct. 25, 2019) (explaining connection between "enervate" and the Latin
word nervus, meaning "sinew or nerve").
58.

Innervate,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

DIcTIONARY,

https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/innervate (last visited Oct. 25, 2019) [https://perma.cc/YWK5LU7A] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
59. Bill Bishop, The big picture: China's reform and opening turns 40, AXIos (July
27, 2018), http://bit.ly/2ZgXd9H [https://perma.cc/9CCF-8VZ6] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
For Chinese names, this Article uses the standard convention of placing the surname
before given name(s) except for when the individual has demonstrated a preference
through his/her/their writing to place given name(s) first.
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ousting the Republic of China (Taiwan). 60 It was, nonetheless,
circumspect throughout the 1970s: "China either abstained or
refrained from casting any vote [in the.Security Council], by using
what it labeled the 'fifth voting style' . . . on 63 occasions (or 32.3% of
all votes) during this period [from 1971-1979]."61
This unobtrusive stance continued in the 1980s and even into the

1990s. Deng's stated approach towards foreign policy was one of "hide
your strength, bide your time, never take the lead. 6 2 While not taking
the lead, China did join important human rights treaties during the
Deng era: the Convention on the Elimination of All .Forms of
Discrimination against Women (1980),63 the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1981),6 and
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1988).65 China's engagement
with human rights treaties continued under Jiang Zemin, including
China's ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(1992)66 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (2001).67 China joined the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities under Hu Jintao in 2008.68

China signed the ICCPR in 1998 but neither Jiang nor Hu
shepherded the treaty through to ratification. 69 Nevertheless, over the
past two decades, China has expressed its intention to ratify the

60.
On October 29, 1971, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 2758,
transferring representation of the seat from the Republic of China to the PRC. For a
historical view leading up to this switch, see Myres S. McDougal & Richard M. Goodman,
Chinese Participationin the United Nations: The Legal Imperative of a Negotiated
Solution,

YALE

L.

SCH.

LEGAL

SCHOLARSHIP

REPOSITORY

(1966),

https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fsspapers/2604/
[https://perma.cc/EAZ3-LM4S]
(archived Aug. 18, 2019).
61.
Joel Wuthnow, Beyond the Veto: Chinese Diplomacy in the United Nations
Security Council, Ph.D. dissertation at Columbia University 28 (May 11, 2011)
(transcript available at https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916D8NC676K)
[https://perma.cc/YD86-3KRX] (archived June 20, 2019); see also Stewart Manley,
Gauging the Economic and Political Costs to China of Article 13(b) Referrals of Sudan
and Myanmar to the InternationalCriminal Court, 7 U. PA. E. ASIA L. REV. 333, 343-45
(2012) (providing an overview of China's voting history).
62.
See Tobin Harshaw, EmperorXi's China is Done Biding its Time, BELFER CTR.
(Mar. 3, 2018), https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/emperor-xis-china-done-bidingits-time [https://perma.cc/8YT5-5UED] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
63.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
64.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
65.
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
66.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
67.
ICESCR, supra note 33.
68.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515
U.N.T.S. 3.
69.
ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supra note 2.
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ICCPR. 70 China is not subject to review by the UN Human Rights

7
Committee because China is not a party to the ICCPR. 1 But it is

subject to the UPR process, which includes an evaluation of China's
72
performance with respect to civil and political rights.
As explained below, the Human Rights Council has addressed
China's failure to ratify the ICCPR at each of China's three reviews:

2009 (Part II.A), 2013 (Part II.B), and 2018 (Part II.C). These reviews
coincided with periods of cautious hope, increasing uncertainty, and
alarm, respectively, regarding China's approach towards human
rights. Looking ahead to the scheduled 2023 review (Part II.D), there
is little reason to think that China will ratify-let alone faithfully
implement-the ICCPR before that date. Rather, the more likely
scenario is that the dire human rights situation will persist and, come

2023, at least some members of the Human Rights Council will once
73
again call for ratification.

A. 2009 Review
The UPR was created shortly after the 2006 founding of the
Human Rights Council. 74 China's inaugural 2009 review coincided

with a period of cautious hope that there was at least modest space for
greater protection of civil and political rights, even if that space was
75
constrained by the precondition of one-party rule.

See, e.g., China Amends Laws for Ratification of ICCPR, CHINA DAILY (July
70.
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-07/14/content_12904570.htm
2011),
14,
[https://perma.cc/5HUW-MJAW] (archived June 20, 2019).
Cf. Human Rights Committee, Introduction: Monitoring Civil and Political
71.
Rights,

U.N.

OFFICE

HIGH

COMM'R

HUM.

RTs.,

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx (last visited Aug. 18,
2019) [https://perma.cc/8B7Q-RHH2] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
72. See Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review, U.N. OFFICE HIGH
CoMM'R HUM. RTS., https://www.ohchr.orglen/hrbodies/upr/pagesfUPRMain.aspx (last
visited Oct. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/97GJ-8BNM] (archived Oct. 26, 2019) (describing
the UPR as "a State-driven process, under the auspices of the Human Rights Council,
which provides the opportunity for each State to declare what actions they have taken
to improve the human rights situations in their countries and to fulfil their human rights
obligations.").
See infra Part II.D.
73.
See G.A. Res. 60/251 (Mar. 15, 2006) (establishing the Council); Welcome to
74.
RTS.,
OFFICE HIGH COMM'R HUM.
the Human Rights Council, U.N.
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx (last visited June
20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/H6BN-ZJ8L] (archived June 20, 2019).
See generally Ming Wan, Human Rights Lawmaking in China: Domestic
75.
Politics, International Law, and International Politics, 29 HUM. RTs. Q. 727 (2007)
(arguing that "[w]hile somewhat limited, China's adoption of rights laws affects how
domestic politics is played out and leads to the creation of a legal profession interested
in promotion of the rule of law"); Bjorn Ahl, Exploring Ways of Implementing
International Human Rights Treaties in China, 28 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 361 (2010)
(describing the establishment of the PRC government working group on the ratification
of the ICCPR in 2003 and the drafting by a group of legal experts of a human rights
protection law in 2008).
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China stated in its National Report, submitted in advance of its
first UPR, that it "respects the principle of the universality of human

rights[,]" 76 had enacted "nearly 250 laws relating to the protection of
human rights[,]" 7 7 and had joined "25 international human rights
instruments." 7 8 These stated advancements were counterbalanced by
the repression of signatories-including later Nobel Peace Prize
recipient Liu Xiaobo-to Charter 08, a manifesto calling for enhanced
human rights and the end to one-party rule. 79
While the council's report following the review included many
concerns regarding human rights in China, statements by council
members listed therein highlighted that aspects of China's claims had
merit. 80 For instance, in 2005 China allowed a visit by the UN Special
Rapporteur on Torture. 8 1 China criticized his strongly worded report, 82

but that he was even allowed into China was a breakthrough. 83 In
2007, the Supreme People's Court took back review of all death
sentences-a procedural move that, combined with emphasis on a
policy of "killing fewer and killing carefully," led to more constrained

76.
2009 National Report, supra note 4, ¶ 6.
77.
Id. ¶ 10.
78.
Id. ¶ 11.
79.
See
China's
Charter
08,
N.Y.
BOOKS
(Jan.
15,
2009),
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/01/15/chinas-charter-08/
[https://perma.cc/4KK3-8EDS] (archived June 12, 2019); see generally Feng Chongyi, The
Threat of Charter 08, in LIU XIAOBO, CHARTER 08 AND THE CHALLENGES OF POLITICAL
REFORM IN CHINA 119 (Jean-Phillippe B6ja et al. eds., 2012) (explaining why, despite the
text of Charter 08 being a "moderate proposal[,]" it presented "a serious threat to the
Chinese communist regime").
80.
See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Universal Periodic Review Report of the
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review, China, ¶ 65, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/25
(Mar. 3, 2009).
81.
See, e.g., Manfred Nowak (Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment), Civil andPoliticalRights, Including
the Question of Torture and Detention, Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or DegradingTreatment or Punishment, Manfred Novak, Mission
to China, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.6 (Mar. 10, 2006).
82.
See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, China Disputes UN Envoy on Widespread Use of
Torture, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/07/world/asia/
china-disputes-un-envoy-on-widespread-use-of-torture.html
[https://perma.cc/UZ7ZF54Z] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
83.
China has not allowed a repeat visit. A request is outstanding, along with
requests for visits by a number of other special rapporteurs overseeing various civil and
political rights, such as freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly and
association, independence of judges and lawyers, and disappearances. Tables for UN
Compilation on China, View Country visits of Special Proceduresof the Human Rights
Council

since

1998,

U.N.

OFFICE

HIGH

COMM'R

HUM.

RTs.,

https://spinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/5/SpecialProceduresInternet/ViewCountryVisits.
aspx?Lang-en (last visited June 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/HD97-94JM] (archived June
20, 2019); see generally Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth
Periodic Report of China, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CHN/CO/5 (Feb. 3, 2016) (reporting
developments with respect to compliance with the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment).
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84
In 2008, the entry into force of new
use of the death penalty.

regulations gave citizens the ability, albeit limited, to demand access
to information in the government's hands.8 5 These specific rules were
86
part of broader rhetoric recognizing the need to decrease opacity.
Specifically regarding the ICCPR, several UN bodies had already
"invited China to consider" ratifying the ICCPR, and the Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights noted that it had developed six
projects with China "to support preparation for the ratification of the
ICCPR." 8 7 Domestically, legal scholars felt secure enough to submit a
letter to the government in January 2008 calling for ratification of the
88
ICCPR before that summer's Olympic games in Beijing.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) used the UPR's
89
stakeholder submission procedures to recommend that China should
90
"fulfill its promise to ratify the ICCPR" and "ratify all signed human
91
Members of the council
rights treaties . . . in particular the ICCPR."
recommendations
accepted
China
Although
calls.
these
joined in
phrased using vague language (e.g., that China "create conditions for

an early ratification of the ICCPR" (Sweden, Algeria)), it rejected more
forceful recommendations, such as that it "ratify the ICCPR as quickly
as possible and with minimal reservations" (Australia); "release a clear

84.

See 2009 National Report, supranote 4, ¶ 44; see generally SUSAN TREVASKES,

THE DEATH PENALTY IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2012) (analyzing a shift in the 2000s

towards a decrease in use of the death penalty).
See 2009 National Report, supra note 4, ¶ 61.
85.
See Jamie P. Horsley, China Adopts First Nationwide Open Government
86.
9,
2007),
FREEDOM
INFO
(May
Information
Regulations,
http://www.freedominfo.org/2007/05/china-adopts-first-nationwide-open-governmentinformation-regulations [https://perma.cc/6VQK-AT9E] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
Human Rights Council, Compilation Prepared by the Office of the High
87.
Commissioner for Human Rights, in accordance with Paragraph15(B) of the Annex to
Human Rights Council Resolution 5/1, ¶T 1, 10, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/4/CHN/2 (Dec.
16, 2008).
Wendy Zeldin, China:Legal Scholars Callfor Ratification of ICCPR, LIBRARY
88.
OF CONGRESS (Feb. 2, 2008), https://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/china-legalscholars-call-for-ratification-of-iccpr/ [https://perma.ccY3BQ-V4B2] (archived June 20,
2019) (citing Nanfang Zhoumo, RC Law Experts Call for Ratification of International
Covenant on Rights, Jan. 10, 2008, Open Source Center No. CPP20080113530005); see
also International Seminar on International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
Criminal Legal System Reform (Dec. 5-6, 2009) (conference materials on file with
author) (conference jointly sponsored by the Institute of International Law, Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences; N.Y.U., U.S.-Asia Law Institute; and City University of
Hong Kong Law School).
The groups quoted in this Article represent only a small number of those that
89.
submitted comments during each review cycle. For other examples of comment
contributors, explore the documents referenced in Human Rights Council, Universal
Periodic Review - China - Reference Documents, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/6 (Dec. 26, 2018).
HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST SUBMISSION TO THE OFFICE OF
90.
THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 5 (Feb. 2, 2019), https:/Ibit.ly/2Fo5Shr

[https://perma.cr/8WEY-BM37] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, IMPLEMENTATION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN
91.
RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 6 (Sept..1, 2008), https://bit.ly/2Cv4pVV

[https://perma.cc/3QUL-26Y9] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
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timetable for work towards ICCPR ratification" (United Kingdom); and
"state a precise calendar for ratification and adoption of the necessary
measures for the ratification of the ICCPR" (France). 92
These nudges a decade after China first signed the ICCPR
recognized the need for significant groundwork prior to ratification
while reminding China that the international community was watchful
as to whether domestic momentum was slowing. 93 In contrast to future
UPRs, developments to that date gave reason to think that the next
review might bring reports of continuing incremental reforms towards
improving civil and political rights. 94

B. 2013 Review
The mood was more uncertain in 2013. Important changes had
occurred since China stated in its April 2009 Human Rights Action

Plan that it would "make domestic laws better linked with [the
ICCPR]" in preparation for ratification of the treaty. 95 Xi Jinping was
elevated to General Secretary of the party in 2012 and was further
named as head of state and of the military-the same trifecta of major
titles held by his two predecessors. 96 Much speculation accompanied

Xi's rise, with debates whether he might reveal hinrself to be a reformer
who had simply held his cards close to his chest during his political

92.
China: Responses to Recommendations, UPR INFO, 1, 5, 6 (2009),
https://bit.ly/2Ft8XyO [https://perma.cc/FTP9-S4Z2] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
93.
See generally supra notes 91-92 (citing reports that recognize points of
progress but maintain a skeptical wait-and-see attitude).
94.
For an example of cautious optimism that ratification would, eventually,
follow see Katie Lee, China and the InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights:
Prospectsand Challenges, 6 CHINA J. INT'L L. 445 (2007).
95.
National Human Rights Action Plan of China (2009-10), STATE COUNCIL
INFORMATION
OFFICE (Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.gov.cn/english/official/200904/13/content_1284128.htm [https://perma.cc/F5FZ-GAJE] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
China stated again in the 2012 plan that it "continued to carry out administrative and
judicial reforms and prepare the ground for approval of the [ICCPR]." NationalHuman
Rights Action Plan of China, Congressional-Executive Commission on China (20122015), ST. COUNCIL INFO. OFF. (June 11, 2012), https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legalprovisions/national-human-rights-action-plan-of-china-2012-2015
[https://perma.cc/DA3B-VTMH] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
96.
See Hu Jintao Fast Facts, CNN, https://cnn.it/2ZhMNg5 (last updated Dec.
21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3BG9-9DTD] (archived Oct. 25, 2019); Jiang Zemin Fast
Facts, CNN, https://cnn.it/2XmoLbF (last updated July 30, 2019). In his later years,
Deng Xiaoping held the most power in the central leadership despite not having that
power reflected in formal titles. See Daniel Southeri, For Deng, Titles Aren't Everything,
WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 1985), https://wapo.st/2TnciSI [https://perma.cc/V8MX-UKNR]
(archived Oct. 26, 2019).
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rise, 9 7 or, as others argued, that he would dash these hopes and instead
adhere to the party line. 98
In its 2013 National Report, China reiterated that it "respects the
principle of universality of human rights," though it qualified this
language with the view that countries have a duty to do so

"commensurate with their national conditions." 9 9 The report detailed
specific examples of improvements in human rights, such as the

10 0
introduction of an exclusionary rule aimed at coerced confessions,
1
01
(albeit ones for
abolition of the death penalty for thirteen offenses

which the death penalty was seldom applied) 10 2, and the addition of
the language "respect for and safeguarding of human rights" to the
Criminal Procedure Law.' 0 3 Within two months of China's second
UPR, China further ended the long-standing practice of "re-education
through labor" that allowed people to be locked up for as long as four
04
China's report
years under a purportedly administrative sanction.1

See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, Looking for a Jump-Start in China, N.Y. TIMES
97.
(Jan. 6, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/opinion/sunday/kristof-looking-fora-jump-start-in-china.html [https://perma.cc/S699-5KUS] (archived Aug. 18, 2019)
("Here is my prediction about China: The new paramount leader, Xi Jinping, will
spearhead a resurgence of economic reform, and probably some political easing as well.").
But see Jeffrey Wasserstrom, Is Xi Jinpinga Reformer? It's Much Too Early to Tell, ASIA
Soc'Y BLOG (Jan. 14, 2013), http://bit.ly/2PeRdcG [https://perma.cc/4GNP-H88Z]
(archived Oct. 27, 2019).
See, e.g., A Discussion with Geremie R. Barmd, CHINA FILE (Mar. 15, 2013),
98.
Oct. 25, 2019)
(archived
[https://perma.cc/Z24F-NUMD]
http://bit.ly/2vdMcry
(expressing skepticism of "happy narratives" of the potential for reform); Jane Perlez, Q.
and A.: Geremie R. Barmd on UnderstandingXi Jinping, SINOSPHERE (Nov. 8, 2015),
https://nyti.ms/2XmoZj1 [https://perma.cc/8A6R-N4GE] (archived Oct. 26, 2019) ("For
those used to thinking about China as being a country that "just wants to be like us," or
as one that fits neatly into the patterns of the Euro-American past, the Xi era is a
challenge."). For an analysis of Xi's rise, see John Garnaut, The Creation Myth of Xi
Jinping, FOREIGN POL'Y (Oct. 19, 2012), http://bit.ly/2DmowpD [https://perma.cc/TY97LB2E] (archived Oct. 25, 2019); see also Carl Minzner, What Direction for Legal Reform
under Xi Jinping, CHINA BRIEF (Jan. 4, 2013), https://jamestown.org/program/what(archived
[https://perma.cc/SN35-DRKD]
direction-for-legal-reform-under-xi-jinping/
Aug. 18, 2019) ("[P]rior experience suggests caution in evaluating the promise of legal
reform by new party leaders.").
2013 National Report, supra note 6, ¶ 4.
99.
100. See id. ¶ 53; see also Margaret K. Lewis, Controlling Abuse to Maintain
Control: The Exclusionary Rule in China, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 629 (2013).
101. 2009 National Report, supra note 4, ¶ 46; see also Margaret K. Lewis,
Leniency and Severity in China'sDeath Penalty Debate, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 303, 31415 (2011) (discussing these thirteen offenses).
INFO,
UPR
Submission,
UPR
Hua
Foundation,
2013
102. Dui
https://bit.ly/2HKaeSJ (last updated October 2013) [https://perma.cc/KBM8-YD92]
(archived Oct. 25, 2019) (noting that "most of the 13 crimes had rarely or never resulted
in execution"). See generally Tobias Smith & Su Jiang, Making Sense of Life Without
Parole in China, 21 PUNISHMENT & Soc'Y 70 (2019) (discussing history of reductions in
death-eligible crimes in lead up to 2015 introduction of possible lifelong imprisonment
for the crime of corruption).
103. See 2009 National Report, supra note 4, ¶ 47.
104. See Margaret K. Lewis & Jerome A. Cohen, How Taiwan's Constitutional
Court Reined in Police Power: Lessons for the People's Republic of China, 37 FORDHAM
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nodded towards this forthcoming change by noting that the
government was studying proposals related to ending re-education
through labor. 105
These points needed to be heard in conjunction with the
observations of NGOs. Human Rights Watch submitted that, while
China claimed that it made "human rights advances" through the
revised Criminal Procedure Law, the provisions on "residential
surveillance" had "legalized enforced disappearances" in contravention

of the ICCPR.1 06 Despite the end of re-education through labor, 107
Human Rights in China reported that "legal experts noted a
resurgence of informal, extra-legal political institutions that advanced
predatory and repressive government policies, including 'black jails'
and enforced disappearances used to target activists, petitioners and
dissidents."1 08 Evidentiary reforms were undercut by reports that the
conviction rate "was allegedly in excess of 99 percent" and "[e]ven when

there had been no confession, lawyers placed themselves in jeopardy of
criminal conviction under Article 306 [which criminalizes the
falsification of, or inducing the falsification of, evidence] simply by
pleading their clients 'not guilty."' 109 Amnesty International
summarized as follows:
While the Chinese authorities have made progress on some of the
recommendations made during its first [UPR] in 2009, they have failed to make
significant progress on others, and have taken regressive steps with regard to
110
some.

NGOs once again called on China to ratify the ICCPR with, for
example, Human Rights Watch reporting that China had failed to take
affirmative action towards ratification and that it should ratify
"without further delay." 11 1 Amnesty International noted that "[s]ome
legal changes made since the last review would bring China closer into

INT'L L.J. 863, 913-14 (2014).
105. See 2009 National Report, supra note 4, 1 48.
106.

HUMAN

RIGHTS

https://bit.ly/2HB487L

WATCH,

UPR

SUBMISSION

[https://perma.cc/7SM4-TL55]

CHINA

(archived

3 (Mar.
Oct. 25,

2013),
2019)

[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH].

107. See China abolishes reeducation through labor, CHINA DAILY (Dec. 28, 2013),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-12/28/content_17202294.htm
https://perma.ccIV9FJ-7A6N (archived June 20, 2019).
108. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Summary prepared by
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph
15(b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1 and paragraph 5 of the annex
to Council resolution 16/21, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/17/CHN/3 (July 30, 2013).
109. Id. ¶ 32.
110. China: Amnesty International Submission for the UN Universal Periodic
Review 17th Session of the UPR Working Group, October/November 2013, AMNESTY
INT'L 1 https://bit.ly/2CyvAz8 (last updated Mar. 2013) [https://perma.cc/BPG9-QPFC]
(archived Oct. 26, 2019) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L].
111. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 106, at 4.
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compliance with international
ratification of the ICCPR."112

law, thereby

facilitating

China's

Likewise, a number of members of the council raised ICCPR
ratification during the review.113 Unlike following the 2009 review,
China did not reject any recommendations in its formal response.
Nevertheless, it merely "noted" recommendations that it ratify the

ICCPR (Albania, Hungary, Chile, Spain); establish a clear timeframe
in order to ratify the ICCPR (Belgium); timely ratify the ICCPR
(Japan); and move towards ratification of the ICCPR in the near future
"accepted"
It
Korea).11 4
of
Republic
Portugal,
(Norway,
recommendations couched in more preparatory language, such as that
it "consider" ratifying the ICCPR (Cape Verde); "continue carrying out
administrative and judicial reforms to prepare for the ratification of
the ICCPR" (Egypt); and "continue its national reforms with an aim to

ratify the ICCPR" (Guatemala, Latvia, Botswana).11 5 The lack of
specificity regarding next steps underscored the growing uncertainty
regarding China's resolve to take even incremental steps towards

strengthening

rights

protection,

as well

as

whether

China's

involvement in the UPR was more form over substance.116

C. 2018 Review
By the 2018 UPR, any uncertainty about what Xi Jinping's
leadership would mean for human rights had turned to alarm. A
deterioration in the domestic situation was coupled with a shift in

rhetoric from the 2009 National Report's reassurance that China

7
"respects the principle of the universality of human rights"11 to the
2018 National Report's statement that "[t]here is no universal road for
the development of human rights in the world."118
In rejecting definitions "on the basis of a single authority[,]"119
China asserted that it was "[g]uided by Xi Jinping Thought on
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era" in "following

112. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 110.
113. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the
Universal Periodic Review, China (including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China), U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/25/5 (Dec. 4, 2013).
114. China:Responses to Recommendations & Voluntary Pledges, UPR INFO, 1-2
(2013), https://bit.ly/2YelzjK [https://perma.cc/4SGP-U6KL] (archived Oct. 27, 2019); see
also Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review, China, Addendum, Views on conclusions and/or recommendations, voluntary
commitments and replies presented by the State under review, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/25/5/Add.1 (Feb. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Rep. of the Working Group on UPR].
115. Rep. of the Working Group on UPR, supra note 114.
116. Cf. Rhona Smith, Form Over Substance? China's Contribution to Human
Rights through UniversalPeriodic Review, 17 AsIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 85, 115 (2014) ("China's
involvement is a classic case of 'much ado about nothing."').
117. 2009 National Report, supranote 4, 1 6.
118. 2018 National Report, supranote 7, ¶ 4.
119. Id.
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the road of developing human rights with Chinese characteristics." 12 0
The concept of "development" is central to this vision. In June 2017,
the Human Rights Council passed China's resolution on "the
contribution of development to the enjoyment of human rights." 12 1 At
the November 2018 council session, China stressed its "experience in
promoting human rights in the process of development and poverty
alleviation,
which
included
always
giving
top priority to
development. 122 For the seventieth anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in December 2018, Xi Jinping
emphasized that China "considers the rights to subsistence and
development as the primary and basic human rights, and works for

coordinated development of the people's economic, political, social,

cultural and environmental rights." 123
China's stance that "development is a primary human right"1 24
refutes the principle of the indivisibility of human rights by placing

economic development as a higher priority than civil and political
rights. 125 The 2016 report on implementation of China's national
human rights action plan failed to even mention the ICCPR, thus
accentuating the official diminishing of its importance. 126 China is not

120. Id.
121. Human Rights Council Res. 35/3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/35/L.33/Rev.1 (June 20,
2017),
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/d_res_dec/AHRC35_L.33Rev.doex
[https://perma.cc/5BCW-4HGU] (archived Aug. 6, 2019).
122. 2018 China UPR Report, supra note 21, ¶ 22 (reporting China's response
during interactive dialogue at the Council session).
123. Xi stresses human rights development in Chinese context, CHINA DAILY (Dec.
10,
2018),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/ 10/WS5c0e3158a310eff303290272.html
[https://perma.cc/XF8J-JSLV] (archived June 20, 2019).
124. China's Perspective on Human Rights Widely Understood, Recognized,
Supported: Diplomat, XINHUANET (Nov. 7, 2018), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/
2018-11/07/c_137590004.htm [https://perma.cc/LMF2-5R32] (archived June 20, 2019).
For more on implications of this approach, see Worden, supra note 40 (analyzing the
"PRC's effort to dramatically change the orientation of UN human rights mechanisms
and norms to reflect the CCP's view of state-led development as the paramount 'right' to
be implemented through state-to-state cooperation, with no meaningful room for
individual rights holders").
125. See Andrea Worden, The CCPat the UN: Redefining Development and Rights,
SINOPSIS
(Mar.
17,
2019),
https://sinopsis.cz/en/the-ccp-at-the-un-redefiningdevelopment-and-rights/ [https://perma.cc/8B75-WSAX]
(archived Oct. 27, 2019)
(arguing that "the PRC has aggressively promoted its view that the 'right to
development' transcends all other rights"); Chen, supra note 47, at 1194-95 (explaining
framing of a development-centered view as a "'China Proposal' . . . endorsing an
alternative path for developing countries"). For background, see Frequently Asked
Questions on the Right to Development, Fact Sheet No. 37 2, U.N. OFFICE HIGH COMM'R
HUM. RTS., https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FSheet37_RtD_EN.pdf (last
visited Aug. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cc/66B9-CQGX] (archived Aug. 6, 2019) ("[T]he right
to development" is "a human right on a par with all other human rights. It is neither an
all-encompassing 'super right,' nor a highly restricted 'mini right,' but rather an equal
right among the universal, inalienable, interrelated, interdependent and indivisible
human rights.").
126. See generally Assessment Report on the Implementation of the National
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the first authoritarian state to show a preference for economic and
social rights vis-a-vis civil and political rights. Similar leanings were
seen "in the context of the deepening cold war tensions between East
and West."1 27 But precedent does not mitigate the problematic nature
of this stance. China's framing rejects the essential interdependence of
economic, social, and cultural rights on the one hand and civil and
political rights on the other, "specifically, that these rights are
12 8
mutually reinforcing and equally important."
Concerns about China's rhetoric were amplified by alarm at the
reality on the ground. The disconnect between China's 2018 National
Report and the situation reported by nongovernmental entities was
stark. 129 For example, China self-reported that it "improved the relief
and accountability mechanisms for safeguarding lawyers' rights to
practice law."1 30 The "709 Crackdown"-so named for July 9, 2015,
when hundreds of lawyers and other rights activists disappeared31
contradicts this claim.1 Repression of lawyers who took on "sensitive"
32
but the scale and severity
cases was not new under Xi's leadership,1

had increased markedly.1 33
Similarly, the statement that "[n]etizens express their views via
Internet platforms"1 34 glossed over the blocking of entire websites as

Human Rights Action Plan of China (2012-15), STATE COUNCIL PEOPLE'S REP. CHINA
(June 15, 2016), https:/fbit.ly/2FrIEbd [https://perma.cc/8C4J-JYTK] (archived Oct. 26,
2019).
127. See Ann Kent, China and the InternationalMultilateral Human Rights
System, in HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA 61, 62 (Sarah Biddulph et al. eds.,

2019) (discussing 1991 PRC White Paper emphasizing "the right to subsistence" and
broader prioritization of "the right to development"); Key Concepts of ESCRs, U.N.
OFFICE HIGH CoMM'R HUM. RTS., http://bit.ly/2Pm7bSA (last visited Oct. 26, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/32J5-DDJ5] (archived Oct. 26, 2019) (describing how "the centrally
planned economies of the Eastern bloc highlighted the importance of economic, social
and cultural rights").
128. Helen Quane, A FurtherDimension to the Interdependence and Indivisibility
of Human Rights? Recent Developments Concerning Indigenous Peoples, 25 HARV. HUM.
RTs. J. 49, 50 (2012).
129. For NGO submissions, see Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Summary of Stakeholders'submissions on China: Report of the United Nations
High Commissionerfor Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/31/CHN/3 (Sept. 3, 2018)
and the Corrigendum issued on Nov. 5, 2018, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/31/CHN/3/Corr.1*.
130. 2018 National Report, supra note 7, ¶ 50.
131. See Hualing Fu, The July 9th (709) Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers:
Legal Advocacy in an Authoritarian State, 27 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 554 (2018); Nectar
Gan, Detained and disbarred: China's human rights lawyers, INKSTONE (July 9, 2018),
http://bit.ly/2IsUDrR [https://perma.cc/9AYL-4Y9S] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
132. See SIDA Liu & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE
POLITICS OF LAWYERS AT WORK 91 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2016).

133. See 2014 Congressional-Executive Commission on China: Annual Report,
113th Cong. 157 ("[A]uthorities intensified the degree of harassment and abuse of both
human rights lawyers and defenders .... "); 2015 Congressional-ExecutiveCommission
on China: Annual Report, 114th Cong. 270-71 (including a brief section reporting on the
"Harassment and Abuse of Human Rights and Public Interest Lawyers").
134. 2018 National Report, supra note 7, 1 54.
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well as the erasing from permitted platforms of comments that contain
even veiled criticism of the party-state. 135 The incessant cat-andmouse game between censors and citizens has generated creative
attempts at evasion with, for instance, China's #MeToo movement
adopting the term "rice bunny" because of those words' pronunciation
in Mandarin-"mi tu."136 Likewise, claims that China "protect[s] the
lawful rights of news media"1 37 paint a far different picture from
reports by foreign correspondents and domestic journalists of the

heightened repression they face. 138 And official praise for cooperation
between domestic civil society organizations and international
counterparts was undermined by the 2016 passage of the Law on the
Management
of Overseas
NGOs'
Domestic
Activities
that
"significantly tighten[s] restrictions on funding and authorize[s]
punishment of the leaders of such groups that seek or receive
funding."1 39
China's statement that, in the name of counterterrorism, "the
public security organs have cracked down hard on terrorist
organizations and individuals" is accurate in so far as the police
presence in Xinjiang has reached unprecedented levels.14 0 What the
report omitted was that these measures include the arbitrary

135. See
Freedom on
the
Net
2018:
China,
FREEDOM
HOUSE,
http://bit.ly/2DoDMCu (last visited Oct. 27, 2019) [https://perma.c/A3RX-NPBU]
(archived Oct. 25, 2019) (page includes drop-down box with links to prior years' reports).
136. Meg Jing Zeng, From #MeToo to #RiceBunny: how social media users are
campaigning in China, CONVERSATION
(Feb. 5, 2018), http://bit.ly/2ZcFEr4
[https://perma.cc/S5EB-8YE7] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
137. 2018 National Report, supra note 7, ¶ 55.
138. See, e.g., FCCC Working ConditionsReport 2018, FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS'
CLUB CHINA (Jan. 29, 2019), http://it.ly/2ZieLCa [https://perma.cc/8MWY-U4N5]
(archived Oct. 25, 2019); Javier C. Hernandez, 'We're Almost Extinct': China's
Investigative Journalists Are Silenced Under Xi, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/world/asia/china-journalists-crackdown.html
[https://perma.cc/3R63-62ZG] (archived Aug. 5, 2019); Ian Johnson, 'It's Hopeless But
You Persist': An Interview with Jiang Xue, N.Y. BOOKS (Feb. 19, 2019),
http://bit.ly/2WOXLOA [https://perma.ccW2LR-24MB] (archived Oct. 26, 2019); Jane
Perlez, For China's Leading Investigative Reporter, Enough is Enough, N.Y. TIMEs (June
7,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/07/world/asia/china-journalist-huwanyong.html [https://perma.cc/2YXZ-K9P8] (archived Aug. 17, 2019).
139. Angeli Datt & Alex Beck, Assessing Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and
Association in Contemporary China, in HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra

note 127, at 397, 411. For the official PRC view, see 2018 National Report, supra note 7,
¶ 78 ("Civil society organizations in the human rights field ... have actively carried out
exchanges and cooperation on human rights .... ").
140. 2018 National Report, supra note 7, ¶ 39. There have been concerns about
government surveillance in Xinjiang for years, but both the scale of surveillance and
deprivations of liberty have escalated dramatically. Compare Michael Wines, In Restive
Chinese Area, CamerasKeep Watch, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2010), https://nyti.ms/2VRgXOQ
[https://perma.cc/9VDM-C8X6] (archived Oct. 27, 2019), with Paul Mozur, Being Tracked
While Reporting in China, Where 'There Are no Whys', N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019),
https://nyti.ms/2GJ3v9 [https://perma.cc/8AXY-93QJ] (archived Oct. 26, 2019) ("It took
four days in Kashgar, China, for the secret police to get access to my dreams.").
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deprivation of liberty of over a million Uighurs and members of other
Muslim minority groups. 14 1
NGOs again weighed in on the ICCPR with Amnesty
International not calling directly for ratification but instead

emphasizing the lack of progress towards this aim: "Two decades after
becoming a signatory to the ICCPR and despite accepting
recommendations in this regard, China has shown no significant

progress towards its ratification."1 4 2 Other groups-including PEN
44
and Front Line
International,14 3 Reporters Without Borders,1
45
-reiterated that China should ratify the ICCPR. Human
DefendersRights in China selected more precise language: "Urge China, within
the explicit focus of the Third UPR on implementation, to commit to a
specific timeframe for the ratification of the ICCPR, but not beyond the
time period of the [National Human Rights Action Plan] (2016-

2020)."146
Notably, the voices of domestic NGOs have been muted, with "the
High Commissioner for Human Rights express[ing] his dismay at the

continuing efforts made by China to prevent independent members of
47
Ina
civil society from engaging with human rights mechanisms."1
2017 report, Human Rights Watch detailed how "Chinese officials have
photographed and filmed activists on UN premises in violation of UN
rules, and restricted travel by mainland activists to the UN Human
48
Rights Council in Geneva."1

141. See James Millward, Reeducating'Xinjiang's Muslims, N.Y. BOOKS (Feb. 7,
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2019/02/07/reeducating-xinjiangs-muslims/
2019),
(archived Aug. 18, 2019); supra note 12 and
[https://perma.cc/QY4M-2A22]
accompanying text.
142. China: Human Rights Violations in the Name of "National Security",
AMNESTY INT'L 5 (Mar. 2018), http://bit.ly/2VeKMvA_(last visited Oct. 25, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/NPE6-PHMU] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
143. See Joint Submission for the UPR of the People'sRepublic of China, PEN INT'L
(Mar. 2018), https://pen-international.org/app/uploads/Joint-Submission-for-the-UPRof-ChinaFinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PDP-A9DW] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
144. In submission to UN panel, RSF urges China to free detained journalists,
REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS (Mar. 29 2018), https://rsf.org/en/news/submission-un-

[https://perma.cc/LYP4-FHUA]
panel-rsf-urges-china-free-detained-journalists
(archived June 20, 2019).
145. UPR Submission - China 2018, FRONT LINE DEFENDERS 6 (Mar. 29, 2018),
2
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/en/statement-report/upr-submission-china- 018
[https://perma.cc/U3VW-PJ7L) (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
146. StakeholderSubmission by Human Rights in China, HUM. RTS. CHINA 7 (Mar.
2
2018), https://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/hricchina upr_ 018_submission.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LH7A-W3HK] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
147. U.N. Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review, "Compilation on China: Report of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights," ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/WG.6/31/CHN/2 (Aug. 27,
2018).
148. UN: China Blocks Activists, Harasses Experts, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 5,
2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/05/un-china-blocks-activists-harasses-experts
[https://perma.cc/HDQ6-K994] (archived June 20, 2019); see also Justin Worland, U.N.
Panel Claims China Tried to Silence Women's Rights Activists, TIME (Nov. 7, 2014),
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Also telling were shifts in the stakeholders that submitted reports;
Beijing Aizhixing Institute's 2013 submission documented a number of
instances of discrimination and other mistreatment of people with

HIV/AIDS, such as restrictions on people with HIV/AIDS from coming
to Beijing during large, important government meetings. 149 Beijing
Aizhixing did not make a submission in 2018,150 and its founder was
living outside of China as a fellow at the National Endowment for

Democracy. 15 1
Moreover, for those organizations that provide submissions as
part of the UPR process, their names do not necessarily capture the
nature of their organizations. "China Foundation for Human Rights

Development," for example, is a "GONGO"-a government-organized
NGO that is part of the state's fabric, not an independent watchdog. 152
Its 2013 submission recognized that much work was left to be done to
improve human rights education but largely listed the "breakthroughs"
since 2009.153
Despite commenting in its 2018 National Report that China
continued to prepare for ICCPR ratification, 154 China made no mention
of this aim in the "Future goals" section. 15 5 In February 2019, China
rejected sixty-two of the 346 recommendations lodged at the UPR
"mainly because they are inconsistent with China's national
conditions, contradictory with Chinese laws, politically biased or
untruthful."1 56 Among the rejected recommendations was that China

https://time.com/3572796/united-nations-china-activists/ [https://perma.cc/2FSE-T66P]
(archived Aug. 18, 2019) (reporting the UN committee's request "that China 'take steps
to ensure that in the future no travel restrictions are placed on individuals/human rights
defenders[']").
149. Beijing Aizhixing Institute, Individual UPR Submission-China-October2013:
Report on Security Monitoringand Controlling of People with HIV/AIDS in China (Oct.
2013),
https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/china/session_17_[https://perma.cc/NHE8-CHNX]
_october_2013/aizhixingupr17_chn_e_main.pdf
(archived June 20, 2019).
150. Human Rights Council, Contributions for the Summary of Stakeholder's
information,

U.N.

OFFICE

HIGH

COMM'R

HUM.

RTS.,

https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages[UPRCNStakeholdersInfoS3l.aspx
(last visited Oct. 26, 2019) [https://perma.cc/ED7E-C2WN] (archived June 20, 2019) (list
of stakeholders does not include the organization).
151.

See Fellows: Mr.

Yanhai

Wan,

NAT'L

ENDOWMENT

FOR DEMOCRACY,

https://www.ned.org/fellows/mr-yanhai-wan/
(last
visited
Nov.
11,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/9Y3V-L2NX] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
152. Yuting Su, The 2018 Forum on Human Rights concludes in Beijing, CGTN
(Sept. 22, 2018), http://bit.ly/2UJAqof [https://perma.cc/9TQA-ZDHT] (archived Oct. 26,
2019); cf. HRC Live Meeting, supra note 1, at 49 min. (statement by John Fisher of
Human Rights Watch, describing GONGOs as "government cheerleaders").
153. See generally Human Rights Education in China, CHINA FOUND. HUM. RTS.
DEV., https://bit.ly/2WixAD5 (last updated Oct. 2013) [https://perma.cc/NY67-GB3V]
(archived Oct. 26, 2019).
154. 2018 National Report, supra note 7, ¶ 14.
155. See generally id. 11 85-89.
156. Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review, China, Addendum, Views on conclusions and/or recommendations,
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ratify

the

ICCPR,

with

China

responding:

"China

is

making

preparations for ratification, but the specific date of ratification
15 7
depends on whether relevant conditions in China are in place."
On March 15, 2019, the Human Rights Council completed China's
third UPR process. 158 The tone had shifted from the first UPR cycle in

2009 when there were indications that China was leaning towards
engaging with-even if not openly embracing-universal conceptions
of human rights.1 59 By the time the third UPR process concluded,
China had moved to refuting universal standards as the yardstick by

which its practices should be judged.1 60 At the closing session, the PRC
representative noted his gratitude for countries that "expressed
16
respect for China's path and model." 1 He further affirmed that
"China resolutely opposes the use of human rights as an excuse to
interfere in China's internal affairs and undermine China's
62
sovereignty and territorial integrity."1

D. 2023 Review
China's fourth UPR is scheduled for November 2023. Xi Jinping
was initially slated to hand over the reins of power to a successor in
2022.163 His attainment of a constitutional amendment abolishing
presidential term limits opened the door for him to retain this title
emphasizing Xi's core
indefinitely.1 64 Intensified propaganda
the duration of his
extend
to
an
intention
expresses
role
leadership

voluntary commitments and replies presented by the State under review, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/40/6/Add.1 (Feb. 15, 2019).
157. Id. at rec. 28.5.
158. See generally 2018 China UPR Report, supra note 21; HRC Live Meeting,
supra note 1 (recording of the closing session).
159. See 2009 National Report, supra note 4, ¶¶ 6-8.
160. See, e.g., HRC Live Meeting, supra note 1, at 45 min. (statement by Helsinki
Foundation for Human Rights that China's engagement during its third UPR
demonstrated how it "questions the universality and indivisibility of human rights
principles").
161. Id. at 52 min. (H.E. Mr. Le Yucheng, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the People's Republic of China (Final Remarks)).
162. Spotlight: China completes 3rd Universal Periodic Review at UN Human
Rights Council, XINHUANET (Mar. 16, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201903/16/c_137899908.htm [https://perma.cc/2QHL-9J3T] (archived June 20, 2019) (quoting
Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng).
163. See Chris Buckley, Xi Jinping, Seeking to Extend Power, May Bend
https://nyti.ms/2KJybNO
2017),
(Mar. 2,
TIMES
N.Y.
Retirement Rules,
[https://perma.cc/SRD8-KU33] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
164. See Jerome A. Cohen, Xi Jinping Amends China's Constitution, LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/xi-jinping-amends-chinas2018),
7,
(Mar.
BLOG
constitution [https://perma.cc/P5RH-BE8Z] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
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power. 165 These developments cast a pall over any hopes for a
turnaround in the domestic atmosphere for human rights.1 66
2022 also marks the one-hundredth anniversary of the founding
of the CCP,1 6 7 a momentous occasion the run-up to which is expected
to be marked by tight repression. Sensitive anniversaries-and
important
meetings-regularly
prompt periods
of heightened
control.1 6 8 The PRC Party-state tends to clamp down with greater
intensity when those anniversaries are of a significant number of
years.169 The thirtieth anniversary of the June 4, 1989, massacre, for
example, saw the detention of activists and a near media blackout. 170
2022 is further notable because China will host the winter
Olympics.1 7 1 The International Olympic Committee website includes
articles like "Beijing 2022 Shows Positive Impact of Games Vision."1 72
In contrast, the surveillance state and widespread repression that
accompanied the 2008 Olympics portend that Beijing 2022 will have a

negative

impact

on

human

rights.1 73

Accordingly,

absent an

165. See John Garnaut, Engineers of the Soul: Ideology in Xi Jinping's China,
SINOCISM (Jan. 16, 2019), https://sinocism.com/p/engineers-of-the-soul-ideology-in
[https://perma.cc/3GZG-NRQ7] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
166. See generally Susan L. Shirk, China in Xi's "New Era": The Return to
Personalistic
Rule,
29
J.
DEMOCRACY
1,
21
(Apr.
2008),
https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/china-in-xis-new-era-the-return-topersonalistic-rule/ [https://perma.cc/E4DE-XFU2] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
167. Eleanor Albert & Beina Xu, The Chinese Communist Party, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinese-communistparty [https://perma.cc/P2EQ-TCLZ] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
168. For an analysis of tightened periods of repression, including activists being
"touristed" (i.e., sent on trips with government minders), see Sinica Podcast:Live with
Zha Jianying, On China's Troublemakers, SUP CHINA (Feb. 21, 2019),
https://supchina.com/2019/02/21/sinica-podcast-live-with-zha-jianying/
[https://perma.cc/7QUN-CTWD] (archived Aug. 17, 2019).
169. Cf. Neil Thomas, The Politics of History: Why Anniversaries Matter in China,
MACRO POLO (June 18, 2019), https://macropolo.org/china-2019-political-anniversary/
[https://perma.cc/9QH6-A7QG] (archived Aug. 6, 2019) ("Anniversaries are important
primarily because the CCP, lacking the popular mandate conferred by elections, has
made its role in China's history a cornerstone of its political legitimacy.").
170. Tom Embury-Dennis, Tiananmen Square: Dozens of activists detained or
threatened in 'wave of persecution'ahead of 30th anniversary, INDEPENDENT (May 31,
2019), https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/tiananmen-square-anniversaryprotests-china-beijing-une-4-xi-jinping-a8937756.html
[https://perma.cc/H9WX-4C3Q]
(archived Oct. 25, 2019).
171. See generally Beijing 2022, OLYMPIC, https://www.olympic.org/beijing-2022
(last visited Oct. 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/BK97-YGFR] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
172. Beijing 2022 Shows Positive Impact of Games Vision, OLYMPIC (July 19,
2019),
https://www.olympic.org/news/beijing-2022-shows-positive-impact-of-gamesvision [https://perma.cc/9JLN-FDY5] (archived Aug. 6, 2019).
173. See, e.g., Ying Yu et al., Governing Security at the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 26
INT'L J. HIST. SPORT 10-11 (2009) (linking "Beijing's security approach" to "the
repression of unwanted 'elements' considered to threaten Beijing's harmonious urban
environment and to endanger the games' smooth running."); Paul Mozur et al., Made in
China, Exported to the World: The Surveillance State, N.Y. TIMEs (Apr. 24, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/technology/ecuador-surveillance-cameras-policegovernment.html [https://perma.cc/E4ZJ-CXA3] (archived Aug. 6, 2019) (tracing origins
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unexpected shock to China's governing system, the chances that China
will ratify the ICCPR prior to its next UPR-let alone faithfully
implement it-are slim. It is time to ask what, if anything, would be
accomplished at the next UPR by once again advising China to work
towards ratification, especially if the deterioration of internal human
rights conditions continues apace. It is further time to ask if there is a
better approach as a matter of law and politics. The law question
necessitates stepping back to address what is required of a state
between the signing and ratification of a treaty (Part III). Then the
inquiry turns to whether China has met those legal requirements and,
if China has not, what should the international community do about it

(Part IV).

III. THE INTERIM OBLIGATION

That a state signs a treaty but fails to ratify it promptly is not
unusual.1 74 A variety of political and legal considerations can slow the
process. The United States is infamous for its reluctance to join
multilateral treaties; even with the executive branch's endorsement,
attaining the two-thirds vote in the Senate that must precede
5
ratification is a formidable task.17 It took nearly fifteen years to ratify

the ICCPR,1 76 and the United States has signed but not ratified the
Convention on the Rights of the Child177 and the International
78
An example
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.1
on
the Law of
Convention
UN
is
the
realm
rights
human
the
outside

of a security system to 2008 Olympics); China: Hosting Olympics a Catalyst for Human
2008),
22,
(Aug.
WATCH
RTS.
HUM.
Abuses,
Rights
https://www.hrw.org/news/2008/08/22/china-hosting-olympics-catalyst-human-rightsabuses [https://perma.cc/Z4RX-P5KK] (archived Aug. 6, 2019).
174. The Republic of China (Taiwan) is an unusual example of a signatory that is
unable to deposit ratification papers because of its international status. See Yu-Jie Chen,
Localizing Human Rights Treaty Monitoring: Case Study of Taiwan as a Non-UN
Member State, 35 WIS. INT'L L.J. 277, 290 (2018).
175. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (explaining the process for treaty ratification);
Treaties Pending in the Senate, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (July 17, 2019),
https://www.state.gov/s/i/treaty/pending/ [https://perma.cc/6WUK-6GF9] (archived Oct.
25, 2019) (showing the number of treaties pending in the Senate).
176. See ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supra note 2 (showing date of US
ratification of ICCPR).
177. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 66. For contending views
on whether the United States' previous use of the death penalty for offenses committed
when the offender was under eighteen violated the object and purpose of the convention,
compare Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and InternationalLaw, 52 DUKE
L.J. 485, 512-13 (2002), with Panel Discussion, Human Rights and Human Wrongs: Is
the United States Death Penalty System Inconsistent with InternationalHuman Rights
Law?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2793, 2812 (1999) (comments of William Schabas).
178. ICESCR, supra note 33.
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the Sea, which, despite substantial support on both sides of the
political aisle,17 9 has yet to obtain Senate approval.1 80
That a signature does not fully bind a state is understandable in
an age where governments often separate powers such that the

legislative branch must also give its approval.181 Outside the specific
American context, Barbara Oomen explains as follows:
The period of ratification is the time in which the treaty is introduced into the
domestic arena and in which (successive) governments and political parties take
a position on different treaty provisions. In addition, parliaments have their say
on how they would like to see a treaty implemented and substantial lobbying
82
pertaining to a treaty takes place.1

This explanation applies with less force to China where, although
there is a national legislature, it does not act as a serious check on
executive power.1 83 The structure is better understood as a separation
of functions, with the entire government operating under the CCP's
direction. 184 Just as the constitutional amendment abolishing
presidential term limits passed by a margin of "2,958 votes in favor,
two against, three abstentions and one invalid vote[,]"1 85 the National
People's Congress (NPC) Standing Committee1 86 would no doubt

179. See Dave Majumdar, Why the United States Needs to Join UNCLOS, NAT'L
INTEREST BLOG (July 12, 2016), https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-theunited-states-needs-join-unclos-16948 [https://perma.cc/77NJ-U7LP] (archived June 20,
2019) (discussing bipartisan resolution H.Res.631 (2016)). But see Theodore R. Bromund,
James Jay Carafano & Brett D. Schaefer, 7 Reasons U.S. Should Not Ratify UN
Convention on the Law of the Sea, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 4, 2018),
https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/commentary/7-reasons-us-should-not-ratify-unconvention-the-law-the-sea [https://perma.cc/9GE3-5UFM (archived June 20, 2019)
(arguing that ratification would bring no new benefits to the United States and would
create burdens and risks).
180. Treaties Pending in the Senate, supra note 175.
181. Jonas & Saunders, supra note 18, at 594-96.
182. Oomen, supra note 15.
183. See generally NPC OBSERVER BLOG, https://npcobserver.com/ (last accessed
Nov. 10, 2019) [https://perma.cc/B6D9-GQ9K] (archived Oct. 25, 2019) (discussing the
PRC's National People's Congress and its operation).
184. See, e.g., Susan Trevaskes, A Law Unto Itself Chinese Communist Party
Leadership and Yifa zhiguo in the Xi Era, 44 MOD. CHINA 347 (2018); Christopher K.
Johnson & Scott Kennedy, China's Un-Separationof Powers, FOREIGN AFF. MAG. (July
24,
2015),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-07-24/chinas-unseparation-powers [https://perma.cc/2M9J-C9LE] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
185. Chris Buckley & Steven Lee Meyers, China's Legislature Blesses Xi's
Indefinite Rule. It Was 2,958 to 2, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2v9mynR
[https://perma.cc/8W2F-NNQH] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
186. Cf. Hanqin Xue & Qian Jin, InternationalTreaties in the Chinese Domestic
Legal System, 8 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 299, 302 (2009) (noting that ICCPR ratification
"would require a decision on the part of the Standing Committee of the NPC"); Law of
the People's Republic of China on the Procedure of the Conclusion of Treaties, art.
3, https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/f6c2a7/pdf/
(last
visited
Jan.
30,
2020)
[https://perma.cc/N9EZ-4UDD] (archived Oct. 25, 2019) ("The Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress . . . decides on the ratification and abrogation of treaties
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promptly approve the ICCPR if directed to do so by the central Party
leadership. As described by Bj6rn Ahl:
When the NPC Standing Committee approves a treaty, internal decision-making
includes not only the delegates of the Standing Committee but involves in the
process of informal decision-making other relevant actors of the Party-State.
Therefore, the NPC Standing Committee's power to approve treaties is, in
18 7
practice, not a genuine power of parliamentary participation and control.

During the zone between signing and ratification, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) provides that
a state must, at a minimum, refrain from acts that would defeat the
treaty's object and purpose. 188 Even for states, like the United States,
that have failed to ratify the Vienna Convention, much of the
convention's contents are deemed to reflect customary international
law. 189 China became a party to the Vienna Convention in 1997.190
Consequently, there is no need to use customary international law to
apply this "object and purpose" requirement to China. The tricky part
is figuring out what this requirement entails.
The "object and purpose" language appears in other contexts'as
well, most notably in the Vienna Convention's prohibition on
reservations that are incompatible with a treaty's object and
purpose. 19 1 There is much debate about what this phrasing means in

the context of reservations, but at least in that realm there is
192
considerable state practice.

187. Bjorn Ahl, The Application of InternationalTreaties in China, 207 BEITRAGE
ZUM AUSLANDISCHEN OFFENTLICHEN RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 355, 357-58 (2009).

188. See Vienna Convention, supra note 19, at art. 18 ("A State is obliged to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when . .. it has signed
the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party
to the treaty.").
189.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

145 (quoting S. EXEC. Doc. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1 (1971)) ("Although not yet in
force, the Convention is already generally recognized as the authoritative guide to
current treaty law and practice"); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties,
Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARv. J. INT'L L. 307, 307-08 (2007)
("Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, many
commentators claim that Article 18 reflects customary international law that is binding
on nations that have not joined the Convention, a claim that the United States has not
denied."); Herbert W. Briggs, United States Ratification of the Vienna Treaty Convention,
73 AM. J. INT'L L. 470-71 (1979) (addressing status of Vienna Convention as customary

law).
190. Multilateral Treaties to Which China is a Party or Which China has signed,
CHINA-UN, http://www.china-un.org/eng/zghlhg/flsw/t28583.htm (last visited Nov. 10,
2019) [https://perma.cc/6VHB-M73Y] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
191. See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, Reservations to Treaties and United States
Practice, 8 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. (2003) (explaining when treaty reservations are considered
permissible).
192. See, e.g., InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, U.N. TREATY
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What is required of states during the period between signing and
ratification is murkier. 193 The series of special rapporteurs at the
International Law Commission who worked on the issue during the
Vienna Convention's drafting did not share a common understanding
of the clause's meaning. 194 Nevertheless, at least "the [International
Law Commission] drafters intended the interim obligation to be legal

in nature." 195
There is general agreement among scholars that the requirements
of the Vienna Convention and customary law demand some level of
good-faith performance. 19 6 In his 2019 article, Ryan Scoville notes that

"[t]he precise nature of the interim obligation is the subject of
disagreement," but the doctrine "likely requires at least that the
United States refrain from 'actions that would substantially
undermine the ability of the parties to comply with, or benefit from,
the treaty after ratification."' 197 In their 2018 article, Curtis Bradley

and Jack Goldsmith cite the United States' position that states are
"expected to avoid actions which could render impossible the entry into

force and implementation of the [agreement], or defeat its basic
purpose and value to the other party or parties." 198 They continue that
"[t]his narrow interpretation of Article 18 is defensible in light of both
its text and drafting history, despite some academic claims about a
broader scope of the obligation."1 99 To wit, even if the obligation is
narrow, it exists.
In attempts to bring greater precision to this inquiry, scholars
have delved into the "object and purpose" language and proposed tests
to determine whether a state has failed to meet even a minimal

COLLECTION (Dec. 16, 1966), http://bit.ly/2GnkI8b [https://perma.cc/267Y-3867]
(archived Oct. 25, 2019) (listing declarations and reservations made by ICCPR parties);
see also Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on Its Sixty-Six Session, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. A/66/10 (Jan. 8,
2011) http://bit.ly/2GkWcEN [https://perma.cc/Y7S6-7TGN] (archived Oct. 25, 2019)
(Guide to Practice on Reservations). Contra D6rr, supra note 20, 1 5, (listing only five
instances where the interim obligation was invoked, and none involved the ICCPR).
193. Joni S. Charme, The Interim Obligationof Article 18 of the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties: Making Sense of an Enigma, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INVL & ECON. 71,
114 (1991) (addressing "the difficulty inherent in attempting to adequately define and
develop the contours of interim obligation expressed in article 18").
194. See U.N. OFFICE HIGH COMM'R HUM. RTS., supra note 32, at 306-10.
195. Charme, supra note 193, at 95.
196. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 304 cmt. e (AM. LAw INST. 2018) (noting that while "there appears to be widespread
acceptance of an interim obligation... [t]he scope of such interim obligations, however,
has remained unclear, in particular as to the nature of the acts prohibited.").
197. Ryan M. Scoville, Ad Hoc Diplomats, 68 DUKE L.J. 907, 994 (2019) (quoting
Bradley, supra note 189, at 315-16).
198. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over
InternationalLaw, 131 HARv. L. REV. 1201, 1237 (2018) (quoting Memorandum from
Roberts B. Owen, U.S. Dep't of State Legal Adviser (Feb. 21, 1980), reprinted in S. EXEC.
REP. NO. 96-33, at 47 (1980)) (alterations in original).
199. Id. at 1237-38.
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requirement. 200 In a 2010 article, David Jonas and Thomas Saunders

reviewed four proposed tests and suggested a fifth that should be
adopted in their place. 2 0 1 This article stands as the most
202
comprehensive effort-at least in an American law review -to make
203
the interim obligation more concrete.

First, the "essential elements" test focuses on whether a state has
adhered to the critical parts of the treaty, even if it has failed to comply
204
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, for
with relatively minor aspects.
example, distinguish between mere signature and full ratification by
explaining that "core treaty obligations attach earlier in the
205
Jonas
incorporation process-that is, upon signature of the treaty."
and Saunders critique this approach both as unworkable because of
uncertainty regarding what elements are "essential" and also as
undermining the importance of domestic review. 2 06 Using this test,

"essential parts of the treaty are binding immediately upon signature,
depriving domestic political factions of the same full opportunity to

207
review those obligations before the state is bound by them."
Second, the "impossible performance test" hinges on whether

subsequent performance would become "meaningless" as a result of the
state's actions. 208 This test is most easily applied to a bilateral treaty

where one country has, for example, agreed to return an ancient
artifact to another country but, prior to return, destroys it. This
irreplaceable-object scenario is, however, but one of many contexts for
a treaty. Jonas and Saunders thus question this test on the basis that

&

200. See, e.g., Charme, supra note 193, at 72 (noting that, in 1991, scholars, courts,
and tribunals had already looked to Article 18 of the Vienna Convention for over thirty
years).
201. See Jonas & Saunders, supra note 18.
202. Barbara Oomen notes that "[o]ne particularly surprising lacuna in the social
science literature on treaty implementation concerns the period between signing and
ratifying human rights treaties." Oomen, supranote 15, at 426 (emphasis added).
203. Cf. Matthew Neely, Good Law for "Bad Hombres", 32 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
255, 276-77 (2018) (citing Jonas & Saunders, supra note 18, for a description of various
tests); Paul Williams & Laura Livingston, Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War. By Orde
F. Kittrie. Oxford, 110 AM. J. INT'L L. 838, 843 n.30 (2016) (book review) (citing Jonas
Saunders, supra note 18, in support of the statement that "[t]hough the specific meaning
of the term [object and purpose] remains the subject of extensive academic debate, it has
generally been defined to refer to a treaty's or statute's essential or otherwise principal
goals").
204. Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek, The "Object and Purpose"of a Treaty: An
Enigma?, 3 AUSTRIAN REV. INT'L & EUR. L. 311, 343 (1998) (assessing a treaty's object
and purpose based on separating the treaty's essential elements from the unessential
ones).
205. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 31, at 173.
206. Id.
207. Jonas & Saunders, supra note 18, at 597.
208. Charme, supra note 193, at 101-02 (quoting MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 322 (1985)); Jonas & Saunder, supra note 18, at 598;
see also D6rr, supra note 20, ¶ 37.
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"some actions defeat a treaty's object and purpose even when
subsequent performance has not been rendered impossible."2 0 9
Furthermore, this test is an uncomfortable fit for treaties
addressing human rights: "If one signatory state engages in torture
prior to ratification, this act does not defeat the goals of preventing
torture and shaming those who practice it. Rather, the fresh violation
makes the treaty's goals even more compelling." 2 10 One option is that

some treaties would, in reality, not be subject to the interim obligation.
Curtis Bradley proposes a narrow reading of the interim obligation

that

would

"preclud[e]

only

actions

that would

substantially

undermine the ability of the parties to comply with, or benefit from,
the treaty after ratification." 21 1 He notes that this would mean the
interim obligation "has little relevance" to certain types of treaties,
including human rights treaties. 21 2
Third and fourth, Jonas and Saunders address the related "bad
faith" and "manifest intent" tests. 2 13 These tests look beyond "contractbased treaties"--in which states "engage[] in a reciprocal exchange of
considerations"-to also address "law-creating treaties"-in which
states "agree to abide by particular rules of conduct." 2 14 The ICCPR

falls squarely within the latter camp. The "bad faith" test assesses
whether a signatory state's actions "are unwarranted or condemnable"
whereas the "manifest intent" test merely requires that the state's
actions "seem unwarranted and condemnable . .. regardless of actual
proof of bad faith." 215 Jonas and Saunders critique these tests as both
"highly subjective" and as leaving unanswered the thorny question of
"which actions actually demonstrate bad faith or the manifestation
6
thereof." 2 1
Unsatisfied with these four tests, Jonas and Saunders propose a
"facilitation test" that proceeds in two parts. 217 It first asks if a state

has "transgressed" any articles of the pending treaty, defined as "acting
contrary to the obligations the treaty would impose had the treaty
already entered into force." 218 If this transgressing is not new, Jonas
and Saunders posit that "there has been no violation." 219 The argument
being that "[s]ignatory states may not move away from eventual

209. Jonas & Saunders, supra note 18, at 600.
210. Id. at 600 (citing Klabbers, supra note 34, at 286) ("[I]t is awkward to argue
that states have a right to lay landmines if they have signed ... a treaty prohibiting such
practices, simply because the calendar has not yet reached a certain date.").
211. Bradley, supra note 189, at 308.
212. Id.
213. See Jonas & Saunders, supra note 18.
214. Id. at 601 (citing Klabbers, supra note 34, at 289-91).
215. Id. at 602 (quoting Klabbers supra note 34, at 330).
216. Id. at 603.
217. Id.
218. Id. (explaining use of "'transgressed' because the treaty is not yet binding law
and thus cannot be breached in a legal sense.").
219. Id.
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compliance, but they are permitted to move toward it." 2 20 At least the
status quo must be maintained: a state is permitted to tread water, but,

hopefully,

there

will

be

directional

thrust

towards

increased

compliance. 22 1 The domestic review of a treaty can proceed under
conditions that "minimize[] the potential burden on signatory states by
shaping the interim obligation to fit each state's existing pattern of
behavior."2 22
Some tests discussed in this Part are an awkward or even
inapposite fit for multilateral human rights treaties. For those that do
lend themselves to use in that context, the next Part contends that, as
a matter of law, China has failed to meet the required threshold for
adherence to the ICCPR. That no single measure is the accepted
benchmark for compliance with the interim obligation counsels in favor

of a holistic evaluation rather than the selection of a single test. Going
a step beyond legal arguments, as a matter of politics, there are strong
reasons that states should call for China's unsigning.

IV. THE CASE FOR UNSIGNING
22 3
While
Signatures languish but are seldom renounced.
remaining in limbo between a treaty's signing and ratification is

unexceptional, 224 a state's decision to undo its own signature is big
news. The United States, for instance, made a splash in 2002 when,

despite prior signature, it announced its intention not to become a
party to the Rome Convention establishing the International Criminal
Court. 22 5 Similar to the rift between the Clinton and Bush
Administrations over the Rome Convention, in July 2019 the Trump

220. Id. at 604.
221. Cf. id. at 605.
222. Id. at 608.
223. See Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Signature, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES
208, 216 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012) [hereinafter Bradley, Treaty Signature] ("There is
little State practice involving [Vienna Convention Article 18 on making clear an
intention not to become a party]. Although it is not uncommon for signatory States to
delay their ratification of a treaty, these States generally do not make express
statements indicating that they do not intend to ratify the treaty.").
224. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, S. ExEc Doc. 0, 81-1 (1949) (providing several examples of
extended delay: Bolivia (signed 1948, ratified 2005); New Zealand (signed 1949, ratified
1978); Paraguay (signed 1948, ratified 2001); United States (signed 1948, ratified 1998)).
225. See Curtis A. Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International
Criminal Court Treaty, AM. SOC. INT'L L. INSIGHTS (May 11, 2002),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/7/issue/7/us-announces-intent-not-ratifyinternational-criminal-court-treaty [https://perma.cc/TN9H-XJNN] (archived Nov. 10,
2019); see also Swaine, supra note 26 (analyzing the "tumult over the Bush
Administration's decision to 'unsign' the treaty establishing the [ICC]."). For an earlier
example, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 198 (noting that, in 1981, "the Reagan
Administration made clear to the Soviet Union that the United States had no intention
of ratifying the [Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) II Treaty]").
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Administration sent a letter to the UN Secretary General stating "that
the United States does not intend to become a party to the [Arms Trade
Treaty]. Accordingly, the United States has no legal obligations arising
from its signature on September 25, 2013."226 This followed the Trump
Administration's 2017 announcement that it was renouncing the Paris
Agreement on climate change, 227 to which the Obama administration
had previously signed on. 228 Although then President Obama
"adopted" the agreement using an executive order, Eugene
Kontorovich argues that the United States never properly joined

because "[i]t is a treaty that requires the advice and consent of the
Senate."22 9

Irrespective of the Paris Agreement's legal status, Trump made
clear that the United States was pulling out. He explained his decision
based on domestic considerations, namely what he perceived as "the
draconian financial and economic burdens the agreement imposes on
our country." 230 Countervailing international considerations are in
play if the executive branch abandons a treaty, in a similar manner to

when the legislative branch fails to ratify it: "[A] decision by the
legislature to not ratify an international treaty, which was signed by
the government, may damage the state's international reputation and
its ability to conduct negotiations in the future, especially bilateral
agreements." 2 31 For unsigning as compared with mere delay, the issue
is not just one of reputation but also of law. 23 2 The international law

226. President Trump "Unsigns"Arms Trade Treaty After Requesting Its Return
from the Senate, 113 AM. J. INT'L L. 813, 816 (2019).
227. See Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord (June 1,
2017), http://bit.ly/2UpfZYO [https://perma.cc/PWE4-QVZE] (archived Oct. 26, 2019)
(statement by Trump that "[i]t is time to exit the Paris Accord"); see also Robinson Meyer,
Syria Is Joining the Paris Agreement. Now What?, ATLANTIc (Nov. 8, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/1 1/syria-is-joining-the-parisagreement-now-what/545261/ [https://perma.cc/3QEP-7VZ5] (archived Oct. 26, 2019)
(reporting that the United States' "declaration means that the United States is the only
country in the world that has rejected the treaty and promised to withdraw from it").
228. See Tanya Somanader, President Obama: The United States Formally Enters
the Paris Agreement, OBAMA WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 3, 2016), http://bit.ly/2UJjKNv
[https://perma.cc/8L92-DTNB] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
229. Eugene Kontorovich, The U.S. Can't Quit the Paris Climate Agreement,
Because It Never Actually Joined, WASH. POST, (June 1, 2017), https://wapo.st/31DdWFh
[https://perma.cc/GKE3-RT7V] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
230. Statement by President Trump, supra note 227.
231. Rivka Weill, Judicial Review of Constitutional Transitions: War and Peace
and Other Sundry Matters, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1425 (2012); accord Swaine,
supra note 26, at 2076 ("Unsigning with abandon, or exploitatively, would cause their
reputations to suffer, leading fewer nations to trust them as signatories (and likely
impugning, in the bargain, their more general reputations for honoring commitments).").
232. With respect to United States' practice, it is worth noting that, while there is
debate regarding the reputational concerns of pulling out of the Iran nuclear agreement,
it was a political commitment and not a treaty under international law. See Julian Ku,
How President Obama Gave President-electTrump the Power to Undo the Iran Deal and
Paris Agreement, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 9, 2016), http://opiniojuris.org/2016/11/09/whypresident-obama-gave-president-elect-trump-the-power-to-undo-the-iran-deal-and-
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233
One view is that the act of
implications of unsigning are unclear.
234
unsigning even seems impossible.
There is, of course, no literal way for a state to unsign a treatythere are no magic words or diplomatic erasers that can undo a
historical signature. 235 "Unsigning" is a shorthand for acts through
236
which a state "ma[kes] its intention clear not to become a party."
China has not explicitly done so with respect to the ICCPR or any
23 7
On the contrary, China
treaty signed by the PRC for that matter.
stated in its 2018 National Report submitted as part of the UPR
238
It is thus
process that it continued to prepare for ICCPR ratification.
fair to hold China-as a party to the Vienna Convention and a
239
Whether other
signatory to the ICCPR-to the interim obligation.
states should and will hold China to the interim obligation ventures
into uncharted waters.

paris-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/N9PY-6UDS] (archived Sept. 10, 2017) ("President
Obama's lawyers went even farther to clarify that the Iran Nuclear Deal was a
nonbinding political agreement and that the emissions targets in the Paris Climate
Change Agreement were also legally nonbinding . . . ."); see also Jamil N. Jaffer,
Withdrawal from Treaties and Accords: Elements of Its Own Demise: Key Flaws in the
ObamaAdministration's Domestic Approach to the Iran Nuclear Agreement, 51 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 77, 78 (2019) (noting that the agreement was not submitted for
ratification as a treaty); David S. Jonas & Dyllan M. Taxman, JCP-No-Way: A Critique
of the Iran Nuclear Deal as a Non-Legally-Binding Political Commitment, 9 J. NAT'L
SEcURITY L. & POL'Y 589, 590 (2018) (describing the agreement as a "non-binding
political commitment").
233. See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479,
1508 (2003) ("Under international law, it is unclear what the precise legal force of
'unsigning' a previously signed treaty should be.").
234. Swaine, supra note 26, at 2063, n.12.
235. See id. at 2082 (noting that there is "no guidance on how this intention [not
to be bound] may be made manifest"); Bradley, Treaty Signature, supranote 223, at 217
("Nor does the [Vienna Convention] or State practice provide any support for the
possibility of such a physical 'unsigning."').
236. Vienna Convention, supra note 19, at art. 18.
237. Cf. Multilateral Treaties to Which China is a Party or Which China has
Signed, CHINA-UN, http://www.china-un.org/eng/zghlhg/flsw/t28583.htm (last visited
Nov. 10, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6VHB-M73Y ] (archived Oct. 25, 2019) (no mention of
unsigning).
238. 2018 National Report, supra note 7, ¶ 14.
239. Vienna Convention, supranote 19, at art. 18. Cf. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 304 cmt. e (AM. L. INST. 2018) ('"That

obligation arises at the time of the state's signature (or its exchange of instruments
subject to ratification) until such time as the state has made its intention clear not to
become a party to the agreement. It also applies from the time of a state's expression of
consent to be bound until the agreement enters into force."). Regarding the second clause
of Article 18 on extended delay prior to a treaty entering into force, the ICCPR entered
into force in 1976, more than twenty years before China even signed the treaty. See
ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supra note 2. In addition, that the Vienna
Convention applies only to treaties concluded after the Convention has entered into force
with respect to a state (see art. 4) is satisfied because China acceded to the Vienna
Convention in 1997 and signed the ICCPR in 1998.
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A state's decision to unsign is rare. 240 A call by other states that a
treaty be unsigned is, perhaps, unprecedented. While it is impossible
to know all that has transpired behind closed doors among diplomats,
there appears to be no high-profile example of a public, peer-incited
unsigning based on a failure to fulfill the interim obligation. With
respect to China, the author's experience is that a common response
from diplomats, scholars, and human rights advocates has been a

reluctance to press China to disengage from international treaties
because the international community worked so hard to get China to
engage in the first place and/or because of concerns for precedent such
action might set. 24 1 These are valid concerns, and even a couple of
years ago this Article would have been written with a question mark
in the title. As explained below, however, accelerating concerns about
China's position towards civil and political rights both at home and
abroad necessitates a departure from repetition of thus-far ineffective
strategies as well as a broader rethinking of how to counter China's
rights-diluting initiatives on the international plane. 24 2
With these considerations and the intended collegial nature of the
UPR in mind, 243 it is not surprising that, at China's 2018 UPR, council

members stopped short of a brusque proposal that China withdraw
entirely from the ICCPR. Some did adopt a more pointed tone in their
questioning compared with the relatively milquetoast approach at
prior reviews. For instance, the United Kingdom asked in its advance
questions what steps China was taking to ensure that activists
"detained for merely exercising their constitutional rights are released
without delay?" 24 4 Australia pointed out China's shift in wording

between its 2013 and 2018 National Reports and pressed, "Does China

240. Swaine, supranote 26, at 2064 (describing the United States' unsigning of the
Rome Convention as "apparently unprecedented").
241. This assessment is based on informal conversations. A search for past written
suggestions that China has even violated the interim obligation with respect to the
ICCPR-let alone that other states should call for it to disengage from the treaty-did
turn up an unpublished student Note in which the author stresses China's use of
pervasive surveillance and harsh state-secrets laws to "reveal a violation of the interim
obligation." Nicholas Hernandez, Determining Defeat: The PRC, the ICCPR, and the
Interim Obligation 25 (Dec. 16, 2010) (unpublished note) (on file with SSRN). The Note
concludes by proposing a few discrete steps that China could take to comply with the
interim obligation, such as defining state secrets and leaving it to parents to decide when
to block their children's access to the Internet. See id. at 51-54.
242. See infra Part IV.B.
243. See Statement by the President of the Human Rights Council, Vojislav Suc
(Slovenia), to the 73d Sess. of the U.N. General Assembly, Third Committee, U.N.
Headquarters
(Nov. 2, 2018),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/
NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=23842&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/7CM5-A5CJ] (archived
Aug. 18, 2019) (UPR as "a platform for non-politicized, non-selective and nonconfrontational discussion among peers").
244. Advance Questions to China (First Batch), U.N. HUM. RTs. COUNCIL,
https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/china/session_31_-_november_
2018/advancequestionschina.pdf (last updated 2018) [https://perma.c/6JWG-KWEV]
(archived Oct. 26, 2019).
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still accept the principle of universal human rights, and if not, can
China explain how its conception of human rights fits into the
international human rights regime built on the concept of
universality?" 24 5

With the third UPR cycle now concluded, this Article posits a bold
prescriptive claim: states should call on China to unsign the ICCPR
and China should do so. This Part explains why the international
community should pursue this path both as a matter of law and
politics. Martti Koskenniemi has long argued that lawyers and
scholars should grapple with the intertwined nature of politics and law
in the international realm. 24 6 Just as the classic optical illusion can be
viewed as a duck or a rabbit,2 4 7 international events simultaneously
248
Koskenniemi has cautioned
carry legal and political significance.
about the use of "and" between law and politics because "[t]he
conjunctive form would suggest a meeting of two separately
identifiable entities whose action upon each other would be subjected
to analysis."2 4 9 While recognizing that caution, in this Part, the two are

addressed separately because "[t]o speak of 'politics' is intended to
highlight the reality of choice in international law and to contrast it
250
4
with the technical production of the justification for it."
For this Article's argument in favor of unsigning to prevail, it must

speak both "'Duckalese' (or legal language)" and "like a rabbit (that. is
politics). 2 51 A narrow legal perspective is insufficient. Accordingly,
this Part justifies unsigning based on the legal doctrine behind the
interim obligation and because it is sound policy.

There is uncertainty about what would happen if states heeded
this Article's advice. Just because the current approach may not be
25 2
) countries
producing the desired result of many (though far from all
that China ratify the ICCPR and uphold the rights therein does not

245. Advance Questions to China (Fourth Batch), U.N. HUM. RTs. COUNCIL,
(last updated 2018)
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies[UPR/Pages/CNindex.aspx
[https://perma.cc/3CXJ-GP4Z] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
246.

MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE POLITIcS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW v (2011) ("The

relationship (if that is the correct word) is not one of two entities colliding against each
other but one of identity. International law is an expression of politics.").
247. Duck-Rabbit, ILLUSIONS INDEX, https://www.illusionsindex.org/i/duck-rabbit
(last visited Nov. 10, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9P5T-GSU5] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
248. See Martti Koskenniemi, Speaking the Language of International Law and
Politics: Or, of Ducks, Rabbits, and Then Some, in MOBILISING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
'GLOBAL JUSTIcE' 22-45 (Jeff Handmaker et al. eds., 2018).
249. KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 246, at v.
250. Id. at vi.
251. Koskenniemi, supra note 248, at 27.
252. For countries that sign (and even ratify) the ICCPR but also have deeply
problematic human rights records, they may prefer the current recurring admonitions
followed by periods of relative inaction. Cf. HRC Live Meeting, supra note 1 (statements
by Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, and others praising China at the closing session of its
third UPR).
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mean that a different approach would be more effective. 253 Nor is a call
for unsigning guaranteed to have beneficial externalities, even if not
improving China's domestic adherence to the ICCPR. 254 A different
approach could even be a worse approach. One could imagine, for
example, China responding to calls for it to disengage from the ICCPR
by not just maintaining its current foot dragging with respect to
ratification but actually becoming even more resistant to outside
criticism. 255 And the very act of pressuring China to disengage could
prompt other states to renounce treaties they had signed, though
practice to date gives little reason to worry about such a parade of
horribles. 2 56 But this Article's proposal is not a rash "kick the broken

television" maneuver. Despite the leap of faith that comes with any
dramatic switch in diplomatic posturing, this Part contends that the
potential upsides of advocating unsigning outweigh the possible
downsides.
First, as a matter of law, states can make a sound argument that

China has failed to fulfill the interim obligation. 257 Second, not only
can states make this legal argument on firm even if not rock solid legal
footing, 258 they should do so for political reasons, with "politics"
understood broadly as "the total complex of relations between people
[and here "states"] living in society." 2 59 In other words, beyond the
lawyers' ability to make a technical legal argument that China has
violated the interim obligation, the diplomats and other officials who
formulate China policy could find this argument a useful tool in

253. There is a longstanding debate about the effectiveness of external pressure
on China's internal human rights practices. See, e.g., Ann Kent, Engaging China on
Human Rights,

in

PRINCIPLED

ENGAGEMENT:

NEGOTIATING

HUMAN

RIGHTS

IN

REPRESSIVE STATES 75, 78 (Morten B. Pedersen et al eds., 2013) (listing scholarly
literature "questioning the effectiveness or otherwise of different kinds of external
pressure on China's human rights"); Pitman B. Potter, Chinaand the InternationalLegal
System: Challenges of Participation, 191 CHINA Q. 699, 710-13 (2007) (describing
China's "normative resistance" to certain international human rights norms).
254. See infra Part IV.B on importance of messaging to various audiences even if
there is no discernible improvement in China's adherence to international human rights
norms.

255. Cf. Associated Press, China rebukes Canadaand other diplomats for letter on
Muslim rights, CBC RADIO-CAN. (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/chinacanada-uighurs-letter-1.4906522 [https://perma.cc/VR77-HQF7] (archived Oct. 26,
2019). The human rights situation in Xinjiang has deteriorated since the November 2018
letter, see Nebehay, supra note 12, though any causal relationship is speculative.
256. Cf. Bradley, supra note 225, at 218 ("In any event, at least to date it does not
appear that there have been substantial abuses by States of the ability to decide not to
ratify a treaty after signature.").
257. See infra Part IV.A.
258. The novelty of this approach means that there is not an iron-clad legal
argument that China has breached the interim obligation. While recognizing the lack of
both precedent and clear guidance in treaties, there is nonetheless a serious argument
to be made.
259.

Politics,

MERRIAM-WEBSTER

webster.com/dictionary/politics
(archived Oct. 26, 2019).

(last

visited

DICTIONARY,

2019)

https://www.merriam-

[https://perma.ccURM9-YADZ]
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China's
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of human

rights

norms.

Policymakers could stop short of actually calling for unsigning and
instead simply put forward the legal analysis. There are, however,
benefits to a more pointed reprimand.2 60
A. Law
Evaluating whether China has fulfilled its interim obligation as a
signatory to the ICCPR begins with determining what, if anything, has

been said about the interim obligation as applied to the ICCPR (Part
IV.A.1). With this backdrop, the inquiry then turns to China's case:

How does China's performance measure up to the various proposed
tests for whether a state has failed to meet even the minimal
obligations of a signatory (Parts IV.A.2-4)?

1. The Interim Obligation and the ICCPR
As explained in Part III above, there is no consensus regarding the
precise contours of the interim obligation under international law. 26i

18

Article

of the Vienna

Convention

may be

an

"enigmatic

provision[,]" 2 62 but it is some sort of obligation: "A State is obliged to

refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty
when .

.

263
And this obligation is legal in
. it has signed the treaty."

character. 264 The question is not whether the signatory state has to do
something but rather what exactly that something is.
Even if there were agreement that a specific case constituted a
violation of the interim obligation, there is disagreement regarding
26 5
And even if a state wants
what, if anything, could be done about it.
to unsign a treaty, there is no literal way to erase a signature, plus

state practice is exceedingly thin.26 6 Nonetheless, under the Vienna
Convention, a signatory state may declare its intention not to become

a party.26 7 And there is no legal barrier to other states telling it to

260. See infra Part IV.B.
261. See supra Part III. In addition to the lack of specificity in the Vienna
Convention itself, there is "relatively little judicial precedent [regarding the obligations
that attach at signing], and most of what there is long predates the [Vienna
Convention]." Bradley, supra note 225, at 213.
262. Charme, supra note 193, at 73.
263. Vienna Convention, supra note 19, at art. 18 (emphasis added).
264. See Charme, supra note 193, at 95.
265. See Buffard & Zemanek supra note 204, at 311.
266. See supra Part III. For instance, the United Nations still lists the United
States as a "Participant" to the Rome Convention but includes a footnote regarding the
2002 communication announcing the United States "does not intend to become a party
to the treaty...." Rome Statute, supra note 25.
267.

See MARK E. VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON

THE LAW OF TREATIES 250 (2008) (noting the ability of a State that has signed but not
ratified a treaty to be "free at any time to make its intention clear not to become a party
to the treaty, i.e., either by means of an express statement or through implied conduct,
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unsign even if they cannot compel such action. Joni Charme wrote in
1991 that the interim obligation of Article 18 "does not represent a

readily definable and, therefore, enforceable obligation. 2 6 8 However,
"an obligation, undertaken upon signature, to respect the signed
instrument, is an undisputed consequence of the codification of the
interim obligation in article 18 of the Vienna Convention." 26 9
There is no specific guidance in the ICCPR concerning either the
obligation to respect the signed instrument prior to ratification or a
signatory state's ability to declare, prior to ratification, its intention to
no longer be bound. The drafters could have articulated views on these
points but did not. 270 Nor has the Human Rights Committee-the body
charged with monitoring implementation of the ICCPR 271 -expressed
its opinion on unsigning prior to ratification. In contrast, with respect
to post-ratification behavior, the committee is "firmly of the view that
international law does not permit a State which has ratified or acceded

or succeeded to the [ICCPR] to denounce it or withdraw from it."2 72 The
UN Secretary General has opined that withdrawal requires consent of
all other parties, in line with Article 54 of the Vienna Convention. 27 3
That neither the committee nor Secretary General has issued
similar guidance regarding renouncing a signature suggests that
China is free to unsign the ICCPR. 274 Additionally, that the UN
Secretary General cited the Vienna Convention's provisions regarding
withdrawal 2 75 in the context of interpreting the ICCPR suggests that
the Convention's provisions in Article 18 should also apply, namely
that a signatory state need only make clear its intention not to be
bound without any requirement of outside approval. 2 76 Furthermore, a
rule that signature alone irrevocably binds a state to comply with the

in which case Article 18 can no longer be invoked").
268. Charme, supra note 193, at 104.
269. Id. at 113.
270. Cf. Ed Bates, Avoiding Legal Obligations Created by Human Rights Treaties,
57 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 751, 756 (2008) (explaining that "many human rights treaties
include a specific provision providing for their denunciation" though not addressing
unsigning).
271. See Human Rights Committee, U.N.

OFFIcE HIGH COMM'R HUM. RTs.,

http://bit.ly/2Gteyo9 [https://perma.c/3QE3-ZMWN] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
272. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 26(61), General
comment on Issues Relating to the Continuity of Obligations to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997)
[hereinafter General Comment 26].
273. See Aide Memoire: Denunciation of the ICCPR by the Democratic People's
Republic
of
North
Korea,
C/N/467/1997
(Sept.
23,
1997),
https://treaties.un.org/do/Publication/CN/1997/CN.467.1997-Eng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8W4L-56KR] (archived June 20, 2019).
274. For a discussion of how states should handle unsigning, and a suggestion
"that the period for withdrawal may be easily borrowed in order to establish the lead
time for unsigning," see Swaine, supra note 26, at 2087-88.
275. See Aide Memoire, supra note 273 (citing Vienna Convention, supranote 19,
at arts. 54, 56, 56.1, 62).
276. Id. at art. 18.
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ICCPR would contradict the intended purpose of an interim period as
providing space for domestic debate prior to solidifying a commitment
through ratification. 277

A separate question from whether a state can unsign the ICCPR
is what kind of behavior would constitute a violation of the interim
obligation. This requires some speculation because the committee also
has not opined on what kinds of actions would contravene the "object
and purpose" of the ICCPR in the context of a state's interim obligation.
In 1994, however, the committee issued guidance on what kinds of

reservationswould be incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty. 278 Despite sharing the same "object and purpose" phrasing, the
Vienna Convention differentiates between the two scenarios by
disallowing reservations that are "incompatible with the object and
purpose"2 79 but providing that signatory states are "obliged to refrain
28 0
The
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose."

significance of this difference is debated, with Curtis Bradley noting,
"[t]he word 'incompatible' in that limitation may not signify the same
limitation as the word 'defeat' in Article 18."281 "Defeating" something
sounds more forceful than merely being "incompatible" with it, but they.

are at least related to the extent that the inquiry is whether the state
is acting in a manner that goes against the treaty's object and purpose.
The ICCPR's "object and purpose" exists independently of a state's
status as mere signatory as compared with party.282 There is nothing
in its text to indicate that this same phrasing should be interpreted
differently in the two contexts. Thus, it is appropriate to use the
committee's view on the ICCPR's "object and purpose" in the context of

reservations as a basis upon which to conjecture what the committee
might say in the context of the interim obligation, with the important

caveat that the "defeat" language applied to the latter stresses a more
serious affront.
The committee has first clarified that reservations offending
2 83
customary international law-and particularly peremptory norms _
would not be compatible with the ICCPR's object and purpose:

277. See Oomen, supra note 15.
278. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights General Comment 24: Issues Relating
to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional
Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Apr. 11,1994)
[hereinafter General Comment 24].
279. Vienna Convention, supra note 19, at art. 19 (emphasis added).
280. Id. at art. 18 (emphasis added).
281. Bradley, supra note 225, at 213.
282. See generally General Comment 24, supra note 278.
283. See, e.g., David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International
HumanitarianLaw as a Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT'L L. 219, 228-29 (2005) (explaining peremptory norms as "protect[ing] the most
compelling and essential interests of the international community as a whole .... ");
Vienna Convention, supra note 19, at art. 53 (defining a peremptory norm, in part, as
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[A] State may not reserve the right to engage in slavery, to torture, to subject
persons to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, to arbitrarily
deprive persons of their lives, to arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, to deny
freedom of thought, conscience and religion, to presume a person guilty unless
he proves his innocence, to execute pregnant women or children, to permit the
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred, to deny to persons of
marriageable age the right to marry, or to deny to minorities the right to enjoy
2 84
their own culture, profess their own religion, or use their own language.

This list is illustrative but not exhaustive, with the committee
then "[a]pplying more generally the object and purpose test to the

[ICCPR,]" for example, as a basis for refusing a reservation that
provided. a state would not respect rights in a nondiscriminatory
manner. 2 85
Reservations
to nonderogable2 8 6
provisions
(e.g.,
imprisonment for debt) should be examined with particular
scrutiny, 287 and reservations that remove critical supportive
guarantees (e.g., need to provide remedies for rights violations) are

flagged as unacceptable. 2 88
The committee further recognized that "[o]bjections
[to
reservations] have been occasional, made by some States but not
others, and on grounds not always specified" but that "the pattern is so
unclear that it is not safe to assume that a non-objecting State thinks
that a particular reservation is acceptable." 2 89 The pattern might not
be clear, but that the committee recognizes the ability of other states
to lodge objections is. 29 0 By analogy, if a state can object to a
reservation because it goes against the ICCPR's object and purposeeven though the objecting state does not have the power to block the

reservation 2 91-it

is reasonable that a state may object to another

state's performance during the interim period because that practice
goes against the ICCPR's object and purpose. 292 There might not be a
formal mechanism through which to lodge a protest, but the objecting
state could at least issue a statement or otherwise make its opinion
public. Put simply, pressing China to unsign the ICCPR is brash but
not barred.

"accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted.").
284. General Comment 24, supra note 278, ¶ 8.
285. Id. ¶ 9.
286. See ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supra note 2, at art. 4; see also Core
Human Rights in the Two Covenants, U.N. OFFIcE HIGH COMM'R HUM. RTS. (Sept. 2013),
https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/IHRS/TreatyBodies/Page%2Documents/Core%20Human%2
ORights.pdf [https://perma.ec/97Z7-5ETU] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
287. General Comment 24, supra note 278, ¶ 10.
288. Id. ¶ 11.
289. Id. ¶ 17; see also ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supra note 2 (listing
objections by state parties to reservations made by other states).
290. See generally General Comment 24, supra note 278.
291. See id. ¶ 18 ("It necessarily falls to the Committee to determine whether a
specific reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.").
292. Id.
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With this at least tangentially related guidance in mind, the
analysis turns to the various proposed measures for evaluating the
interim obligation. 293 Because there is no consensus supporting a

single test, this analysis draws on several tests to demonstrate the
expanding gap between the ICCPR's protections and China's domestic
human rights conditions.
The aim here is not to create an exhaustive list of discrete acts of
noncompliance in part because that would extend far beyond the
294
And, in part, because of the
bounds of a law review article.
29 5
efforts to catalogue human rights
prevalence of "known-unknowns":
abuses are frustrated by the heavily restricted access to people and

sites in China, as well as the party-state's efforts to limit the flow of
information. 296 In May 2019, an intrepid journalist traveled fifty miles
on foot to view a detention facility in Xinjiang after her taxi was told to
turn around. 297 A 2016 UN report noted:
Reportedly, seven Chinese human rights defenders, who had intended to travel
to Geneva to attend the Committee [Against Torture's] consideration of the
report of China, had been threatened by [PRC] authorities with negative
professional consequences. Moreover, those who had defied the authorities'
orders had reportedly been detained on the ground that their participation could
'endanger national security' .... 298

Such challenges to obtaining information underscore the partystate's concern that an unfiltered view of domestic conditions will reach
299
Any analysis of China's human rights
international audiences.
practices must proceed with imperfect information. But that reality
does not torpedo an analysis of China's compliance with the interim
obligation. This Part's claim is that there is clear, credible evidence

293. See supra Part III.
294. For example, see 2018 Congressional-Executive Commission on China:
Annual Report, 115th Cong. (2018), https://www.cecc.gov/publications/annualreports/2018-annual-report [https://perma.cc/E8XJ-8E9P] (archived Oct. 27, 2019)
(report mandated by Congress monitoring China's compliance with norms in the ICCPR
and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which runs 324 pages in tiny font).
295. Cf. Hart Seely, The Poetry of D.H. Rumsfeld, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2003),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2003/04/the-poetry-of-donald-rumsfeld.html
[https://perma.cc/ZQM3-2HBA] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
296. See, e.g., Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. religious freedom expert seeks visit to
https://reut.rs/2KMEmzQ
2019,
5,
Mar.
REUTERS,
Xinjiang,
China's
[https://perma.cc/GRZ9-Z4S6] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
297. See Sophia Yan, China's Uighur Muslims Forced to Eat and Drink as
2019),
1,
(June
TELEGRAPH
Banned,
Celebrations
Ramadan
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2019/06/01/chinas-uighur-muslims-forced-eat-drinkramadan-celebrations/ [https://perma.cc/J99B-8478] (archived June 11, 2019).
298. U.N. Human Rights Council, Annual Rep. of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights and Reports of the Office of the High Commissioner
and the Secretary-General, Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives
and mechanisms in the field of human rights, 1 22, U.N. Doc A/HRC/33/19 (Aug. 16,
2016).
299. See id.
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that China has defeated the object and purpose of the ICCPR. It
highlights illustrative examples documented by reputable NGOs,
media outlets, and governments. 300 There is enough "there" there for
states to call on China to unsign the ICCPR in a compelling manner.
2. The Essential Elements and Facilitation Tests

This part addresses the "essential elements" and "facilitation"
tests together first by trying to discern the core norms of the ICCPR
and then by analyzing whether China
transgressions of these norms since signing.

has

engaged

in

new

To begin, the "essential elements" test asks whether China has
adhered to the critical parts of the ICCPR, even if it has failed to
comply with relative minor aspects. 30 1 As noted above, 30 2 Jonas and
Saunders first critique this approach on the basis that it "deprive[s]
domestic political factions of the same full opportunity to review those

obligations before the state is bound by them."30 3 This criticism has
limited, if any, salience in the context of China because of the CCP's
lock on power.30 4 The party has stamped out attempts to create
opposition parties, leaving no recognized alternative political factions
to engage in the review. 3 05 At most there are disparate views within
the party, 306 but despite intraparty disagreement on some issues, 30 7
there is no outward indication of a move from within the party to end
one-party rule. And disagreements are rarely played out in the open.
Looking back to the 1980s, a rare publicly seen chink in the armor
occurred when the death of relatively reform-minded Hu Yaobang
sparked protests leading to the June 4, 1989, massacre in Beijing and
broader crackdown across China. 308

300. See infra Parts IV.A.2-4.
301. Cf. Buffard & Zemanek, supra note 204.
302. See supra notes 181-187 and accompanying text (explaining emphasis on
domestic debate and why this factor applies with less force to China).
303. Jonas & Saunders, supra note 18, at 597.
304. For a recent example of voting by the NPC, the new Foreign Investment Law
passed with a 2929-8 vote, with eight abstentions and three delegates not voting. See
Changhao Wei, Summary of China'sNew ForeignInvestment Law, NPC OBSERVER (Mar.
15,
2019),
https://npcobserver.com/2019/03/15/summary-of-chinas-new-foreigninvestment-law/ [https://perma.cc/AYF2-9DJZ] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
305. See, e.g., Sinica Podcast, supra note 168 (discussing Zha Jianguo, "a
democracy activist in China who was charged with subversion of state power and
subsequently jailed for nine years").
306. See Cheng Li, The Powerful Factions Among China's Rulers, BROOKINGS
(Nov. 5, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-powerful-factions-among-chinasrulers/ [https://perma.cc/E8Q3-YVGB] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
307. Joseph Torigian, Elite Politics and foreign policy in China from Mao to Xi,
BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/elite-politics-andforeign-policy-in-china-from-mao-to-xi/ [https://perma.cc/SDP2-BUAT] (archived Oct. 27,
2019).
308. See Matt Schiavenza, China's Forgotten Liberal Hero, ATLANTIC (Apr. 16,
2014), http://bit.ly/2PkknqX [https://perma.cc/7KM3-ELKQ] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
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Jonas and Saunders also question the usefulness of this test
30 9
The
because of uncertainty regarding what elements are "essential."
Human Rights Committee has not labeled certain provisions of the
ICCPR as "essential." General Comment 24 did, however, stress the
importance of some elements: "[P]rovisions in the Covenant that

represent customary international law (and a fortiori when they have
the character of peremptory norms) may not be the subject of
310

reservations."
The committee listed a number of critical norms. For example, a
state may not reserve the right "to arbitrarily arrest and detain
persons" or "to deny to minorities the right to enjoy their own culture,
311
China is
profess their own religion, or use their own language."
flagrantly violating these norms in Xinjiang, where estimates are that
at least one million members of Muslim minority groups have been
held at locations that the government describes as providing vocational
312
training but that have been roundly criticized as internment camps.
The European Union noted, after three diplomats were allowed to visit
government-selected facilities in early 2019, that their improved
understanding of official policy did "not invalidate the E.U.'s view of
the human rights situation in Xinjiang, including in relation to mass

detention, political re-education, religious freedom and sinicization
policies." 313 Or as more bluntly put by Michael Kozak while a senior
official at the U.S. State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, in March 2019, "Rounding up, in some
estimations .. . in the millions of people, putting them into camps, and
torturing them, abusing them, and trying to basically erase their
culture and their religion and so on from their DNA. It's just
3 14
remarkably awful."

The situation in Xinjiang speaks to Jonas and Saunders' proposed
"facilitation test."3 15 As

3 16
to the initial "transgression" inquiry,

309. Jonas & Saunders, supranote 18, at 597.
310. General Comment 24, supra note 278, ¶ 8.
311. Id.
312. See, e.g., Nebehay, supra note 12.
313. Nick Cumming-Bruce, Rights Groups Seek U.N. Inquiry Into China's Mass
Detention of Muslims, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2KQXFIn
[https://perma.cc/XCE8-A84H] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
314. Lesley Wroughton & David Brunnstrom, U.S. says China's Treatment of
Muslim minority worst abuses 'since the 1930s', REUTERS, Mar. 13, 2019,
https://reut.rs/2HLNtxN [https://perma.cc/9N52-AANW] (archived Oct. 27, 2019). The
August 2018 press release by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination following its review of China's practices similarly reported as follows:
[A]n Expert said citing "credible sources," China had turned [Xinjiang] into something
that resembled a massive internment camp shrouded in secrecy, a "no rights zone", while
members of the Xinjiang Uyghur minority, along with others who were identified as
Muslim, were being treated as enemies of the State based on nothing more than their
ethno-religious identity. Id.
315. Jonas & Saunders, supra note 18, at 603.
316. Id. (explaining use of '"transgressed" instead of "breached").
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China's actions are "contrary to the obligations the treaty would

impose had the treaty already entered into force." 3 17 The detentions
lack any judicial process, are targeted at groups because of their
religious beliefs and ethnicity, and suppress dissenting voices. 318 As to
the "status-quo maintaining" inquiry, 319 while China's Muslims have
long faced discrimination, the scale of detentions is unprecedented and
has grown in terms of numbers and geographic scope. 320 China
reiterated in a March 2019 white paper that "[e]ducation and training

centers have been established with the goal of educating and
rehabilitating people guilty of minor crimes or law-breaking and
eradicating the influence of terrorism and extremism." 321
Even if, as claimed by China in July 2019 but as of yet unverified,
"most of the inmates" in the detention facilities have been released, 322
they return to all-encompassing surveillance and the threat of renewed
detention if they step out of line. 3 23 This indicates not momentum
towards compliance with the ICCPR but rather mounting evidence of
the extension of "rule by fear." 324
China's increasingly draconian treatment of religious groups
extends beyond Muslims. 32 5 The Buddhist population in Tibet, for

317. Id.
318. See, e.g., Millward, supra note 141.
319. Jonas & Saunders, supra note 18, at 605.
320. Rob Taylor, China Supersizes Internment Camps in Xinjiang Despite
International
Criticism,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Nov.
1,
2018),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-internment-camps-in-xinjiang-swell-1541052650
[https://perma.cc/TUT2-YATK] (archived Aug. 18, 2019) (using satellite imagery to
estimate size of facilities).
321. Preventive Approach: China's effective means to combat terrorism,
XINHUANET
(Mar.
18,
2019),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201903/18/c_137904900.htm [https://perma.cc/33VP-CJRC] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
322. Chris Buckley & Edward Wong, Doubt Greets China's Claim That Muslims
Have
Been
Released
From
Camps,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
30,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/30/world/asia/china-xinjiang.html
[https://perma.cc/M8SB-W25S] (archived Aug. 5, 2019).
323. See Is China Really Freeing Uighurs?, N.Y. TIMES: THE DAILY (Aug. 15, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/15/podcasts/the-daily/china-xinjiang-uighurdetention.html [https://perma.cc/DE5B-R33Y] (archived Aug. 17, 2019) (describing
experience of Uighur family whose family member was temporarily released under tight
surveillance and then re-detained); Mozur, supra note 140.
324. Cf. Eva Pils, The Rise of Rule by Fear, AsIA DIALOGUE (Feb. 15, 2016),
https://theasiadialogue.com/2016/02/15/rule-of-law-vs-rule-by-fear/
[https://perma.cc/55EK-FKRR] (archived Aug. 18, 2019); see also Timothy Grose, 'Once
Their Mental State is Healthy, They Will Be Able to Live Happily in Society', CHINA FILE
(Aug. 2, 2019), http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/once-their-mentalstate-healthy-they-will-be-able-live-happily-society?utmsource=HRIC+Updates&utm_
campaign=d8b8696556-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2018_12_04_ l_54_COPY_01&utm_
medium=email&utm_term=0_b537d30fde-d8b8696556-255334385
[https://perma.cc/2GX9-V9MU] (archived Aug. 6, 2019) (analyzing conflation of Uighur
identity with mental illness and "a history of C.C.P. attempts to pathologize any culture
that poses a political threat.").
325. Anna Fifield, With wider crackdowns on religion, Xi's China seeks to put state
stamp on faith, WASH. POST (Sept.
16, 2018), https://wapo.st/2FmRRAk
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example, has long been repressed, including an official requirement
that the reincarnation of a living Buddha must obtain government

approval. 326 But the policies of Chen Quanguo-party secretary of the
Tibetan Autonomous Region from 2011-2016-brought a marked
escalation in repressive policies. 327 Chen has since moved on to oversee
328
the crackdown in Xinjiang.
A further example of the Human Rights Committee's concern for

both arbitrary detention and a denial of "freedom of thought,
conscience and religion" 329 is the treatment of Christian groups. The

December 2018 arrest of a popular pastor on charges of inciting
subversion followed an uptick in repression of Christian groups and

destruction of places of worship. 33 0 As with the treatment of Muslims
and Buddhists, this is not merely a continuation of status quo denial of
religious freedom but rather a heightened government effort to control
religious groups. Eva Pils explains, "What happens in Xinjiang and
what happens to house churches is connected . ... Those kinds of new
attitudes have translated into different types of measures against
Christians, which amount to intensified persecution of religious
groups." 331
The deterioration of civil and political rights in China is far from

limited to religious practices. Turning to the treatment of people
accused by the state as law breakers, the ICCPR prohibits arbitrary
detention and requires that "[a]nyone arrested or detained on a
criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other

[https://perma.cc/47ZV-3AUC] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
326. Reincarnation of Tibetan living Buddhas must get government approval,
PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE (Aug. 3, 2007), http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/6231524.html
[https://perma.cc/DBH3-YZH4] (archived Aug. 18, 2019); see Jessica Batke, Is This the
Last Dalai Lama?, CHINAFILE (Mar. 15, 2019), http://www.chinafile.com/reportingopinion/viewpoint/last-dalai-lama [https://perma.cc/A3A3-3YAS] (archived Aug. 18,
2019) (explaining succession question once the eighty-three year-old Dalai Lama dies).
327. Beijing Defends Policiesas Tibetans Mark Anniversary, CHINA DIGITAL TIMES
(Mar. 12, 2019), http://bit.ly/2UJnP4h [https://perma.cc/7E4Q-C5KR] (archived Oct. 27,
2019); ICT's Submission to UN Committee Against Torture on China's action in Tibet,
SAVE TIBET (Nov. 16, 2015), http://bit.ly/2KP1qhp [https://perma.cc/9UWS-5UTR]
(archived Oct. 27, 2017) ("[A]lthough the PRC officially prohibits torture, it has become
endemic in Tibet, a result both of a political emphasis on ensuring 'stability' and a culture
of impunity...").
328. See Beijing Defends Policies as Tibetans Mark Anniversary, supra note 327.
329. General Comment 24, supra note 278, 1 8.
330. Ian Johnson, This Chinese ChristianWas Charged With Trying to Subvert the
State, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/25/world/asia/
pastor-wang-yi-detention.html [https://perma.cc/6HQQ-7ZBH] (archived Aug. 5, 2019);
Ian Johnson, Pastor Charged With 'Inciting Subversion' as China Cracks Down on
Churches, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2Djll1Q [https://perma.cc/BY4ZVFCD] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
331. Lily Kuo, In China, they're closing churches, jailing pastors - and even
http://bit.ly/2XIXjuF
2019),
13,
(Jan.
GUARDIAN
scripture,
rewriting
[https://perma.cc/G2MP-DN9R] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
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officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power." 332 The 2012
addition of "residential surveillance at a designated location" to the
PRC Criminal Procedure Law, however, allows people to beheld up to
six months without access to a lawyer or judicial review. 333

"Residential" means outside of official detention facilities; it does not
mean at the person's residence. 334 Joshua Rosenzweig wrote of the
law's revisions: "The fact that 'non-residential' residential surveillance
and waiver of notification of criminal detention in certain cases have

been given the imprimatur of 'law' makes them no more legitimate in
the eyes of international human rights law, which strictly prohibits
arbitrary detention and enforced disappearance." 33 5

Following detention, the Human Rights Committee's admonition
that "a general reservation to the right to a fair trial would not be
[acceptable]" 336 brings to the fore questions about trials in China. Since
signing the ICCPR in 1998, China has seen moves towards
professionalization of the judiciary along with reforms to formal
criminal procedure laws. For instance, the push for "trial centered"
reforms seeks to place more emphasis on the presentation of evidence

at trial.

337

Yet these reforms exist within "a highly legalist and

instrumentalist vision of law [that] seeks to build the legitimacy and

credibility of the political-legal regime and to more effectively control

332. ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supra note 2, at art. 9.
333. PRC Criminal Procedure Law [Zhonghua renmin gongheguo xingshi susong
fa], passed July 1, 1979, as amended Mar. 14, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 2013, art. 73 (China).
334. PRC Supreme People'sProcuratorate,Provisions on People's Procuratorates'
Oversight of Residential Surveillance in a Designated Location, CHINALAWTRANSLATE
(July
14,
2017),
https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/procuratoratedlrs/
[https://perma.cc/CV8T-QR9Q] (archived Nov. 10, 2019) ("Designated locations shall
possess the conditions for ordinary life and rest and shall be separate from places of
interrogation; they shall be equipped with surveillance equipment to facilitate
monitoring and management; and they shall possess security measures to ensure the
security of case handling.").
335. Joshua Rosenzweig, DisappearingJustice: Public Opinion, Secret Arrest and
CriminalProcedureReform in China, 70 CHINA J. 73, 95-96 (2013).
336. General Comment 24, supra note 278, ¶ 8.
337. See Implementation Opinion of the Supreme People's Courton Comprehensively
Advancing the Trial-CenteredCriminalProcedureSystem, CHINA LAW TRANSLATE (Feb.
21,
2017),
https://www.chinalawtranslate.comen/implementation-opinions-of-thesupreme-peoples-court-on-comprehensively-advancing-the-trial-centered-criminalprocedure-system/ [https://perma.cc/RT67-7RA7] (archived June 12, 2019). Compare
Reform Puts Trial in Court at Center of Justice System, CHINA DAILY (Oct. 12, 2016),

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2016-10/12/content_27031253.htm
[https://perma.cc/34SR-E8CJ] (archived Oct. 27, 2019) (describing the reform as a break
from the "decades-old model of criminal procedure centered around investigations by the
police and prosecutors"), with Elisa Nesossi, Justice Restored Under Xi Jinping: A
Political Project, CHINOIRESIE (June 20, 2018), https://www.chinoiresie.info/justicerestored-under-xi-jinping-a-political-project/
[https://perma.cc/A7VL-JTED] (archived
Oct. 27, 2019) (noting muted international praise for reforms in part because they were
"being carried out at the same time as the expansion of legally dubious tactics employed
to suppress any form of dissent").
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dissent and crime through criminal law so as to sustain Party
supremacy and social stability." 338
This repression is pervasive but not always blatant. China law
scholars have drawn comparisons to Ernst Fraenkel's work in the
1930s on the "dual state" when explaining China's current politicallegal system. 339 Hualing Fu describes this duality in China as "a

normal legal system, full of Chinese characteristics, of course"
coexisting with a "prerogative state to solve politically sensitive
matters through substantively extra-legal methods." 34 0 This duality
means that life in China can simultaneously be extremely repressive
34 1
But to enjoy that
for some people while vibrant and fun for others.

excitement requires an acceptance of loosely defined and ever-shifting
boundaries as well as an accompanying relinquishment of civil and

political rights. 342 Challenging those boundaries risks severe
reprisal. 34 3 And, as Fu cautions, the prerogative state "has become
344
The risks
more visible, expansive, and assertive under Xi's rule."
by the
are
demonstrated
party-state
the
challenging
with
come
that
and
trials,
fair
denied
been
had
who
clients
for
who
advocated
lawyers
345
an
Being
abuse.
to
subject
became
themselves
lawyers
the
then
carried
always
has
state
single-party
China's
in
lawyer
outspoken
risk.346 The magnitude of those risks heightened with the July 9, 2015,

en masse round-up of lawyers and other rights advocates, marking the
shift towards an even more repressive era. 34 7 In March 2019, a UN

338. Sarah Biddulph, Elisa Nesossi & Susan Trevaskes, CriminalJustice Reform
in the Xi Jinping Era, 2 CHINA L. & Soc'Y REV. 63, 112-13 (Dec. 2017).
339. See, e.g., Eva Pils, China Dual State Under Xi Jinping, UNIV. B.C. (Nov. 2,
2017), https://open.library.ubc.ca/cIRele/collections/ubccommunityandpartnerspublicati/
52387/items/1.0366867 [https://perma.cc/J26M-NB9G] (archived Oct. 27, 2019) (video of
talk delivered at the University of British Columbia).
340. Hualing Fu, Duality and China's Struggle for Legal Autonomy, 1 CHINA
PERSP. 1, 3 (2019).
341. Compare Shiwei Ye, UN Rulings on Arbitrary Detention in China Since 2014,
MEDIUM (Nov. 28, 2018), https://medium.com/@Shiwei.ye/un-rulings-on-arbitrary[https://perma.cc/CB85-8CHY] (archived
detention-in-china-since-2014-2f3177c24387
Oct. 27, 2019) (links to cases recognized by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, many involving human rights advocates) with Time Out Shanghai,
2019,
parties
of
dinners
and
Year's
Eve
New
Shanghai's best
4
http://www.timeoutshanghai.com/features/Nightlife-Nightlife_features/413 8/
Shanghais-best-New-Years-Eve-parties.html [https://perma.cc/5JV3-FBM7] (archived
Feb. 4, 2020) ("From fancy Bund-side parties to down and dirty alternative music gigs,
this is where to . .. welcome 2020 in Shanghai") (archived Jan. 27, 2020).
342. See Stephen McDonell, China Social Media: WeChat and the Surveillance
State, BRIT. BROAD. CORP.: CHINA BLOG (June 7, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogschina-blog-48552907 [https://perma.c/7HUV-ZXPY] (archived Aug. 18, 2019).
343. See, e.g., Fu, supra note 340.
344. Id. at 8.
345. Id. at 3, 6 (discussing the "continuous crackdown" on human rights attorneys
and the "repressive measures" taken against the entire legal profession under President
Xi Jinping).
346. See generally LIU & HALLIDAY, supra note 132.
347. See China: On "709"Anniversary, Legal Crackdown Continues, supra note 10;
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press release reported, "UN experts said human rights defenders in
China are at risk of enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention and
ill-treatment in custody for their work." 348

The UN statement was issued shortly after lawyer Jiang Tianyong
completed his two-year sentence for inciting subversion-though even
after "release" he was put under constant surveillance at his parents'
home. 34 9 Jerome Cohen coined the term "non-release release" to

describe this type of situation "when a prisoner is formally released
from prison but immediately put under other forms of official
surveillance or control."35 0 Jiang had previously been detained in
2016.351 In 2017, a group of-UN human rights experts called on China

to immediately release him, "express[ing] concern that Mr. Jiang's
'crime' apparently included communications with foreign entities,
which potentially included the United Nations human rights
mechanism." 352

Concerns extend beyond the reasons for deprivations of liberty to
include the conditions thereof. Detainees have been subject to torture
and other "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,"

see also Third Anniversary of the Lawyers Crackdown in China: Where are the Human
Rights
Lawyers?,
AMNESTY
INT'L
(July
9,
2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2018/07/china-human-rightslawyers-crackdown-third-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/8JLV-FCJZ] (archived Oct. 25,
2019) (In January 2019, for example, lawyer Wang Quanzhang was sentenced to four
and a half years in prison for subversion); Lily Kuo, Wang Quanzhang: China Sentences
Human Rights Lawyer to Four Years in Prison, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/28/wang-quanzhang-china-sentenceshuman-rights-lawyer-to-four-years-in-prison [https://perma.cc/KL9Q-DCA9] (archived
Oct. 25, 2019).
348. China: UN Experts Renew Calls for Probe into Death of Cao Shunli, U.N.
OFFICE

HIGH

COMM'R

HUM.

RTS.

(Mar.

14,

2019),

https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=24331&Lang
ID=E [https://perma.cc/QV53-LMVJ] (archived Oct. 25, 2019); see also Defending Rights
in a "No Rights Zone": Annual Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in
China
(2018),
CHINESE
HUM.
RTS.
DEFENDERS
(Feb.
21,
2019),
https://www.nchrd.org/2019/02/2018-hrd-report/
[https://perma.cc/2NXW-2RLF]
(archived Oct. 25, 2019) (discussing the "relentless persecution of human rights
defenders" in the form of arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and torture).
349. Mimi Lau, Freed Chinese Human Rights Lawyer Jiang Tianyong 'Threatens
to ProtestIf Reunion with Wife and Daughteris Blocked', S. CHINA MORNING POST (Mar.
7,
2019),
https://www.semp.com/news/china/politics/article/2189070/freed-chinesehuman-rights-lawyer-jiang-tianyong-threatens [https://perma.cc/A5NG-F5D3] (archived
Oct. 25, 2019) (Tianyong under "close watch" by police, with officers following him each
time he left home and restricting his phone access and visits with relatives).
350. Sophie Beach, Lawyer Jiang Tianyong Disappears Upon Release, CHINA
DIGITAL TIMES (Feb. 28, 2019), https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2019/02/lawyer-jiangtianyong-disappears-upon-release-from-prison/ [https://perma.cc/QBX8-665N] (archived
Oct. 25, 2019); see also Jerome A. Cohen, Human Rights Lawyer Jiang Tianyong Has
Disappearedfor Nine Days After Visiting 709 Family in Changsha, JEROMECOHEN.NET
(Dec. 1, 2016), http://www.jeromecohen.net/jerrys-blog/human-rights-lawyer-jiangtianyong-has-disappeared [https://perma.cc/K6GN-ULTE] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
351. Beach, supra note 350.
352. U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 147, $ 25.

WHY CHINA SHOULD UNSIGNICCPR

20201

which the Human Rights
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Committee lists as core rights in the

ICCPR.35 3 China has introduced legal restrictions and used technology
(e.g.,

taping

confessions)

to

reduce

misconduct

during

interrogations, 354 but the opacity of the system stymies efforts to
355
There was
ascertain the extent to which abusive practices continue.
to
Torture
against
Committee
UN
the
reaching
evidence
enough

conclude in 2016 that "the practice of torture and ill-treatment is still
356
Researchers
deeply entrenched in [China's] criminal justice system."
35 7
use of forced
have documented denial of medical treatment,
medication, 358 and extended interrogations while constrained in metal
chairs.3 5 9 Opacity is especially acute when, as with "residential

surveillance," detention is carried out at locations other than the

36 0
facilities constructed for the formal criminal justice system.
In December 2018, the detention of two Canadians in China
following the arrest in Canada of Huawei CFO Meng Wenzhou brought
361
increased international scrutiny to conditions of confinement.
During at least his initial detention, Michael Kovrig reportedly had the
lights on twenty-four hours per day, was not allowed to see a lawyer,.
36 2
At the time of
and was only allowed one consular visit per month.
writing, the Canadians are still under investigation for allegedly

353. General Comment 24, supra note 278, ¶ 8.
354. See generally Ira Belkin, China's Tortuous Path Toward Ending Torture in
CriminalInvestigations, 24 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 273 (2011).
355. See Margaret K. Lewis, Freedom from Torture, in HANDBOOK ON HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 127, at 348, 361-62.
356. Committee Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic
Report of China, 120, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/CHN/CO/5 (Feb. 3, 2016).
357. Frances Eve, China Is Risking the Lives of Political Prisoners by Denying
Them Medical Care, CHINA FILE (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.chinafile.com/reportingopinion/viewpoint/china-risking-lives-of-political-prisoners-denying-them-medical-care
[https://perma.cc/PDX8-YH3H] (archived Oct. 25, 2019) (reporting on withholding
of medical care for detainee with frostbite, psychological distress, and severe dehydration
and suggesting that his "case is not an outlier").
358. Eva Pils, A New Torture in China, ASIA DIALOGUE (Aug. 10, 2017),
https://theasiadialogue.com/2017/08/10/a-new-torture-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/DN5BRJBT] (archived Oct. 25, 2019) (reporting that detainees were given prescription
medication without being informed of their diagnoses, and in some cases, "the authorities
never even bothered to claim that the drugs were prescribed by qualified doctors").
359. Tiger Chairs and Cell Bosses: Police Torture of Criminal Suspects in China,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (May 13, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/13/tiger-chairs[https://perma.cc/J7WF-EZ58]
and-cell-bosses/police-torture-criminal-suspects-china
(archived Oct. 25, 2019) (detainees reported police strapping them to "tiger chairs" for
hours or days to deprive them of sleep, causing immobilization and swelling of legs).
360. See
Dialogue-Issue 45:
Separate
and
Unequal,
DUI
HUA,
https://duihua.org/dialogue-issue-45-separate-and-unequal/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/82P3-XJWA] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
361. See Anna Fifield, Canadian Analyst Held in China is Kept in a Cell with
Lights Always On, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2018), https://wapo.st/2YfMOKD
[https://perma.cc/6ZG3-FY9Y] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
362. Id.
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endangering national security and have yet to see a lawyer or their

families. 3 63
China is not unique in its harsh detention conditions. People
familiar with the United States' rights-depriving practices in
Guantanamo Bay, 3 64 Rikers Island, 3 65 and other sites might raise that
there would be a pot-calling-the-kettle-black scenario if the United

States-and other states that have likewise violated civil and political
rights-urged China to unsign the ICCPR.3 66 First, that other states
have violated rights does not immunize China from censure; each

state's performance should be assessed on the merits. Countries are
free to criticize each other, as seen in the annual dueling reports issued
by the United States and PRC governments on each other's human
rights practices. 36 7 Pointing out other states' transgressions starts a

conversation,

it

does

not

end

one.

Second,

engaging

in

"whataboutism"3 6 8 attempts to deflect attention to other governments'
behavior but does not change the severity of any existing rights abuses
in China. Third, efforts to create a moral equivalence, say between
Guantanamo Bay and Xinjiang, throws out the window all sense of
proportion-even one human rights abuse is one too many, but the

363. See Nathan Vanderklippe et al., CanadiansMichael Spavor, Michael Kovrig
formally arrested in China months after being detained, GLOBE & MAIL (May 17, 2019),
https://tgam.ca/2KnOyj1 [https://perma.cc/7QEN-T9E9] (archived Oct. 25, 2019).
364. See Samantha Pearlman, HumanRights Violations at GuantdnamoBay: How
the United States Has Avoided Enforcement of InternationalNorms, 38 SEATTLE U. L.
REv. 1109, 1109 (2015) (asserting that the United States' Guantinamo Bay is "globally
known for the human rights violations committed there").
365. See Erika L. Glenn, Violence at Rikers Island Lands NYC Right in Court, AM.
BAR ASS'N (Jan. 12, 2015), http://bit.ly/2IFOhEQ [https://perma.cc/468N-5LCW]
(archived Oct. 25, 2019) (reporting that "an infectious cycle of violence" was inflicted
upon teenage detainees at Rikers Island).
366. Cf. China Focus: China Issues Report on U.S. Human Rights Situation,
XINHUA
(Mar.
14,
2019),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/201903/14/c_137894687.htm
[https://perma.cc/8N7D-BEPP] (archived Oct. 25, 2019)
("China's report said the U.S. government, a self-styled 'human rights defender,' has a
human rights record which is flawed and lackluster, and the double standards of human
rights it pursues are obvious.").
367. Compare Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018, China
(Includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau), U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (March 2019),
http://bit.ly/2PinnUA [https://perma.cc/6XV6-JCXV] (archived Oct. 25, 2019) (reporting
a litany of human rights violations, such as "arbitrary or unlawful killings by the
government"; forced disappearances by the government"; "torture by the government";
and "arbitrary detention by the government"), with Human Rights Record of the United
States in 2018, PRC INFO. OFF. OF THE STATE COUNCIL (Mar. 14, 2019),
http://bit.ly/2XhYxXY [https://perma.cc/8G9E-NSVM] (archived Oct. 25, 2019) ("[I]t will
not be difficult to find that the United States government, a self-styled 'human rights
defender,' has a human rights record which is flawed and lackluster, and the double
standards of human rights it pursues are obvious.").
368. See Donald Clarke, Whataboutism: Valid and Invalid Forms, CHINA
COLLECTION (Feb. 5, 2018), https://thechinacollection.org/whataboutism-valid-invalidforms/ [https://perma.cc/KD47-6EPR] (archived June 20, 2019).
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arbitrary deprivation of liberty of approximately a million people is of
a magnitude that deserves extreme condemnation.
Other less facially egregious violations further support the case
that China is defeating the object and purpose of the ICCPR and doing
so in a manner that is creating greater distance between China's
36 9
For example, a fusing of party
practices and the convention's aims.

and state disciplinary processes may look at first glance like a
mundane bureaucratic maneuver, but China's decision in 2018 to do

just that has further codified repressive practices. The party has
always had a separate system for disciplining members. 370 In 2018,
however, a constitutional amendment created a "super-sized anticorruption body called the National Supervision Commission" that
37 1
This
makes the new body "ultimately accountable only to the CCP."

commission has the power to hold people under a system of liuzhi
(retention in custody) for up to six months, during which time people

have no access to lawyers or courts. 372 The legalization of liuzhi
continues the trend described in 2017 by Sarah Biddulph, Elisa
Nesossi, and Susan Trevaskes of "innovations designed to support the.
373
Rather than fortifying rights;,
current Party leadership's agendas."
the entwining of party and state structures is moving China further
away from the ICCPR.
Another example of China distancing itself from the ICCPR's core
guarantees is the right to "freedom of expression [including] freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers." 374 The PRC Constitution provides for freedom
of speech, but Rogier Creemers explains that "in practice, speech in
China can be very costly. Few legal norms protect expression against
state intervention." 375 Pervasive censorship led Freedom House to

369. See generally Ling Li, The Rise of the Discipline and Inspection Commission,
1927-2012: AnticorruptionInvestigationand Decision-Makingin the Chinese Communist
Party, 42 MOD. CHINA 447 (2016).
370. See id.
371. Jamie P. Horsley, What's So Controversial About China's New AntiCorruptionBody?, DIPLOMAT (May 30, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2018/05/whats-so[https://perma.cc/EYS8-9XEZ]
controversial-about-chinas-new-anti-corruption-body/
(archived June 20, 2019). See generally Flora Sapio, The National Supervision
Commission: A History of Power Limitationsand Untapped Possibilities(Apr. 27, 2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3427836 [https://perma.cc/6APS-TUC3] (archived Oct. 25,
2019) (explaining creation and powers of the National Supervision Commission).
372. See Laney Zhang, China: Supervision Law Enacted Establishinga New State
Supervisory Organ, LIBRARY OF CONG. (July 9, 2018), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreignnews/article/china-supervision-law-enacted-establishing-a-new-state-supervisoryorgan/ [https://perma.cc/BJ9C-T4KZ] (archived June 20, 2019) ("The Law grants
supervision commissions the power of retention in custody (liu zhi) in investigating
serious corruption cases." Retention cannot exceed three months, but may be extended
by another three months).
373. Biddulph et al., supra note 338, at 64.
374. ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supranote 2, at art. 19(2).
375. Rogier Creemers, The Privilege of Speech and New Media: Conceptualizing
China's Communications Law in the Internet Era, in THE INTERNET, SOcIAL MEDIA AND
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conclude in 2018 that "China was the world's worst abuser of internet
freedom . . . for the fourth consecutive year," and that the level of
internet freedom declined compared with previous years. 376 In July
2019, a Chinese journalist told The New York Times, "The space for
free speech has become so limited . . . . It's now dangerous to say you
are an independent journalist." 37 7 Censorship goes beyond removing
content to tracking carefully who is posting what content. 378 Quite
simply, the Chinese leadership decides what information people within
China's borders receive and impart. They have nailed proverbial Jell-

O to the wall. 3 79
The chill in academia has also deepened. In March 2019,
constitutional law professor Xu Zhangrun was banned from teaching
and put under investigation for writing essays critical of Xi Jinping. 38 0
Taisu Zhang commented in May 2019 on this tightening space: "Since

2015, Chinese scholars, students, and pubic intellectuals have faced
escalating levels of governmental control, intimidation, and occasional
persecution. Academic freedom is arguably at its lowest point since the
early 1980s."381
In light of the restrictions on even relatively arcane academic
criticism of the leadership, it is not surprising that there are severe
restrictions on the right to "take part in the conduct of public affairs,
directly or through freely chosen representatives." 382 The party's lock

A CHANGING CHINA (Jacques deLisle et al. eds., 2016).
376. Freedom on the Net 2018: China, supra note 135 (in June 2019, additional
newspapers were added to the growing list of blocked websites); see also Gerry Shih,
China Adds Washington Post, Guardianto 'GreatFirewall'Blacklist,WASH. PosT (June
8, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-adds-washington-post-guardianto-great-firewall-blacklist/2019/06/08/5ae4fb76-8a56-1 1e9-bla8716c9f3332ce_story.html [https://perma.cc/Y84Q-58FD] (archived June 12, 2019) ("[T]he
trend since 2013 has shown more and more foreign websites being irrevocably added to
China's blacklist.").
377. Herndndez, supra note 138.
378. See, e.g., McDonell, supra note 342 (reactivation of WeChat account
suspended for "spreading malicious rumors" after posting photos of vigil commemorating
June 4, 1989 required faceprint and voiceprint).
379. See Clinton's Words on China: Trade is the Smart Thing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9,
2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/09/world/clinton-s-words-on-china-trade-isthe-smart-thing.html [https://perma.cc/2K7B-BSMM] (archived June 12, 2019) (quoting
then President Bill Clinton: "Now there's no question China has been trying to crack
down on the Internet. Good luck! That's sort of like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall.").
380. See What Does the Punishment of a Prominent Intellectual Mean for
Intellectual
Freedom
in
China?,
CHINA
FILE
(Mar.
28,
2019),
http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-does-punishment-of-prominent-scholarmean-intellectual-freedom-china [https://perma.cc/T8FR-5MLQ] (archived June 11,
2019). For translations of Xu's work, see Xu Zhangrun Archive, CHINA HERITAGE,
http://chinaheritage.net/xu-zhangrun-%E8%A8%B%E7%AB%A%E6%BD%A4/
(last
visited Nov. 10, 2019) [https://perma.cc/W5HW-92BJ] (archived June 12, 2019).
381. Taisu Zhang, This Year, I Couldn't Avoid May Fourth, CHINA FILE (May 8,
2019), http://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpointlyear-i-couldnt-avoid-mayfourth [https://perma.cc/X23D-G2CL] (archived June 11, 2019).
382. ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supra note 2, at art. 25.
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on power has only become tighter and even the previously limited space

for local elections has contracted. 38 3 Since Mao Zedong, the party has
justified its rule based on the "People's democratic dictatorship,"

meaning the people's interests are represented despite the lack of a
384
The current leadership has emphasized
direct electoral mechanism.
in March 2018 that only the party can
stated
Daily
People's
claim:
this
38 5
fully promote democracy.

Not only is the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs
curtailed, so is the right to take part in civil society organizations. The
386
yet the
ICCPR provides a right to "freedom of association:"
repression of student Marxist groups, as Mary Gallagher explains, "is
part of a broader crackdown on labour activists, lawyers and feminists
who have all tried to build more sustained movements for social

change.

..

The party is more concerned with their ability to organise

3 87
Zheng Churan-the wife of
than with the substantive issues."
detained labor activist Wei Zhili and herself a formerly detained
women's-rights activist-is running ten thousand kilometers to draw

attention to her husband's plight. 3 88 Wei, the editor of a prolabor
website, is reportedly being investigated for the criminal charge of
"picking quarrels and provoking trouble," the same charge that Zheng
faced in 2015.389

The "right of peaceful assembly" 390 was tightly constrained prior
to Xi Jinping's rise. Kam C. Wong wrote in 2006 that "the PRC

Assembly Law makes clear that police officers should be concerned

383. See Monica Martinez-Bravo et al., The Rise and Fall of Local Elections in
China: Theory and Empirical Evidence on the Autocrat's Trade-off (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 24032, 2017); see also Freedom in the World 2019,
2
FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world- 019
(last visited Nov. 10, 2019) [https://perma.cc/MUM3-RYL4] (archived Aug. 18, 2019)
("[The Party] seeks to monopolize all forms of political organization and does not permit
any meaningful political competition.").
384. Mao Zedong, Address in Commemoration of the Twenty-Eighth Anniversary
of the Communist Party of China: On the People's Democratic Dictatorship (June 30,
1949).
Eloi4i (Mar. 1,
cick f 1&-c ,
385. 4f2! (pseudonym), IWiXR@)E
3
http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0301/c1001-29840 44.html
2018),
20,
2019).
June
(archived
[https://perma.cc/U5H9-UGYX]
386. ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supra note 2, at art. 22(1).
387. Yuan Yang, Inside China's Crackdown on Young Marxists, FIN. TIMES (Feb.
https://www.ft.com/content/fd087484-2f23-11e9-8744-e7016697f225
2019),
13,
[https://perma.cc/24SQ-NVLP] (archived Nov. 11, 2019).
388. Nishita Jha & Chermaine Lee, This Woman is Running to Save the Love of
(June
7,
2019),
BUzzFEED
NEWS
Her
Life,
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/nishitajhazheng-churan-feminist-five-chinasee also
(archived June 20, 2019);
[https://perma.cc/87VU-ETXQ]
running
@allisongrabbit, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/allisongrabbit (last visited Nov. 10, 2019)
her
(journaling
2019)
10,
Nov.
(archived
[https://perma.cc/2D72-P5B2]
#racetofreeweizhili).
389. See Jha & Lee, supra note 388.
390. ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supra note 2, at art. 21.
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with state security and social stability over and above the citizens'
right of assembly." 39 1 Today, the concern for stability above all
remains, but the police now have the technology to match it. The New
York Times explains that "the police across China gather material from
tens of millions of cameras, and billions of records of travel, internet
use and business activities, to keep tabs on citizens." 392 Efforts to
gather people for a public demonstration are hence first stymied by
challenges to coordinating a meeting place and time. 393 If a nonofficially-sanctioned demonstration is formed, then it faces the risk of
being immediately quelled. Didi Kirsten Tatlow described a small
gathering in support of women's rights on March 6, 2017-two days
before International Women's Day in an effort to evade official censure:
"[D]espite the deliberately low-nature of the event,... security guards
repeatedly chased them away, saying that banners were not permitted
in the park and that their dress [of the gowns worn by female students
when the Day was first marked in China in 1924] was 'strange[']."394
In sum, evaluating China's performance under the essential

elements test and Jonas and Saunders' proposed "facilitation test" not
only produces a litany of articles in the ICCPR that China has

transgressed, it further demonstrates that China is moving away from
compliance. 395 Or, as put by a Chinese lawyer with whom this author
spoke in June 2019, instead of "jiegui" (-,)
(literally "connecting the
rails" but figuratively used for "integration"), China is diverging from
international human rights norms. 3 96 In his June 4, 2019, testimony
to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, Carl Minzner

warned of this retrograde motion: "[T]he decision that Party leaders
took [in 1989] continues to reverberate and amplify today. And it is
now dragging the country backwards out of the reform era, raising the

391. Kam C. Wong, Law of Assembly in the People's Republic of China, 12 WASH.
& LEE J. CIv. RTS. & Soc. JUST. 155, 169 (2006).
392. Paul Mozur, Jonah M. Kessel & Melissa Chan, Made in China, Exported to
the
World:
The
Surveillance
State,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
24,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/technology/ecuador-surveillance -cameras-policegovernment.html [https://perma.cc/9QFM-QFBA] (archived June 12, 2019).
393. See Gerry Shih, Liu Xiaobo Supporters Mark His Death amid Concerns for
Widow,
AP
NEwS
(July
19,
2017)
https://www.apnews.com/2f7b967359d0462f85914314d88fe221 [https://perma.cc/7NCS5FWP] (archived Oct. 26, 2019) (reporting on the difficulties of commemorating Liu
Xiaobo, resulting in arrest of individual responsible for staging muted protest).
394. Didi Kirsten Tatlow, PostcardFrom China: Secret Video of a Women's Rights
Demonstration,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
27,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/27/insider/postcard-from-china-secret-video-of-awomens-rights-demonstration.html [https://perma.cc/W7FH-247M] (archived Aug. 5,
2019).
395. Cf. Jonas & Saunders, supra note 18, at 603.
396. Further identifying information omitted to preserve the speaker's anonymity.
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risk that China will relive even yet more tragic periods of its own
history." 39 7
3. The Impossible Performance Test
As noted in Part III, measures other than the essential elements
test and facilitation test are an awkward fit for human rights
39 9 given the
treaties. 39 8 Regarding the "impossible performance test,"

Party's thus-far unshakeable premise that its dominance is not subject
to question, it is impossible that people could freely choose their
representatives under the current party-state structure. 400 There
would need to be a fundamental shift in party doctrine and practice.
Nonetheless, the civil and political rights that China is currently

denying its citizens could, and hopefully will, someday take hold. In
that respect,

China's future performance of the ICCPR remains

possible. And, even if China never respects the rights in the ICCPR,
performance is not only possible in other countries but is already

occurring. 40 1 Subsequent performance of the ICCPR can continue, just
perhaps not in China.
The analysis is more complicated, however, when viewed from they
Human Rights Committee's emphasis on the ICCPR's rights belonging

to the people:
The rights enshrined in the Covenant belong to the people living in the territory
of the State party. The Human Rights Committee has consistently taken the
view, as evidenced by its long-standing practice, that once the people are
accorded the protection of the rights under the Covenant, such protection
devolves with territory and continues to belong to them, notwithstanding change
in government of the State party, including dismemberment in more than one
State or State succession or any subsequent action of the State party designed to
402
divest them of the rights guaranteed by the Covenant.

397. Carl Minzner, Congressional Testimony, Tiananmen at 30: Examining the
Evolution of Repression in China, CONG.-EXEC. CoMM'N ON CHINA 3 (June 4, 2019),
https://www.cecc. gov/events/hearings/tiananmen-at-30-examining-the-evolution-ofrepression-in-china [https://perma.cc/XZ8F-PJQU] (archived June 20, 2019).
398. See supraPart III.
399. See Charme, supra note 193, at 101-02 ("[T]here is a distinction between
actions that render meaningless subsequent performance of the treaty, and actions that
render impossible subsequent performance.").
400. See China's Party System is Great Contribution to Political Civilization: Xi,
XINHUA (Mar. 5, 2018), http://www.xinhuanet.comlenglish/2018-03/05/c_137015955.htm
[https://perma.ccVQG8-QF9X] (archived Jan. 20, 2020) (Xi asserted that China's system
"pools ideas and suggestions through institutional, procedural, and standardized
arrangements and develops a scientific and democratic decision making mechanism.").
401. See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITIcS (2009) (documenting examples where ratification of human
rights treaties, including the ICCPR, have led to improved human rights practices).
402. General Comment 26, supra note 272, ¶ 4.
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The phrase "once the people are accorded the protection of the
rights under the Covenant" suggests that at least ratification must
occur. 403 But what about before ratification? If the ICCPR's rights
devolved fully to the people upon signature alone, then the owners of
the treaty would be the people at that moment, as compared with
devolution occurring at the later point of ratification. In this case, the
state (through the formal government structure) would presumably not
be permitted to make "its intention clear not to become a party"404
because the owners of the treaty would already be the people. This
would, however; create a modification to the general rule of Article 18
of the Vienna Convention that is not stated in the ICCPR's text or
interpretations by UN bodies. Stripping states of the ability to unsign
would further undermine the goal of domestic debate prior to
4 05
cementing a state's commitment.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, it could be that none of the
protections in the ICCPR-other than those applicable independently
as peremptory norms 40 6-devolve to the people prior to ratification. 407
This approach would focus solely on the benchmark of ratification at
which point the ICCPR's rights would spring fully formed to protect
the people as an armored Athena from Zeus's head. During the interim
period, in contrast, the people within the state would have no claim
that the ICCPR's rights applied to them.
Regardless of what the Human Rights Committee would say if in
the future it spoke directly to the meaning of the interim obligation,

this inquiry is important today because it shifts the conversation to
asking to whom the interim obligation is owed. Just as the interim
obligation demands some minimal level of adherence to a treaty's
object and purpose albeit one far short of total compliance, perhaps for
the ICCPR at least some minimal level of devolution occurs during the
interim period. If the rights therein begin the process of residing in the
people themselves upon signature, then the transition from signing to
ratification would not be an on-and-off light switch but rather a
dimmer. Indeed, in his commentary on the Vienna Convention's
interim obligation, Oliver Dorr reasons, "If the treaty in question
entails subjective rights for individuals.. . (e.g. human rights treaties),

403. See Xue & Jin, supra note 186, at 305, 309 (There is a further issue of the
steps China would need to take to incorporate the ICCPR's provisions into domestic law.
The PRC Constitution does not stipulate either a monistic or dualistic approach, but
"international conventions on human rights do not have direct legal force in domestic
law.").
404. See Vienna Convention, supra note 19, at art. 18.
405. See supra notes 181-187 and accompanying text.
406. Cf. supra note 285.
407. In other words, one possible reading of the language in General Comment 26,
supra note 272, ¶ 4, that "once the people are accorded the protection of the rights under
the Covenant, such protection devolves with territory and continues to belong to them"
is that ratification is required to accord people any of the ICCPR's protections.
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it would seem natural that those individuals could also demand
408
compliance with the interim obligation in respect of their rights."
If China's interim obligation is understood as according the people
currently living therein a claim to the minimal protection that their

government not defeat the object and purpose of the ICCPR, then the
impossibility of two decades of retroactive performance is apparent.
Regardless of future improvements in China's domestic human rights
environment, it cannot fully remedy the violations that have already
4 09
occurred to individuals who have lived or are currently living there.
The possible impossibility of China's future performance is seen
with respect not just to individual lives but also to collections of people.
Namely, there are concerns among scholars and activists that
repression of ethnic and religious minorities could result in cultural
genocide, or "ethnocide"4 10 if cultural and ethnic practices are
irremediably lost. 411 Such extinction fits Edward Swaine's explanation

that "the interim obligation is more commonly understood to safeguard
against acts that would disable the mere signatory (or others) from
complying with the treaty once it entered into force-in an attempt to
412
If an ethnic or religious
maintain, as relevant, the status quo ante."
community is irrevocably altered, or even extinguished, today because
of repressive practices, the chance to enhance that community's civil
and political rights at some point down the road will be lost. Elise
Anderson-a scholar of Uighur music and other performing artsexplained in 2019,

408. Dbrr, supra note 20, ¶ 32.
409. See Updated: Li Wenzu Meets Husband Wang Quanzhang in Prison, CHINA
AID (June 28, 2019), https://www.chinaaid.org/2019/06/li-wenzu-meets-husband-wangquanzhang.html [https://perma.cc/EZS4-XLJP] (archived Oct. 26, 2019). The account of
jailed lawyer Wang Quanzhang's wife of her first visit in over four years exemplifies that
the absence of the rights in the ICCPR has real, daily impacts on people during the period
between signing and ratification. "Quanzhang looked more devastated, avoiding my
eyes, lowering his chin, and murmuring repeatedly, "I am fine! I am fine! The prison is
good to me!" Id.
410. See Peggy McInerny, China's XinjiangProvince:Assimilationistpolicies turn
2019),
22,
(Jan.
INST.
INT'L
UCLA
scale,
mass
a
on
coercive
[https://perma.cc/LL8Jhttps://www.international.ucla.edu/Institute/article/199647
4FEV] (archived Oct. 26, 2019) (Georgetown University Professor of Qing and Inner
Asian history James Millward said: "It's really a campaign of cultural genocide [or
'ethnocide,' as another scholar interjected]: they are trying to change the nature of
people's ethnicity to make them more pliable and Chinese.").
3,
2007),
(Nov.
Ethnocide, SCIENCESPO
411. See Lukunka Barbra,
https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacreresistance/en/document/ethnocide [https://perma.cc/2ZQ6-RCKM] (archived Oct. 26,
2019) ("[E]thnociderefers to extermination of culture and not necessary extermination
of people." It can also mean the "physical, biological, and cultural dimensions of
'genocide."').
412. Swaine, supra note 26, at 2078; see also Bradley, supra note 225, at 214-15
(interim obligation as ensuring parties do "not change the status quo in a way that
substantially reduces either its ability to comply with its treaty obligations after
ratification or the ability of the other treaty parties to obtain the benefit of the treaty.").
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"My dissertation is about a space that no longer exists." Public performance
events have dropped significantly in number over the past several years, and
prominent Uighur singers are beginning to produce songs and writings, some in
Mandarin, that overtly praise Xi Jinping ... "I think they feel they have to do
this."4 1 3

Reports are also surfacing of the removal of Muslim children from their
families in a "campaign to systematically remove children from their

roots." 414
4. The Manifest Intent and Bad Faith Tests
Turning to the final two proposed tests, the "manifest intent" test
asks whether a state's actions "seem[ ] unwarranted and
condemnable . . . regardless of actual proof of bad faith." 41 5 The scope
and magnitude of China's squelching of civil and political rights has

been condemned by UN bodies, NGOs, and a number of foreign
governments. 416 But this "highly subjective" test 417 seems more like a

summary of an analysis of a state's conduct under the essential
elements or facilitation test than a helpful, standalone measure. The
"bad faith" test's assessment whether a signatory state's actions "are
unwarranted or condemnable" 418 encapsulates a general appraisal of
China's practices but does not provide much guidance about what
exactly should be part of that inquiry, including how to gauge whether
a government made up of a varying mix of leaders over time is acting

in good or bad faith.
At a minimum, none of the proposed tests lend themselves to

supporting an argument that China has not violated the interim
obligation. While a step-by-step analysis of China's performance in
light of proposed tests for the interim obligation builds the foundation

for a legal argument, it also distracts from seeing the forest for the
trees: China's undermining of civil and political rights is so glaring,
pervasive, and expansive that any claim it is sincerely working toward
ratification fails on its face.
B. Politics
Even if a case can be made that, as a matter of international law,
China has engaged in acts that defeat the object and purpose of the

413. Zhang, supra note 381.
414. John Sudworth, China Muslims: Xinjiang Schools Used to Separate Children
From Families, BRIT. BROAD. CORP. (July 4, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-china-48825090 [https://perma.cc/9EFQ-X6Z5] (archived Aug. 7, 2019).
415. Jonas & Saunders, supra note 18, at 602 (citing Klabbers, supra note 34, at
330).
416. Id.
417. Id. at 603.
418. Id. at 602.
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ICCPR, it does not necessarily mean that states should, as a matter of
politics, recommend unsigning. This Part explains why states should
mobilize the interim obligation to confront China with its obligations
under the ICCPR. 4 19 This is a complicated, multifaceted inquiry for
which many a "Yes, but . . ." can be raised. Nevertheless, this Article

contends that, in light of accelerating concerns about China's domestic
and international positions towards civil and political rights, the
potential upsides of a call for unsigning outweigh the possible
downsides.

As an initial point, there is an important expressive function to
invoking the interim obligation whether China rejects that
recommendation or unexpectedly agrees with it. Calling for unsigning

would place China in the position of being in the spotlight to respond
how it is not defeating the object and purpose of the ICCPR. There is
nothing to stop China from repeating its routine line that it is working

towards ratification, but a refraining of other states' messaging from
the current "please ratify the ICCPR" to "please remove yourself from
the ICCPR" would, at a minimum, refresh the stale debate that has
persisted for over two decades. 420 In addition, such public pressing of
China to be forthright about its growing divergence from the ICCPR's
norms would send messages to the Chinese Party-state, pro-human
'

42
rights groups within China, and the international community.

First, jettisoning the staid encouragement that China should
ratify the ICCPR in favor of a stern, and iconoclastic, rebuke would
make plain the growing alarm over human rights abuses. Such blunt
4 22
with the international
criticism of China's "hypocritical compliance"
human rights regime would be a marked escalation in the standard
42 3
naming-and-shaming tactics.
There are many domestic and international forces that can
influence the direction of a country's human rights practices. The polite
rebukes issued during the first three UPRs have not brought China

closer to adherence with the ICCPR, though perhaps one could argue

419. JEFF HANDMAKER & KARIN ARTS, Taking Seriously the Politics of
InternationalLaw: A Few ConcludingRemarks, in MOBILISING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
'GLOBAL JUSTICE' 234 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2019) (describing legal mobilization in
part as instrumentalizing law "to confront states . . . with their obligations under
international law.").
420. Cf. Eva Pils, Human Rights and the Political System, in HANDBOOK ON
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 127, at 32, 53 (arguing for the "re-politicization" of
human rights "to address the changed circumstances of global human rights advocacy
more actively and creatively at a point in time when polities across the globe seem ready
to revert to a crude and outdated notion of national sovereignty.").
421. See Lewis, supra note 3.
422. Nathan, supra note 37, at 176.
423. Cf. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the
Human Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 INT'L ORG. 689, 689 (2008); Phillip R. Trimble,
Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 465, 466 (2002) (discussing
"shaming").
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that the regression in rights would have been even worse but for those
rebukes because the PRC leadership cares what the world thinks. 4 24
In the context of the UN Security Council, for example, Courtney Fung
argues for the importance of status, specifically that recognition from
other states plays into China's decisions whether to support
intervention. 4 25 In the context of the ICCPR, it is speculative whether
civil and political rights in China would have eroded even further in
the absence of international calls for ratification. Furthermore,
acceptance by other states of China's "be patient, we're working on it"
refrain itself has given China status: the decorum of the UPR in
Geneva provides a gloss on the realities of what is occurring within

China.
Stepping up pressure by calling on China to extract itself entirely
from the ICCPR is admittedly unlikely to change the party-state's
practices. Nonetheless, it is worth exploring this more assertive stance
because there are indications that countries seek to avoid "losing face"

in connection with the UPR process. 426 A refusal by other states to be
placated by hollow assurances of preparation for ICCPR ratification
would be a jolt to China. This matters because the official media
surrounding China's recent UPR indicates the party-state's desire to
portray the process as an affirmation of China's human rights
successes-a China Daily headline the day after the conclusion of the
UPR in March 2019 heralded "Human rights work gets UN stamp of
approval" alongside a photo of smiling women at a Xinjiang harvest
festival wearing colorful ethnic garb. 4 27 It would at least be harder for
China to propagandize the UPR process and claim a "stamp of
approval" if there was a collective voice calling for unsigning.

That said, given the tight media control, it is expected that any
action would be construed -in a light most favorable to the party-

424. See Courtney J. Fung, Is China's Influence at the United Nations All It's
Cracked
Up
to
Be?,
WASH.
PosT
(Oct.
7,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/10/07/is-chinas-influence-unitednations-all-that-its-cracked-up-be/ [https://perma.cc/X2AB-33LB] (archived Oct. 13,
2019) ("China is motivated by a variety of interests, including maximizing status
recognition from both great powers and the global south.").
425. See generally COURTNEY J. FUNG, CHINA AND INTERVENTION AT THE UN
SECURITY COUNCIL (2019).

426. See, e.g., Valentina Carraro, The United Nations Treaty Bodies and Universal
PeriodicReview: Advancing Human Rights by Preventing Politicization?39 HUM. RTS.
Q. 943 (2017) ("[T]he political element of the mechanism helps to increase the willingness
of states to seriously commit to the review in order to avoid 'losing face' with political
allies.").
427. Sun Meng, Human Rights Work Gets U.N. Stamp of Approval, CHINA DAILY
(Mar. 16, 2019), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/16/WS5c8c4bf6a3106c65c34ee
f23.html [https://perma.cc/XA3K-9UH3] (archived Oct. 26, 2019). Cf. Jerome A. Cohen,
China's
Xinjiang
Propaganda,
JEROMECOHEN.NET
(Mar.
18,
2019),
http://www.jeromecohen.net/jerrys-blog/2019/3/18/chinas-xinjiang-propaganda
[https://perma.cc/KN3P-KNMW] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
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state. 428 If a group of states actually called for unsigning, the state
media could frame it as evidence of hostile Western forces that are
seeking to exclude China from its seat at the international table. 429
Moreover, given the praise for China at the UPR by friendly
governments-based on economic and/or ideological ties 43 0-there will
remain examples of vocal support on which the state media can draw.
In July 2019, for example, thirty-seven countries issued a joint letter
in support of China following the letter by twenty-two countries
criticizing human rights abuses in Xinjiang. 4 3 1 Consequently, how a
call for unsigning would be portrayed by the PRC leadership should
not be a significant factor: the international community cannot win.
Where the decision whether to call for unsigning becomes more
complicated is with respect to audiences in China who support ICCPR

ratification and who can obtain news outside the state media. China's
signing of the ICCPR in 1998 was a victory for human rights advocates

and served as a symbolic tool to justify calls for reform. 432 This recalls
strategic use of the Helsinki Accords by reformers in the former

Eastern bloc. 433 Further, Sida Liu, Ching-Fang Hsu, and Terence
Halliday have shown how the party-state's discussion of law-based
governance "is evoked as a discursive instrument to legitimize lawyers'
fight against the authoritarian state." 434
With respect to the ICCPR, however, whatever hope and protected
space China's signature provided for reform advocacy has faded in
recent years. Law-based governance is an official part of the party's

428. Cf. Meng, supra note 427.
429. Cf. Document Nine: A ChinaFile Translation, CHINA FILE (Nov. 8, 2013),
[https://perma.cc/Y9D5http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation
LX57] (archived Aug. 18, 2019) (Party-issued document that warns against critics whose
"goal is to use Western constitutional democracy to undermine the Party's leadership,
abolish the People's Democracy . . . and bring about a change of allegiance by bringing
Western political systems to China.").
430. See, e.g., Zhao Shukun, UN PraisesChina's Progressin Human Rights, CHINA
DAILY (Mar. 21, 2019), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201903/21/WS5c92d755a3104
842260lb1la.html [https://perma.ccW7TZ-5VCL] (archived June 12, 2019) ("[T]he
Mauritius representative praised China's inclusive development, and the Nepal
representative complimented China for adhering to interactive contact in developing
human rights.").
431. 37 Countries Rally Around China at Top UN Human Rights Body,
2019),
12,
(July
PRESS
ASSOCIATED
https://www.apnews.com/a2584de07c014e4786a21bcf9f446a40 [https://perma.cc/T9AD78RV] (archived Aug. 6, 2019).
432. See, e.g., Zeldin, supra note 88.
433. See generally DANIEL C. THOMAS, THE HELSINKI EFFECT: INTERNATIONAL
NORMS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND THE DEMISE OF COMMUNISM (2001) (contending that the
Helsinki Final Act directly contributed to the demise of communism in the former
Eastern bloc).
434. Sida Liu et al., Law as a Sword, Law as a Shield: PoliticallyLiberal Lawyers
and the Rule of Law in China, 1 CHINA PERSPECTIVES 65, 65 (2019).
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platform, even if more pomp than reality. 4 35 This at least gives lawyers
empowering language that is currently being touted by the party-state.
In contrast, China's official rhetoric now unabashedly prioritizes
economic development over civil and political rights. 436 Aside from the
rote statements at the United Nations regarding ongoing preparations,
the ICCPR has all but fallen out of the party-state's vocabulary. A
December 2018 PRC white paper on "Progress in Human Rights over
the 40 Years of Reform and Opening Up in China" does not mention
the ICCPR and includes only a short section titled, "The legal norms
guaranteeing civil and political rights have been improved." 4 37
Likewise, a September 2019 PRC white paper titled "Seeking
Happiness for People: 70 Years of Progress on Human Rights in China"
does not mention the ICCPR. 43 8

This assessment that the ICCPR has lost its force as a discursive
instrument is not based on a systematic investigation of the views of
people within China who have supported a strengthening of civil and
political rights. Nor does this author claim to speak for them. An effort
to gain a better understanding of these internal audiences' views,
though difficult in the current political climate, would be helpful in this
analysis. Yet it was telling that, when asked in casual conversations in
2019 about the prospects for and importance of ICCPR ratification, a
Chinese law professor remarked that ratification does not necessarily
mean better human rights practices nor is ICCPR ratification
necessary for improving those practices. 439
Today, innovative rights advocacy is still being carried out under
the radar in China, such as by "feminist activists [who] have cultivated

a networked community numbering into the thousands, revolving
around university students and graduates." 44 0 This diffuse approach is
markedly different from prior direct appeals to the PRC leadership
that it should adhere to international human rights norms. 4 4 1 Besides,
lawyers and academics in China who disagree with this proposal could

435. See id. (discussing the March 2018 announcement of the Party's intent to
establish a "Committee on Comprehensive Law-Based Governance").
436. See Seeking Happiness for People, supra note 28 ("The right to subsistence
and development are the primary rights.").
437. ST. COUNCIL INFO. OFF., supra note 38, at 28.
438. See generally Seeking Happinessfor People, supra note 28.
439. Further identifying information omitted to preserve the speaker's anonymity.
440. Leta Hong Fincher, China's Women's Movement Has Not Only Survived an
Intense
Crackdown,
It's
Grown,
GUARDIAN
(Mar.
7,
2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2019/mar/07/chinas-womensmovement-has-not-only-survived-an-intense-crackdown-its-grown
[https://perma.cc/G4ZL-8X4D] (archived Aug. 6, 2019).
441. Compare supra notes 78, 91 (on domestic debate regarding human rights and
ICCPR ratification in the 1990s and 2000s), with SARAH BIDDULPH & JOSHUA
ROSENZWEIG, Introduction, in HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 127,
at 1, 4 (explaining that because of the "serious political challenge" they pose to the
current Party-state structure, "the main advocates of a human-rights-centered political-
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speak out against it-though those, if any, who agree might have to be
more cautious with their support given that an endorsement of this
Article's proposal would contradict the expected official response. The
process of stirring up debate over the value of the ICCPR in China
today would in itself be preferable to the official repetition of
preparation without any stated benchmarks or timeline.
If the international community pursues the approach
recommended herein, careful messaging will be necessary such that a
call for unsigning not be seen as an abandonment of hopes for improved
civil and political rights in China. Much has been written about
possible "decoupling" of the United States and China in the high-tech
industry. 44 2 Similarly, the international community's rebuke of the

party-state's retrograde motion on human rights should be
accompanied by clear support for people in China who look to the
ICCPR for inspiration. U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo's
statement on June 3, 2019, demonstrated such decoupling of
leadership and people when he commended "ordinary Chinese citizens
[who] continue to seek to exercise their human rights, organize
independent unions, pursue justice through the legal system, and

simply express their views." 443
As Jianying Zha wrote in her 2011 book Tide Players about life in
China, "[i]n the face of cheerful indifference, jaded apathy, fearful
compromise, cynical swagger, and pure evil, acts of noble courage and
idealism-or just common decency-continue to rear their head and

surge forward, sometimes when you least expect it." 4 44 These words
ring all the more true today. For those people within China who put

themselves at risk to stand up for civil and political rights, the least
that those outside China can do is to hold on to a modicum of idealism
and express support for that mission. Part of that support is making

clear that the outside world does not take the leadership's periodic
statements of preparation towards ratification at face value.

Third, a public declaration that China has failed to fulfill even its
minimal obligations as a signatory would affirm that the states making

that declaration take seriously the rights the covenant proclaims. Even

legal structure in China have come under direct attack since the ascendance of Xi
Jinping to power in 2012.").
442. See, e.g., Samm Sacks, Samm Sacks Testifies Before House Foreign Affairs
Committee on 'Smart Competition' with China, NEW AMERICA (May 10, 2019),
https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/samm-sackstestifies-house-foreign-affairs-committee-smart-competition-china/
[https://perma.cc/UF8D-WLXW] (archived June 12, 2019) ("Efforts to segregate or
"decouple" the two systems will come at a steep cost to U.S. innovation and technological
leadership.").
443. Michael R. Pompeo, Press Statement: On the Thirtieth Anniversary of
https://www.state.gov/on-the-30th-anniversary-of2019),
3,
Tiananmen (June
tiananmen-square/ [https://perma.cc/T23Q-622F] (archived June 20, 2019).
444.

JIANYING ZHA, TIDE PLAYERS: THE MOVERS AND SHAKERS OF A RISING CHINA

225 (New Press 2011).
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those rights, like freedom of expression, for which some limitations are
permitted, have aspects that are unalterable. The Human Rights
Committee has stressed that the allowed restrictions "may never be

invoked as a justification for the muzzling of any advocacy of multiparty democracy, democratic tenets and human rights." 445
A glimpse of cohesion in pushing back against China's human
rights record was seen in the March 2016 joint statement by twelve
governments-including the United States, which at the time was a
member of the Human Rights Council. 446 The statement expressed
"concern[ ] about China's deteriorating human rights record." 44 7
Similarly, in June 2019, twenty-two countries (not including the
United States) wrote a joint letter to the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights urging China to stop the mass detentions in Xinjiang. 448
A collective call for China's unsigning of the ICCPR would be an
opportunity to reengage in concerted messaging as well as to declare
that the contours of rights in the ICCPR are not so malleable as to be
contrived into whatever shape fits a particular country's idiosyncratic
views.
Coordinated messaging is, of course, not costless. It takes time and
political capital both to negotiate wording among states (even those
who are "friendly" and share similar views of civil and political rights)
and then to raise these issues with China. There are opportunity costs
to using time during the UPR or other fora to make this argument
when there are many pressing concerns, such as ongoing arbitrary
detentions. 44 9 One question then is how much more energy this
Article's approach would require as compared with repeated calls for
ratification. And, even if organizing and voicing a multilateral
response takes significant energy, that energy might be well spent
because a critique rooted in the Vienna Convention to which China is
a party provides a law-based platform for criticism.
Even if states that support a robust view of civil and political
rights ultimately issue a call for unsigning, this Article is written with

445. U.N. Hum. Rts Comm., General Comment No. 34, General Comment on
Issues Relating to the Freedoms of Opinion and Expression to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ¶ 23, CCPR/C/GC/34, Sept. 12, 2011; see also
Lewis, supra note 3.
446. Michele Kelemen, U.S. Pulls Out of U.N. Human Rights Council, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (June 20, 2018), https://n.pr/2IERwMJ [https://perma.cc/3WKN-AV2N] (archived
Oct. 26, 2019).
447. Keith Harper, Joint Statement - Human Rights Situation in China, MISSION
U.S. GENEVA (Mar. 10, 2016), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2016/03/10/item-2-jointstatement-human-rights-situation-in-china/
[https://perma.cc/Z422-C8NV]
(archived
June 20, 2019).
448. See Cumming-Bruce, supra note 22.
449. See generally Opinions Adopted by the Working Group on ArbitraryDetention
at its Eighty-Fourth Session, U.N. OFFIcE HIGH COMM'R HUM. RTS. (May 29, 2019),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Detention/Opinions/Session84/A_HRCWGA
D_2019_15.pdf [https://perma.cc/5BF7-ZJLM] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
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the expectation that China would reject the proposal and frame it as
an example of the politicization of the international human rights
regime. 45 0 The party-state leadership has become more brazen in its
pushback when faced with foreign criticism, as seen in 2017 when
451
He was
Nobel Peace Prize recipient Liu Xiaobo died in custody.
the
though
subversion,
for
allegedly
sentence
serving an eleven-year
as
conviction
his
criticized
widely
community
international
452
Following
opinions.
of
political
criminalizing his peaceful expression

Liu's death, the chair of the Norwegian Nobel Committee recalled that
Liu received the award "for his efforts to implement the fundamental
human rights secured in international instruments as well as in the
constitution of [China]."453 Liu's widow was finally permitted to leave
454
in 2018 after years of extralegal house arrest.
If, however, China did unsign the ICCPR, that would be a
refreshing admission by the party-state of its intolerance for civil and
political rights. In light of the PRC leadership's current assault on civil
and political rights, making clear its intention not to become a party to

the ICCPR would also be good for the rights therein. If and until the
pivots in a rights-protecting direction, the
PRC leadership
of civil and political rights would be better
conceptions
international
outside the ICCPR rather than enfeebling
remaining
China
served by
in the ICCPR's interpretive and
engagement
via
these rights
monitoring mechanisms.
One concern is that China's unsigning could lead to a mass exodus
from the ICCPR. There are factors tempering this concern. The only
other signatories who have not yet become parties to the treaty are
45 5
Even if all five of these
Comoros, Cuba, Nauru, Palau, and St. Lucia.
quite-small signatories suddenly voiced their intention not to become
parties, it hardly seems that the fabric of the ICCPR would unravel.
456
it is at least
For the 172 states that are already parties,
extremely difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to withdraw. The

-

450. Cf. Chinese Official Urges Human Rights Council to Avoid Repeating Past
6
Mistakes, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 16, 2016), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/201
2019).
June
20,
(archived
03/16/content_23885822.htm [https://perma.cc/QYW6-TG9P]
451. See Liu Xiaobo: ChinaRejects Foreign Criticism Over Dissident's Death, BRIT.
9
BROAD. CORP. (July 14, 2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-4060305
[https://perma.cc/8KWK-FBY7] (archived Oct. 26, 2019).
452. See, e.g., Liu Xiaobo: China, PEN AMERIcA, https://pen.org/advocacy-case/liuxiaobo/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2019) [https://perma.cc/VK3D-9KNG] (archived Oct. 27,
2019).
453. Berit Reiss-Andersen, Statement by Ms. Berit Reiss-Andersen, Chair of the
2017),
13,
(July
PRIZE
NOBEL
Committee,
Nobel
Norwegian
[https://perma.cc/7CHWhttps://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2010/statement/
7B6Y] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
454. Jane Perlez, Liu Xia, Detained Widow of Nobel Peace Laureate, Leaves China,
N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2018, https://nyti.ms/2ZjMivQ [https://perma.cc/VX9M-2B7X]
(archived Oct. 27, 2019).
455. See ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supranote 2.
456. Id.
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Human Rights Committee determined that states cannot withdraw

once they are parties to the ICCPR. 457 The committee made this clear
in its General Comment No. 26, which was issued in December 1997,
shortly after the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
was rebuffed when it attempted to renounce the ICCPR. 458 The
committee's views are not legally binding, and there is debate about
their significance. 4 59 Nevertheless, "at a minimum, good faith
interpretation of the Covenant ... obliges state parties to duly consider

the content of General Comments, as they are the product of a body
established by state parties to interpret the Covenant, as well as to
monitor and promote compliance with it." 460
While under the Human Rights Committee's view a party cannot
withdraw from the ICCPR, the UN Secretary General has taken the
position that withdrawal is possible but exceedingly difficult. When
North Korea sent notice of its withdrawal, the UN Secretary General
issued an opinion that "a withdrawal from the Covenant would not
appear possible unless all States Parties to the Covenant agree with
such a withdrawal." 46 1 North Korea failed to obtain unanimous
consent. 46 2 In 2000, it submitted its periodic report under the ICCPR
and, in 2001, participated in the review process, indicating that even
this state that is not known for its adherence to international norms
accepted the General Secretary's conclusion. 46 3
The UN Treaty Collection notes no formal requests for withdrawal
other than North Korea's attempt in 1997.464 The Netherlands

reportedly considered withdrawal as well. 46 5 Perhaps other countries
have contemplated this approach, but the quiescence since North
Korea's failed attempt indicates that other states have not openly
pushed back on the restrictive view taken by the Human Rights

Committee and Secretary General.

457. General Comment 26, supra note 272, at 2.
458. See Michael P. Scharf & Patrick Dowd, No Way Out? The Question of
UnilateralWithdrawals of Referrals to the ICC and Other Human Rights Courts, 9 CHI.
J. INT'L L. 573, 607-09 (2009); Bates, supra note 270, at 754-55 (a party to the ICCPR
since 1981, the move to withdraw was "in response to the resolution of a UN subcommission criticizing its human rights practices.").
459. See HELEN KELLER & GEIR ULFSTEIN, UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY BODIES:
LAW AND LEGITIMACY 128-29 (2012).

460. Id. at 129 (citing interview with Eckart Klein).
461. ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supra note 2 (citing art. 54 of the Vienna
Convention).
462. See Bates, supra note 270, at 755 ("At least one State, Denmark, sent a
notification to the Secretary General agreeing with his understanding of Article 54VCLT
and stating that it did not consent to the [North Korea's] withdrawal.").
463. Id. at 755-56.
464. See ICCPR, U.N. Treaty Collection Page, supra note 2.
465. See Elizabeth Evatt, DemocraticPeople's Republic of Korea and the ICCPR:
Denunciationas an Exercise of the Right of Self-Defence, 5 AUST'L J. HUM. RTS. 215, 218
(1999) (noting that "The Netherlands had considered denunciation of the ICCPR after
two decisions by the [Human Rights Committee]").
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As for possible implications on the broader human rights regime
if China actually unsigned the ICCPR, the experience of the United
States unsigning the Rome Convention in 2002 suggests that a domino
effect is unlikely-the Philippines exited the International Criminal
Court in 2019, but in doing so it became only the second country in the

world after the United States. 466
Nor would China's acceptance of this proposal eject it from being

467
or otherwise exclude it from
a member of the Human Rights Council
involvement in the international human rights conversation. By 2009,
"China [was] a party to all the core human rights treaties, except for
46 8
Many doors would remain
the [ICCPR], which is yet to be ratified."
open for engagement, including the periodic UPR process. The hope is
that mobilizing the interim obligation-and perhaps even getting
China to agree-would bring renewed candor and energy to the
discussion surrounding civil and political rights. Even if this Article's
proposal is rejected, it would still serve a useful role by shaking up the
stale routine of urging ratification as civil and political rights continue

to erode.

V. FROM ENERVATION TO INNERVATION

Changing the messaging towards China is a beginning, not an end

in and of itself. A broader discussion is needed concerning what China's
rising voice means to the international human rights regime. In
particular, strategies are necessary to stop the dilution of norms
(enervation) and, instead, to work towards fortifying those norms
(innervation). This need to innervate human rights norms is but one
facet of a larger debate about how to recalibrate engagement with
China. For example, a task force of American China specialists wrote
in its February 2019 report that China "sometimes cheats, other times
ignores, and occasionally outright opposes international law rulings
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and standards to leverage its participation in global governance forums
to push international norms in directions that benefit authoritarian
regimes at the expense of liberal democratic systems and values."4 6 9
Such straightforward criticism is a departure from more cautious
diplomatic language. It also highlights the challenge of refraining an
approach to China's rise that forthrightly addresses China's influence
beyond its borders without tipping into reactionary rhetoric.
Regardless of people's views on tone, it is naive to think that the impact
of the PRC Party-state's view of civil and political rights is felt only

within China. 470 The leadership has created a selectively permeable
membrane that allows its preferred discourse on human rights to pass
through and enter the international realm while simultaneously
attempting to block unfavorable information about domestic rights
violations from breaching the barrier. 47 1
To be clear, this concern for the external influence of China's
human rights discourse should not divert attention from its domestic
human rights situation. The international community has been
encouraging China to ratify the ICCPR for over two decades precisely
in hopes that doing so would spur improved civil and political rights
for the 1.4 billion people living in China. 4 72 These hopes have proved
chimerical and, absent a dramatic upheaval in domestic politics, the
bitterly cold climate for civil and political rights in China is expected
to continue for the foreseeable future. 47 3 Consequently, there are
extensive conversations among scholars and practitioners outside of
China regarding what avenues are still available to collaborate with
people within China on legal reform initiatives and other projects
related to human rights. 4 74 Despite the challenges-and ever mindful

469.
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2013),
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474. See, e.g., COURSE CORRECTION, supra note 470, at 37 ("Overseas governments
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to support human rights in China under these new and far more challenging
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of the risks to interlocutors in China-efforts to engage across the
membrane do and should continue. 4 75
What is seen now is a distinct concern that China's position on
human rights can simultaneously weaken human rights outside

.

China. A 2014 CCP decision makes this external push plain:
"Vigorously participate in the formulation of international norms, ..
strengthen our country's discourse power and influence in
international legal affairs, use legal methods to safeguard our
country's sovereignty, security and development interests." 476 This aim
is evident, for example, in efforts to gain international support for
China's view that crime prevention is a blanket justification for
restricting rights. 477 The United Nations' June 2019 decision to send
its top counterterrorism official to Xinjiang "risk[ed] confirming

China's false narrative that this is a counterterrorism issue, not a
question of massive human rights abuses." 4 78
It is expected that China will take on an even more vocal role in
international organizations as it grows in economic and military
might. 479 The United States' retreat from the Human Rights Council
has further opened up space for China to fill. 4 80 Andrew Nathan
explains
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through
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international

regimes-

circumstances.").
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including on human rights-China "has gained the opportunity to try
to shape the future evolution of that regime to its preferences." 4 81 And
Thomas Kellogg has noted the "intensification of long-term trends that

have been a key part of China's approach to the UN human rights
system for decades. 482 Ted Piccone has analyzed the intensification of
these trends, with China's 2017 and 2018 resolutions in the Human
Rights Council having "emphasized national sovereignty, called for
quiet dialogue and cooperation rather than investigations and
international calls to action, and pushed the Chinese model of stateled development as the path to improving their vision of collective
4 83
human rights and social stability."
China's shift from a passive presence to an active, weighty player
on the international scene gives reason to reevaluate the big-tent
approach aimed at universal participation in human rights treaties. 48 4
This reevaluation has already begun. For example, Human Rights

Watch documented how China has "work[ed] assiduously to weaken or
block key human rights reviews at the United Nations, ease important
standards, and ensure only praise for its rights record." 4 86 Similarly,
Human Rights in China has criticized China's "overt rejection of the
standards for assessing their compliance [with human rights.]" 486
Jessica Chen Weiss has noted how "China's growing economic clout has
also led other states, particularly those in Africa and Latin America
that trade heavily with China, to join Beijing in opposing human rights
resolutions in the UN General Assembly." 4 87
The conversation regarding China's efforts to disrupt human
rights norms, however, has long been largely within the Chinaspecialist and rights-advocacy communities. For example, China

481. Nathan, supra note 37, at 173.
482. Thomas Kellogg,. China Is Getting Better at Undermining Global Human
Rights, FOREIGN POL'Y (Oct. 18, 2017), https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/10/18/china-isgetting-better-at-undermining-global-human-rights/
[https://perma.cc/6WBB-9A9C]
(archived Oct. 27, 2019).
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BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/09/
FP_20181009_chinahumanrights.pdf [https://perma.cc/5RYB-UWCM] (archived Oct.
27, 2019).
484. Cf. Jose E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
213, 220-21 (2002) (pointing to Rome Statute as an example of aiming for universal or
nearly universal membership).
485. Sophie Richardson, Is China Winning Its Fight Against Rights at the UN?,
HUM. RTs. WATCH (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/12/china-winningits-fight-against-rights-un [https://perma.cc/J3XJ-F3EM] (archived Oct. 27, 2019).
486. UPR China: Will Governments Stand Firm on Accountability and Universal
Standards?, HUM. RTS. IN CHINA (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.hrichina.org/en/presswork/hric-bulletin/upr-china-will-governments-stand-firm-accountability-and-universal
[https://perma.cc/8ACB-S4WQ] (archived Oct. 27, 2019) (stating that the March 2018
Human Rights Council resolution "turned the state's accountability for the protection of
fundamental rights into something akin to a management project among states").
487. Weiss, supra note 44, at 96 (but also noting instances where China has
refrained from using its power to defend authoritarian states).
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scholar Ann Kent wrote in her 1999 book analyzing compliance,

socialization, and effectiveness in the context of China's interactions
with the UN human rights regime, "[t]o the extent that China has
sought to introduce new priorities of rights and to influence existing

UN norms and procedures, the UN human rights regime has been
under continual challenge." 48 8 Yet she expressed cautious optimism
48 9
that China had gradually begun to implement human rights norms.
In 2007, Kent observed, "[i]n general, China complies with the rules of

international organizations and treaties and its compliance has
4 90
In 2013, Kent adopted a more wary
usually improved over time."
tone, noting indicators of "a definite regression from China's
increasingly internationalist and mature responses to international
human rights engagement since 1991. If the international community

wishes to uphold the legitimacy of the international bill of rights, it
49
must now act to defend it more resolutely." 1
China's human rights record has only worsened since 2013, with
Kent warning in 2019, "[R]ather than conforming to international

rules, or even seeking to impose an alternative normative agenda,
China is turning human rights on their head and adopting the role of;
norm disruptor in the current system in the interests of its immediate:

political and strategic advantage." 492 It is crucial to engage the broadert
academic field concerned with international human rights in thisconversation about norm disruption. This conversation is all the more
salient because China's growing prominence in international human
rights institutions is occurring as the scholarly community is

questioning whether, as Samuel Moyn recently asserted, "[t]he human
rights measurement controversy of the past decade has reached its
493

limits."
There is extensive literature on the conditions that encourage

states to comply with human rights norms. For example, Goodman and
Jinks detail the mechanisms that drive the law's social influence on

the international plane. 494 They address the potential "for the diffusion

488. KENT, supra note 38, at 9.
489. See id.
490. ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
AND GLOBAL SEcURITY 4 (Stan. Univ. Press 2007).

491. Kent, supra note 253, at 76; see also Sarah M. Brooks, Will the Future of
Human Rights Be Made in China'?, in DOG DAYS: A YEAR OF CHINESE LABOUR, CIVIL
SOCIETY, AND RIGHTS, MADE IN CHINA YEARBOOK 2018 (Ivan Franceschini et al. eds.,

2019) (arguing that "a human rights system 'with Chinese characteristics' is entirely
incompatible with the demands of the human rights movement-and why the current
system, despite its flaws, is nonetheless worth fighting for.").
492. Kent, supra note 127, at 76.
493. Moyn, supra note 51, at 121.
494. See generally GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 50. Debates about mechanisms
to encourage compliance are also occurring in regional organizations, such as within the
European Union. See, e.g., Patrick Lavelle, Europe's Rule of Law Crisis:An Assessment
of the EU's Capacity to Address Systemic Breaches of Its FoundationalValues in Member
States, 22 TRINITY C.L. REV. 35 (2019) (discussing mechanisms to address breaches of
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of undesirable policies" but add an optimistic twist: "In the case of
deleterious norms, actors and institutions that have a better
understanding of acculturation can learn how to overcome or impede

the causal process." 49 5 One cited benefit of acculturation is that
"inclusive membership encourages illiberal states to define and justify
their resistance to global norms in terms of the relevant treaty
obligations." 496 While it is true that China draws on the language of
international human rights in its pronouncements to the UN, 4 97 what
deserves further attention is the extent to which this rhetoric has
shifted from benign lip-service to instead a fagade behind which the
stated norms are actually being sapped of energy. 498 Scholars including
Beth Simmons, 499 Oona Hathaway, 500 and Emilie Hafner-Burton 50 1

have explored in non-China-specific contexts the pessimistic side of
when international human rights ideals come up against the realities

of repressive states.
Today, this conversation in the academic literature has renewed
importance as China's growing heft on the international scene couples
with its effort to hollow out human rights norms. What is beyond the

scope of this Article is a deep analysis of how past research-both
qualitative and empirical-regarding human rights treaties' influence
on human rights compliance is relevant in understanding China's
behavior today. To what extent is China in 2020 challenging views
regarding the benefits of broad inclusion in human rights treaties?

While no two states are exactly alike, are there certain characteristics
about China and its approach to human rights that present special
concerns? How in the face of China's outward push do communities
that believe in robust international human rights prevent enervation
of those norms? The word enervate comes from the Latin word meaning
"out of nerve" or "sinew." 502

the "rule of law" by member states, specifically Poland and Hungary).
495. GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 50, 74-76 (explaining that their account of
norm transmission includes diffusion of "rights restricting" models of state behavior).
496. Id. at 101.
497. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS WEB TV, supra note 1 (opening statement by Mr.
Le Yucheng, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, China).
498. Cf. JEFF HANDMAKER & KARIN ARTS, Mobilising International Law as an
Instrument of Global Justice: Introduction, in MOBILISING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR
'GLOBAL JUSTICE', supra note 419, at 3 ("States may ratify human rights treaties as a
symbolic gesture in order to avoid international criticism.").
499. See generally SIMMONS, supra note 401 (exploring barriers to citizen
mobilization in autocratic regimes for fear of state repression).
500. See generally Hathaway, supra note 13 (analyzing how human rights treaty
ratification has been accompanied in some situations by increased violations).
501.

See generally EMILIE HAFNER-BURTON, MAKING HUMAN RIGHTS A REALITY

(Princeton Univ. Press 2013) (analyzing state conditions that are associated with
improved human rights).
502. Enervate, supra note 57.
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The Human Rights Committee captured this need to preserve the
core fiber in international norms in its guidance on the meaning of
"object and purpose" in the context of reservations:
So that reservations do not lead to a perpetual non-attainment of international
human rights standards, reservations should not systematically reduce the
obligations undertaken only to those presently existing in less demanding
standards of domestic law. Nor should interpretative declarations or
reservations seek to remove an autonomous meaning to Covenant obligations, by
pronouncing them to be identical, or to be accepted only in so far as they are
503
identical, with existing provisions of domestic law.

Reaffirming that states cannot unilaterally alter the meaning of
international norms via domestic law affirms the universal nature of

core human rights. Those who believe that there is an essential sinew
to international human rights should not only preserve the core fiber
of autonomous, universally shared meanings in a defensive manner

but also fortify-"innervate" 5 04-rights

such that they remain imbued

with meaning.

VI. CONCLUSION

The inviolability of fundamental human rights is under strain as

China pushes for greater recognition of countries' uniqueness instead
of embracing the universality of norms. An initial step in
reinvigorating bedrock principles would be opting for forthright

pushback against China's claims of efforts towards ICCPR ratification
instead of yet another round of polite encouragement.
As argued herein, calling on China to unsign the ICCPR would be

well-grounded in the legal scholarship's understanding of the interim
obligation. In addition, it would send a strong signal to audiences

inside China as well as affirm to international audiences the normative
force of civil and political rights.
This Article was written surrounding the thirtieth anniversary of

the June 4, 1989, massacre. The protests leading up to the crackdown
were, in part, driven by a desire for rights that are enshrined in the

ICCPR. 505 Three decades after Tiananmen and two decades after

503. General Comment 24, supra note 278, 1 19 (emphasis added).
504. Innervate, supra note 58.
505. The protests were not just fueled by students demanding democratic reforms.
A much broader swathe of the populace sympathized with the students and also had
their own concerns, including workers seeking to organize labor unions. See Robin
Munro, Remembering Tiananmen Square, THE NATION
(June 2,
2009),
https://www.thenation.com/article/remembering-tiananmen-square/
[https://perma.cc/M9FZ-JSBK] (archived Aug. 18, 2019) (describing how a workers
federation "headquartered in a couple of scruffy tents in the northwest corner of
Tiananmen Square, raised an issue that had been taboo in China since 1949: the right
of workers to engage in independent labor organization and self-representation.").

206

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OFTRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL-53:131

signing the ICCPR, China not only has failed to ratify the ICCPR but
also could not do so in good faith in light of the current state of civil
and political rights in China. Until such time as the PRC leadership
evidences a shift towards convergence with the ICCPR's norms, the
international community can best be unflinching in its support for civil
and political rights by calling on China to unsign.

Concerns about corruption, inflation, and salaries were also among the grievances. See
Timeline: What Led to the Tiananmen Square Massacre, PBS FRONT LINE (June 5, 2019),
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/timeline-tiananmen-square/
[https://perma.cc/QKN5-6NZR] (archived June 20, 2019).

